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16 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
17 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
18 **OAKLAND DIVISION**

19
20 EPIC GAMES, INC.,

21 Plaintiff, Counter-defendant,
22 v.

23 APPLE INC.,

24 Defendant, Counterclaimant.
25

Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH

**EPIC GAMES, INC.'S FOUR-
26 HOUR DEPOSITION
27 DESIGNATION**

Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
28

EPIC GAMES, INC.'S FOUR-HOUR
DEPOSITION DESIGNATION
4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH

1 Epic Games, Inc. respectfully submits the four-hour deposition designations
2 attached herein.

3
4 Dated: April 27, 2021

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP

5 Christine Varney
6 Katherine B. Forrest
7 Gary A. Bornstein
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11 Respectfully submitted,

12 By: /s/ Katherine B. Forrest
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Epic Games., Inc.’s Four-Hour Deposition Designation

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Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)**Deposition Designation of Adrian Ong
(February 24, 2021)****Time**

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
1 hour 2 minutes 19 seconds	1 minute 17 seconds

Ong, Adrian (Vol. 01) - February 24, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 01:03:32.737)****79 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 01:03:32.737)****1. PAGE 9:10 TO 9:12 (RUNNING 00:00:04.121)**

10 Q. Can you please state your full name for
 11 the record?
 12 A. Yes. Adrian Ong.

2. PAGE 9:15 TO 9:18 (RUNNING 00:00:05.141)

15 Q. Are you currently employed?
 16 A. I am.
 17 Q. By whom?
 18 A. Match Group.

3. PAGE 9:22 TO 10:12 (RUNNING 00:00:49.908)

22 Q. What position do you hold at Match
 23 Group?
 24 A. I am the senior vice president of
 25 operations for Match Group.
 00010:01 Q. What are your responsibilities as senior
 02 vice president of operations at Match Group?
 03 A. So I provide oversight to our portfolio
 04 brands on various operational areas, whether or not
 05 it's payments, customer service, fraud or various
 06 initiatives that they're working on.
 07 I'm also in charge of negotiating a
 08 lot of our partnerships across the brands.
 09 Especially those which are common across multiple
 10 brands or across some of our largest brands, and
 11 that has included in the past, you know, our Apple
 12 and Google relationship.

4. PAGE 12:09 TO 13:25 (RUNNING 00:02:36.396)

09 Q. Just stepping back, what is Match Group?
 10 A. Match Group is a portfolio company that
 11 owns, you know, most of the largest dating brands,
 12 online dating brands.
 13 Q. What were some examples of Match Group's
 14 current products?
 15 A. Tinder, Hinge, match.com, OkCupid.
 16 Q. Again, what types of products are those;
 17 what do they do?
 18 A. They're introducing singles to each
 19 other. So, essentially, an online dating platform.
 20 Q. How can consumers access those products?
 21 A. They can access them through apps. So
 22 iOS app, Android app, and then through the web. So
 23 mobile web or the desktop.
 24 Q. Are any of Match Group's dating service
 25 products available on gaming consoles, such as the
 00013:01 Nintendo Switch, the Xbox or the PlayStation?
 02 A. Not that I'm aware of.
 03 Q. Okay. Why is that?
 04 A. It's -- I just don't see it being a good
 05 fit. Number one, it's about audience. You know,
 06 I'm sure there's lots of singles who are gamers,
 07 but -- you know, I would -- I wouldn't say every --
 08 you know, there's a large -- I wouldn't say all

09 single folks are gamers.
10 And so -- and we just find that, you
11 know, majority of the audience and distribution is
12 on the mobile device. And so, you know, most people
13 have their mobile devices with them all the time,
14 which means they're able to find matches anytime
15 they want. You've got push notifications. And so
16 they're receiving alerts and messages that, you
17 know, they've got new matches or they've received
18 new messages from people.
19 Also, our apps are designed to be
20 location-based. And so they're not really -- it's
21 not really convenient to carry your gaming console
22 around with you. And so while people are on the
23 move, whether or not it's traveling from home to
24 work or wherever they are, they're able to find new
25 singles in their area.

5. PAGE 17:03 TO 17:15 (RUNNING 00:00:43.317)

03 Q. Well, just in general, how does Match
04 Group make money from its products?
05 A. Gotcha. Gotcha.
06 Yeah. We sell subscriptions, and
07 what we call our consumables or our products.
08 Q. Do you also offer in-app purchases?
09 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you describe for me first, what are
11 subscriptions?
12 A. Yes. Subscriptions are essentially
13 renewable, paid memberships that allow you to access
14 additional premium features, and they can be
15 single-month or multi-month in length.

6. PAGE 17:22 TO 18:25 (RUNNING 00:01:34.618)

22 more details, but just in general, what are in-app
23 purchases from a Match Group perspective?
24 A. In-app purchases can be either
25 subscriptions or consumables that are purchased via
00018:01 the -- within the app.
02 Q. So what are some examples of Match
03 Group's, what you're calling consumables, in-app
04 purchases?
05 A. Things such as a Super Like that you can
06 purchase on Tinder. Or a Boost. You know,
07 essentially, a Boost will expose you to and give you
08 more exposure to additional people for a fixed
09 period of time.
10 Q. What is a Super Like?
11 A. Super Like is essentially letting
12 someone else know that you're interested in them,
13 but it's -- it provides more emphasis on it so that
14 you can be differentiated.
15 Q. If a Tinder user would like to purchase
16 a Super Like or a Boost, like, how does that work in
17 the app?
18 A. Essentially, they can -- when they --
19 they can go into the app, decide that they want to
20 boost themselves for a period of time, click on the
21 button, you know, essentially, they will be
22 presented with the option for the Boost.
23 You can purchase, the in-app window
24 will pop up, and then touch your thumbprint, touch
25 ID, and you can go through with it.

7. PAGE 20:15 TO 20:22 (RUNNING 00:00:21.737)

15 Q. In your role as senior vice president of
16 operations, are you familiar with Match Group's data
17 analytics work?
18 A. Yes. I'm -- I receive reports from them
19 on a regular basis.
20 Q. Do you use those reports in making
21 decisions in your job?
22 A. I do.

8. PAGE 21:23 TO 21:25 (RUNNING 00:00:07.238)

23 Do you have in front of you the
24 exhibit that we've marked as Exhibit PX-863?
25 A. Yes.

9. PAGE 22:10 TO 23:05 (RUNNING 00:01:14.411)

10 Q. Do you recognize the entirety of Exhibit
11 PX-863?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What is it?
14 A. It's Tinder US. It's Tinder US data on
15 downloads and revenue and unique users.
16 Q. Does Match Group collect data of this
17 type during the ordinary course of its business?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Does Match Group compile data of this
20 type during the ordinary course of its business?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you use information of this type in
23 the ordinary course of conducting your business for
24 Match Group?
25 A. I do.
00023:01 Q. Does the information in this sheet, to
02 the best of your understanding, accurately reflect
03 Tinder's data as it is collected in the ordinary
04 course of business?
05 A. Yes.

10. PAGE 23:09 TO 23:17 (RUNNING 00:00:41.315)

09 How can users access Tinder today?
10 A. Through the iOS app, through the Android
11 app, and also through web, so mobile web and desktop
12 web.
13 Q. When Tinder was initially launched in
14 2012, could users access it through the web?
15 A. No.
16 Q. When was Tinder launched on the web?
17 A. Roughly 2017.

11. PAGE 24:17 TO 25:05 (RUNNING 00:00:46.769)

17 Q. So what, if anything, did Match do to
18 attempt to grow Tinder through the web once it was
19 launched in 2017?
20 A. There was PR. There was quite a fair
21 bit of PR around it. There was marketing campaign
22 pushes, et cetera, so...
23 Q. Did Match do anything with the price of
24 Tinder through the web in order to attempt to
25 attract users?
00025:01 A. It is cheaper than what it is in the app
02 stores.
03 Q. Is Tinder through the web cheaper today
04 than Tinder through the app stores?
05 A. Yes.

12. PAGE 25:14 TO 26:05 (RUNNING 00:01:08.980)

14 Q. Has Tinder through the web been
 15 successful?
 16 A. In the sense that it launched, not in
 17 the sense of real numbers relative to the app sales.
 18 Q. What do you mean "not in the sense of
 19 real numbers relative to" --
 20 A. The app sales just dominate. I mean,
 21 that's where the audience is. That's -- you know,
 22 the majority of our revenue continues to be driven
 23 by the app sales, through the app sales.
 24 Q. So Tinder Online has been available
 25 since 2017.
 00026:01 Since that time, has the app version
 02 of Tinder been increasingly successful, the same
 03 level of success, or has it seen diminishing
 04 success?
 05 A. It's seen increasing success.

13. PAGE 28:09 TO 28:22 (RUNNING 00:01:18.435)

09 Q. So what percentage of Tinder revenue in
 10 2020 came from the web version of Tinder?
 11 [REDACTED]
 12 Q. Then what proportion of Tinder's revenue
 13 in 2020 came from the mobile app version of Tinder,
 14 irrespective of the particular platform?
 15 [REDACTED]
 16 Q. In 2020, for how many years had the web
 17 version of Tinder been available, roughly?
 18 A. Three, three years.
 19 Q. Had the web -- was the -- is the price
 20 of Tinder on the web cheaper, more expensive or the
 21 same than the version of Tinder through the app?
 22 A. It is cheaper.

14. PAGE 28:24 TO 30:25 (RUNNING 00:03:02.239)

24 Has Match Group seen meaningful
 25 switching from Tinder on mobile to Tinder on the
 00029:01 web?
 02 A. No.
 03 Q. Do you have a view as to why not?
 04 A. Yeah. I mean, that the apps just have
 05 persistence; meaning, they're always on the phone.
 06 You know, typically, on the homepage or, ideally, on
 07 the homepage, which means you're going to access
 08 it -- you know, I think that persistence is
 09 important because, to me, it's out of sight, out of
 10 mind. And so, you know, I could be going to -- I
 11 may be thinking about checking my messages, and if I
 12 see the Tinder app there, I may think about clicking
 13 on it even though that wasn't my original intention
 14 for, you know, unlocking my phone. Through that,
 15 it's also able to push notifications to you, if
 16 you've got new matches, you've got new messages.
 17 Again, you've got native swiping,
 18 which we invented and which became famous on Tinder.
 19 And then, obviously, you've got -- you know, our --
 20 our apps are location-based. And so that's a lot
 21 smoother if you try to do things like swiping. In a
 22 browser, you can accidentally go back in the
 23 browser, things like that. It's just not smooth.
 24 So, ultimately, that's just where
 25 our audience is and so we've sort of pushed the
 00030:01 efforts on web, and we'd love to see more sort of
 02 traffic and usage there, it's just not the same as

03 having an app.
 04 Q. One of the features you mentioned was
 05 geolocation on the mobile app.
 06 Can you explain why that feature of
 07 mobile devices is important to users of a service
 08 like Tinder?
 09 A. Yeah.
 10 So we don't ask users for a fixed
 11 location. So back in the day of sort of websites,
 12 you would typically ask -- you know, I would say,
 13 I'm from Dallas, Texas. The way that they work
 14 today, most of the time, is that they don't
 15 necessarily have to collect that information unless
 16 it's for billing purposes.
 17 And so the way the app works is it
 18 will deliver singles in the area that you're in,
 19 which means it also works when you are traveling,
 20 when you are on the go, and so it's key for its
 21 functionality.
 22 Q. You also testified that push
 23 notifications are an important feature of mobile
 24 app --
 25 A. Yes.

15. PAGE 31:22 TO 31:24 (RUNNING 00:00:14.074)

22 Q. So the question is, can you please
 23 explain why push notification is important to Match
 24 for its product Tinder?

16. PAGE 32:01 TO 32:07 (RUNNING 00:00:21.645)

00032:01 A. Yes, it will notify -- it will notify
 02 the user if they have -- it's the main mechanism to
 03 notify users if they have new messages, new matches,
 04 essentially, like, telling you, you've got a new
 05 text message or a new voicemail.
 06 Q. Why is that important for users of a
 07 dating app like Tinder?

17. PAGE 32:10 TO 32:22 (RUNNING 00:00:45.483)

10 A. It essentially increases activity on the
 11 app, and ensures that, you know, users are
 12 responsive and increasingly active.
 13 Q. Changing topics a bit.
 14 For what types of mobile devices are
 15 Match Group's app available?
 16 A. What types of mobile devices? IOS and
 17 Android devices.
 18 Q. In your capacity as senior vice
 19 president of operations, are you involved with
 20 Match Group's distribution of apps on both iOS and
 21 Android?
 22 A. Yes.

18. PAGE 33:08 TO 33:16 (RUNNING 00:00:29.241)

08 Q. How does Match Group distribute its app
 09 on the iOS operating system?
 10 A. Through the App Store.
 11 Q. How else?
 12 A. The app itself, no other way. That's
 13 it.
 14 Q. Why is that?
 15 A. There's no other option.
 16 Q. Why is there no other option?

19. PAGE 33:18 TO 34:07 (RUNNING 00:01:15.461)

18 A. Apple doesn't give you a choice. You
 19 have to use the App Store.
 20 Q. If it were permitted, would Match Group
 21 consider distributing its apps to iOS users in some
 22 other way?
 23 A. Yes, we -- we would explore that.
 24 Q. What benefits to Match would there be of
 25 distributing Match Group's apps to consumers
 00034:01 directly, and not through the App Store?
 02 A. We wouldn't have to use in-app payments,
 03 or IAP, and I think that part is key. Obviously,
 04 that would -- you know, that depends what the
 05 alternative would be, but that would result in, you
 06 know, better margins. It would allow us to price
 07 our products cheaper, like we do on the web.

20. PAGE 34:14 TO 37:07 (RUNNING 00:03:47.190)

14 Does the requirement that Match
 15 Group sell its apps through the App Store permit
 16 Match Group to transact directly with the end users?
 17 A. We are not able to transact -- users are
 18 not able to transact directly with us.
 19 Q. Would there be benefits to Match Group
 20 from being able to transact directly with the end
 21 users of your products?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. What would some of those benefits be?
 24 A. Again, we would not pay the margins of
 25 the 30 percent to Apple, which in turn would result
 00035:01 in lower prices for customers. Roughly, it costs
 02 less than 5 percent, you know, to manage payments,
 03 refunds, all of that.
 04 If you look at PayPal, it's under
 05 2 percent to use PayPal. And the App Store, in-app
 06 payments, PayPal is an option there, so I'm not sure
 07 why we're paying 30 percent when it costs us less
 08 than 2 percent to use exactly the same payment
 09 method.
 10 It's important also from a customer
 11 relationship standpoint. You know, customers are
 12 used to approaching a brand directly for any of
 13 their concerns.
 14 So I would say, paying customers are
 15 our priority. So it's extremely strange and
 16 abnormal for customers to have to reach out to the
 17 main company for all general customer inquiries, and
 18 then have to reach out to another company as it
 19 pertains to the -- their paid experience.
 20 So, you know, for example, we -- if
 21 we -- if a user is contacting us and they're having
 22 a poor experience, we're not able to issue them a
 23 refund. We have to point them to Apple. If they
 24 can't get a refund from Apple and they complain to
 25 us, there's nothing we can do about it.
 00036:01 And we've seen, you know -- we've
 02 seen one-star ratings in the App Store because they
 03 had a poor refund experience with Apple, which kind
 04 of seems to be unfair because, you know, not only do
 05 you have a poor customer experience, but, you know,
 06 typically, what that means is if you have a poor
 07 customer experience, you associate it directly with
 08 that product, right.
 09 So even if the product is working
 10 100 percent and working great, if I have a poor
 11 customer experience, I'm just going to think that

12 brand as a whole -- I'm just going to have negative
13 connotations with that brand.

14 In that case, it seems to be unfair
15 because we didn't manage that customer experience,
16 right. When it came to the payment, we have no
17 choice.

18 So as a result -- and then we get a
19 negative one-star rating -- you know, we get a
20 run-star rating on the Apple App Store for something
21 which we have no control. So I think, you know,
22 managing that customer relationship is going to be
23 important.

24 And then one other thing that we do,
25 when we manage the payment, we also use that
00037:01 information to provide additional checks which are
02 relevant in our category. So we will run, for
03 example, a registered sex offender check for using
04 some of that billing information, and because when
05 we process users through IAP, we don't receive that
06 information, so we don't run registered sex offender
07 checks for iOS users.

21. PAGE 37:25 TO 38:11 (RUNNING 00:00:37.861)

25 Q. Just to local sense, so does Match Group
00038:01 process customer purchases of either subscriptions
02 or in-app purchases for its iOS apps?

03 A. Not directly, no.

04 Q. So who does that?

05 A. Apple does that.

06 Q. Who else?

07 A. No one else.

08 Q. Why is that?

09 A. So for products such as ours, we are
10 forced to use Apple's in-app payment system.

11 Q. Forced how?

22. PAGE 38:13 TO 39:02 (RUNNING 00:00:45.619)

13 A. If we -- if we don't do it, you know,
14 our app will not get approved. If we are not using
15 in-app payments, our app will not get approved.

16 Q. When you say "not get approved," you
17 mean not get approved by Apple; correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Does Match Group pay a fee to Apple in
20 connection with this in-app payment processing?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. How much?

23 A. It's 30 percent for subscribers under a
24 year, and it's 15 percent after a year, but
25 essentially, it equates to 30 percent because most
00039:01 daters are not subscribed to the app for longer than
02 that.

23. PAGE 39:16 TO 39:24 (RUNNING 00:00:32.729)

16 Q. Assume that Apple imposed no
17 restrictions; what would Match do with respect to
18 payment processing within iOS?

19 A. We would offer our own payment system.
20 We would run registered sex offender checks. We
21 would reduce pricing, if users paid that through
22 that method. And essentially, we would direct
23 customers, if they had refunds, directly to our
24 customer service.

24. PAGE 41:12 TO 42:09 (RUNNING 00:01:23.496)

12 Q. In one of your earlier answers, you
13 mentioned that Match Group would prefer to use its
14 own payment processor on iOS; correct?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. How do you know that Match Group could
17 successfully create its own payment processor?
18 A. I mean, we've run -- I mean, I've done
19 payment processing and Match has and we've done it
20 for subscriptions for -- we've managed it for over
21 20 years now; probably longer than almost anyone out
22 there as it pertains to digital subscriptions.
23 We've launched it on Google Play,
24 and I was part of that project. But, you know, we
25 worked on -- we started rolling out, I believe,
00042:01 in -- around 2017, 2018, and that's been a success.
02 Q. You just testified that we launched it
03 on Google Play in 2017 or 2018.
04 What did you launch on Google Play
05 in 2017 or 2018?
06 A. We launched an option for users to pay
07 directly using Tinder's payment system. So I should
08 clarify. It's on Android -- I should say, on
09 Android versus Google Play.

25. PAGE 43:04 TO 44:19 (RUNNING 00:02:23.632)

04 Q. Mr. Ong, you just testified that
05 Match Group had developed its own payment processor
06 for Tinder for use on Android; correct?
07 A. That's correct.
08 Q. Is that payment processor currently in
09 use?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can you explain how it works?
12 A. Yes. Essentially, users will select
13 what subscription package or what product they want
14 to purchase, and then they would be presented an
15 option to pay using Tinder's payment system or using
16 Google Play.
17 Q. What price does Match Group charge for
18 purchases made through its payment processor on
19 Android, as compared to the price to consumers of
20 using Google Play?
21 A. The same.
22 Q. Why is that?
23 A. Google requires us to have pricing
24 parity.
25 Q. How does the sign-up process for using
00044:01 Tinder's payment processor on Android compare to
02 using Google's payment processor on Android?
03 A. When you say the "sign-up process," you
04 mean the process of entering in the payment
05 information?
06 Q. I'm just trying to get at from a user's
07 perspective, which requires more steps. To use the
08 Tinder payment processor, or to use the Google
09 Android processor?
10 A. If the user hasn't transacted before
11 using Tinder's payment system, they have to complete
12 more fields. They have to fill in their credit card
13 or debit card information.
14 So, you know, that's -- yeah, it's
15 quite a few fields versus clicking on Google Play.
16 Q. So you charge the same price as Google,
17 and at least for the initial sign-up, it's more
18 difficult for the user to use Tinder's payment

19 processor than Google.

26. PAGE 45:01 TO 46:10 (RUNNING 00:02:02.142)

00045:01 Has your payment processor been
 02 successful on Android?
 03 A. Yes.
 04 Q. Are -- is Match Group able to analyze
 05 which payment option users select?
 06 A. Yes.
 07 Q. How does it do that; does it do it by
 08 user account basis?
 09 A. We can look at the user account, and we
 10 can see what payment option they picked,
 11 essentially, yes.
 12 Q. Do you track that data?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. What does it show?
 [REDACTED]
 17 Q. If you turn back to Exhibit PX-863, and
 18 if you turn to the page ending in MATCH-40, MATCH
 19 4-0.
 20 A. Yeah.
 21 Q. Does this document describe the revenue
 22 that Match has received from the Google Play option
 23 and also the Tinder payment processing option?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Can you explain what it shows?
 00046: [REDACTED]
 03 through Tinder's payment.
 04 Q. You're focusing on the year 2020;
 05 correct?
 06 A. Correct.
 07 Q. When did Match begin offering its own
 08 payment system for Tinder through Android?
 09 A. I guess it was fully rolled out in --
 10 well, starting to be rolled out in 2019.

27. PAGE 46:13 TO 46:15 (RUNNING 00:00:11.743)

13 Do you believe that Tinder's own
 14 payment processor has been successful on Android?
 15 A. Yes.

28. PAGE 46:17 TO 47:07 (RUNNING 00:01:05.129)

17 Q. To what, if anything, do you attribute
 18 that success?
 19 A. I think users just -- I mean, you know,
 20 giving users choice. Users also like to interact
 21 directly with the brand. You know, they don't
 22 think -- when they are using a Tinder app, they
 23 don't think of that -- you know, they don't -- they
 24 think they're interacting with Tinder. They don't
 25 think they're interacting with Google, or they're --
 00047:01 you know, they're on the Android device, so from
 02 that perspective, they know that if they have any
 03 customer issues, as a subscriber, they can contact
 04 us, and we can resolve the issue.
 05 Q. Have there been any security problems
 06 with Tinder's payment processor on Android?
 07 A. No.

29. PAGE 47:15 TO 48:01 (RUNNING 00:00:34.157)

15 Q. Between using Tinder Pay directly and
 16 the -- compared to when the platform is controlling

17 the payment processing, have there been any security
18 improvements from using the direct method as opposed
19 to the platform?

20 A. I don't know about security improvements
21 because I don't have full insight into the
22 platform's payment system.

23 I know from a safety perspective, we
24 can run the registered sex offender check and
25 explore avenues similar to that when we are

00048:01 controlling the payment system.

30. PAGE 48:04 TO 48:10 (RUNNING 00:00:18.129)

04 Who handles customer transactions
05 for Match Group's apps on iOS?

06 A. Apple does.

07 Q. Who provides customer service with
08 respect to billing and subscription issues from
09 Match Group's iOS users?

10 A. Apple.

31. PAGE 48:14 TO 48:19 (RUNNING 00:00:16.556)

14 Q. Does Match have its own customer service
15 group?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What restrictions does Apple impose on
18 Match's ability to provide customer service to users
19 on iOS?

32. PAGE 48:21 TO 51:06 (RUNNING 00:03:16.127)

21 A. We're unable to provide refunds, and we
22 don't have any visibility into Apple's refund
23 policy. So, you know, just -- just to clarify a
24 bit, you know, Match is -- you know, if you look at
25 our brands, we're very focused on customer

00049:

03 So we have full flexibility when we
04 are in control of the payment system. We have full
05 refunds. We have prorated refunds. We can comp and
06 give free days to people.

07 What is -- you know, what is crucial
08 in that is that, you know, in order to provide a
09 refund, you need to be able to assess that
10 customer's activity and their profile. So, you

[REDACTED]

18 experience. We want to make sure that that person
19 is taken care of so that they will try the app
20 again.

21 You know, people -- there's a lot of
22 singles who date for -- you know, might be in a
23 relationship for a year, but then, you know, that --
24 that relationship ends, and they come back again.

25 So there's a lot of repeat behavior
00050:01 until, you know, that person eventually gets
02 married.

03 So it's -- you know, there's a
04 cyclical nature to this, and so it's important that
05 they have a good customer experience because even --
06 we want them to be successful, and if they are

07 successful, we want them to come back, you know, if,
08 let's say, that relationship falls out, so...

09 Q. Again, how does Apple's restrictions
10 prevent Match from doing the things that you just
11 mentioned?

12 A. We -- we can't -- we can't provide the
13 refund, nor does Apple when they're assessing
14 whether or not that person should get a refund or
15 not, be able to see any of that information to
16 determine that.

17 Q. If an iOS user of Tinder would like to
18 cancel his or her subscription, who handles that
19 cancelation request?

20 A. So they can either cancel it themselves
21 through Apple settings, and not through the app, or
22 they have to contact Apple's customer service. We
23 have users contacting us to -- you know, to try to
24 get refunds. We just have to direct them to Apple,
25 or if they don't get a good result, or they don't
00051:01 get any -- you know, a good customer service
02 experience or the refund that they wanted, they'll
03 try to contact us, and we'll have to --
04 unfortunately, we have to tell them there's not much
05 we can do, and we have to redirect them back to
06 Apple again.

33. PAGE 56:03 TO 56:04 (RUNNING 00:00:06.953)

03 Q. In your experience, does the Apple App
04 Store drive users to Match Group's products?

34. PAGE 56:06 TO 57:01 (RUNNING 00:01:16.500)

06 A. It's been a minimal contribution.
07 I've -- we've looked at data
08 historically, and typically it's in the [REDACTED]
09 digits. So it's less than -- let's just say less
10 than [REDACTED] percent has been driven through Apple either
11 featuring the apps, but, you know, some of it comes
12 through things like rankings, which I don't really
13 sort of -- would say it's Apple's contribution
14 because obviously as we do -- as we become more
15 popular, we go higher up the rankings, so there's
16 effort on our part, but about [REDACTED] percent or
17 potentially more -- it depends by brand. [REDACTED] percent
18 of users are using the App Store as a vehicle to
19 search for the app, meaning they're going to the App
20 Store, typing in "Tinder." So they already know
21 what they're looking for. They just have to go
22 through the App Store in order to download the app.

23 So they're typing it in, finding the
24 app, and then downloading it, which essentially
25 means, we're driving users to the App Store, not the
00057:01 other way around.

35. PAGE 57:20 TO 57:22 (RUNNING 00:00:09.283)

20 Q. I'm showing you a document that's
21 marked -- well, it's Bates stamped Apple App Store
22 06147190.

36. PAGE 58:08 TO 58:10 (RUNNING 00:00:08.483)

08 Q. Now, do you see there's an e-mail from
09 you to someone at Apple dated June 7, 2018?

10 A. I do.

37. PAGE 58:20 TO 59:16 (RUNNING 00:01:07.213)

20 Q. Okay. If you look at the second bullet
 21 in your e-mail that says, "Rev share."
 22 You see that?
 23 A. Yeah. Yes.
 24 Q. The second sub-bullet under that reads,
 25 "Apple drove minimal new discovery, approximately █
 00059:01 percent, while the majority were users organically
 02 looking for our apps, approximately █ percent."
 03 Do you see that?
 04 A. Yes.
 05 Q. What did you mean when you wrote that?
 06 A. I meant that █ percent of our users
 07 were typing in the brand, meaning Tinder, Match.
 08 They weren't typing in "dating." They were
 09 specifically looking for the brand. And so, you
 10 know, essentially, we were driving users to the App
 11 Store and Apple was only driving new users -- or
 12 driving users to our app, and that contribution was
 13 █ percent during that period.
 14 Q. So when Match Group drives users to
 15 Apple's App Store, what impact does that have on
 16 Apple?

38. PAGE 59:18 TO 60:18 (RUNNING 00:01:21.123)

18 A. Well, if a -- I think there's a couple
 19 of ways.
 20 One is when they go to the App
 21 Store, typically, what we'll see is we'll see
 22 competitors -- you know, if someone types in
 23 "Tinder," for example, within the App Store, they'll
 24 see our app, but Apple is actually -- sells
 25 advertising space just above that. And so sometimes
 00060:01 you will see our competitors. I believe we've seen
 02 sites like Ashley Madison, for example, be
 03 advertised above -- so even though the user typed in
 04 "Tinder," was looking for Tinder, they're first
 05 presented with an ad, potentially, of a competitor,
 06 and I've seen Ashley Madison there before, before
 07 they can even download Tinder. So they'll monetize
 08 ads for other apps, you know, before the user can
 09 even download the app.
 10 Once the user downloads the apps,
 11 obviously, if we're pushing users to the App Store,
 12 they have to use in-app payments, and so they'll
 13 take roughly 30 percent of any revenue gained from
 14 that.
 15 Q. Okay. Once the user has downloaded the
 16 app onto iOS, what role does Apple play in
 17 generating in-app purchases through a product like
 18 Tinder?

39. PAGE 60:20 TO 60:23 (RUNNING 00:00:10.335)

20 A. Nothing.
 21 Q. What percentage of the price that a user
 22 pays for in-app purchases in a product like Tinder
 23 does Apple take?

40. PAGE 60:25 TO 61:04 (RUNNING 00:00:13.926)

25 A. Majority of the time in our use case, 30
 00061:01 percent.
 02 Q. When Match Group innovates and drives
 03 more in-app purchases on a product like Tinder, what
 04 impact does that have on Apple?

41. PAGE 61:06 TO 61:18 (RUNNING 00:01:00.318)

06 A. Apple takes 30 percent of those revenue
07 gains.
08 Q. Have you raised this issue with Apple?
09 A. We have.
10 Q. What was Apple's response?
11 A. It's just the way our rules work, and
12 this is -- these are our policies, and it's --
13 it's very hard to change them. But I don't believe
14 that's the case, because we've seen recent changes
15 for digital goods and subscriptions in the recent --
16 just even in the past 12 months where virtual
17 one-on-one classes were paying 30 percent and now
18 they're not, so...

42. PAGE 62:03 TO 62:05 (RUNNING 00:00:07.010)

03 Q. In your view, does Apple's developer
04 support justify it charging the 30 percent
05 commission it takes?

43. PAGE 62:07 TO 62:16 (RUNNING 00:00:31.719)

07 A. No.
08 Q. Why not?
09 A. Because it provides support to apps who
10 are not paying the 30 percent. Again, you know, a
11 lot of the time, they are promoting new features
12 that they're releasing that they want us to utilize.
13 A lot of the time, they're not features that we can
14 utilize, so...
15 Q. What has been your experience with
16 Apple's App Review process?

44. PAGE 62:18 TO 63:03 (RUNNING 00:00:43.755)

18 A. I think it's been an inconsistent
19 experience in terms of their guidelines and rules,
20 which they state are clear, but they clearly are
21 not. And then, you know, it's just been time -- and
22 because of that, it's just been time-consuming for
23 us in terms of operating a business. We've gone
24 back and forth multiple times on various app review
25 issues. Many, many cycles, there have been times
00063:01 when it has last months, so...
02 Q. Do you perceive Apple's app review
03 process to be a benefit to Match Group?

45. PAGE 63:05 TO 64:16 (RUNNING 00:01:57.455)

05 A. I would say, majority of the time,
06 they're hindering us from releasing new changes and
07 slowing us down.
08 Q. Can you give some specific examples of
09 what you identified as inconsistencies in the app
10 review process?
11 A. Sure.
12 So they have released new policies
13 without informing us in advance. So, basically, we
14 have no notice. And then after the fact, we worked
15 with their team -- this was specific to some rate
16 card changes, basically the display of pricing and
17 products on our brands.
18 And the way we worked with them was,
19 essentially, we sent them a mock-up or a design in
20 advance. So after this was sort of rolled out, we
21 sent a design or mock-up, just so that we wouldn't
22 have multiple iterations. And we didn't actually

23 have to send it through app review yet, but we went
24 through their app business management team.
25 We then sent it to app review and
00064:01 reviewed it with app review. And they said, this
02 design will be okay, you can proceed with your
03 engineering and development work and design work, so
04 that's what we did. And we did it across multiple
05 brands because we had been provided the guidance
06 from Apple that this was looking good, and we had --
07 and they had reviewed it with multiple teams
08 including app review.
09 And, ultimately, when we submitted
10 it in full review, we then got rejected. And so
11 there was a lot of back and forth, and a lot of it
12 was because their guidelines were not clear and
13 concise and, actually, subjective and up for
14 interpretation.
15 And so what you're -- what went over
16 for several months was --

46. PAGE 65:01 TO 65:17 (RUNNING 00:00:56.870)

00065:01 What we saw was -- again, I don't --
02 I don't know who's in app review, but we saw
03 approvals from certain app reviewers for the same
04 design, and then rejections. We've seen
05 historically an app or a certain page be approved
06 more than five times by the app review -- app review
07 team, and then let's say on review eight of the same
08 page, which has not changed at all, suddenly get
09 rejected.
10 And then -- and so, you know, I
11 think there's even disagreement within the app
12 review team because, you know, there's -- the
13 guidelines were written in such a way where they
14 were opened up for subjective interpretation, so...
15 Q. What impact, if any, does that process
16 have on Match Group's incentive to innovate within
17 the iOS ecosystem?

47. PAGE 65:19 TO 65:25 (RUNNING 00:00:23.324)

19 A. I mean, it slows us down. It doesn't
20 get our product -- our new features out to users as
21 quickly. You know, and we end up burning
22 engineering and design cycles and product cycles
23 going back and forth on something that Apple itself
24 can't even agree on, versus getting new features
25 out.

48. PAGE 66:01 TO 66:04 (RUNNING 00:00:10.544)

00066:01 So you can imagine, you know,
02 that's -- essentially, we wasted a subset of
03 resources for -- I don't know, for essentially a
04 quarter.

49. PAGE 66:12 TO 66:24 (RUNNING 00:00:42.460)

12 Is Match Group able to tell through
13 which mobile platform users access Match Group's
14 apps like Tinder?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Have you -- has -- have you looked at
17 that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What, if anything, have you learned
20 about how often Tinder's current iOS users use
21 Tinder on Android devices?

22 A. The majority of people do not -- you
 23 know, if their main device is an iOS device, they're
 24 not using an Android device as well.

50. PAGE 67:15 TO 67:19 (RUNNING 00:00:14.774)

15 Q. Just to get it -- again, I don't expect
 16 you to know the exact percentage necessarily, but as
 17 an order of magnitude, more or less than 5 percent
 18 of users who are on Tinder iOS and then log on to
 19 Tinder on Android?

51. PAGE 67:22 TO 67:22 (RUNNING 00:00:02.562)

22 A. I don't know the answer to that.

52. PAGE 67:23 TO 68:05 (RUNNING 00:00:22.710)

23 Q. Have you reached any conclusion about
 24 whether Android is a substitute for iOS for
 25 Match Group's products?
 00068:01 A. It is not a substitute.
 02 Q. Have you reached any conclusions about
 03 whether web browsers are a substitute for iOS's --
 04 for iOS for Match Group's products?
 05 A. It's not a substitute.

53. PAGE 69:17 TO 69:21 (RUNNING 00:00:22.470)

17 Q. So in 2020, what percentage of total
 18 Tinder revenue was attributable to iOS?
 19 A. █ percent.
 20 Q. Could Match Group simply abandon iOS and
 21 develop its products solely for other platforms?

54. PAGE 69:23 TO 70:09 (RUNNING 00:00:41.245)

23 A. No.
 24 Q. Why not?
 25 A. As you can see, it's got the majority of
 00070:01 the distribution, and for a dating platform, that
 02 would be -- that would be extremely destructive,
 03 because essentially, it would be a negative
 04 experience in terms of you wouldn't have those
 05 users -- for the Android users to find as well.
 06 Q. Well, couldn't users just switch back
 07 and forth between Android apps and iOS apps so they
 08 could reach the total dating pool; couldn't users do
 09 that?

55. PAGE 70:11 TO 70:15 (RUNNING 00:00:13.697)

11 A. Well, they don't switch between Android
 12 and the -- the majority do not switch between the
 13 Android and iOS. There's nuances to each platform,
 14 and I think once people become comfortable, they
 15 stick to the one.

56. PAGE 72:07 TO 72:10 (RUNNING 00:00:08.841)

07 Q. Does the majority of Match Group's
 08 revenues come from its iOS apps as opposed to
 09 Android apps or websites?
 10 A. Yes.

57. PAGE 73:01 TO 73:04 (RUNNING 00:00:12.493)

00073:01 Q. Is there a brand operated by Match Group
 02 that has same subscription price between mobile apps
 03 and a website?
 04 A. I'm not -- I'm not sure.

58. PAGE 73:12 TO 73:14 (RUNNING 00:00:12.096)

12 Q. Between iOS apps and Android apps for
 13 the same brand, are the prices different?
 14 A. Usually, they are the same.

59. PAGE 73:23 TO 74:07 (RUNNING 00:00:32.353)

23 Q. When you say "competitive pricing," what
 24 our products are you comparing Match Group's
 25 products against?
 00074:01 A. There's plenty of competitors. We've
 02 got Bumble. We've got eHarmony. We've got the apps
 03 within Spark networks. There's plenty of others.
 04 Obviously, within our own portfolio as well, we have
 05 to reference -- I mean, technically, they're
 06 competing against each other as well for the
 07 attention of the user.

60. PAGE 74:08 TO 74:10 (RUNNING 00:00:13.076)

08 Q. For pricing of products offered on iOS
 09 native apps, did Apple's commission on internet
 10 purchases affect Match Group's pricing decisions?

61. PAGE 74:12 TO 74:12 (RUNNING 00:00:00.872)

12 A. Yes.

62. PAGE 84:01 TO 84:03 (RUNNING 00:00:09.421)

00084:01 Q. Without Apple's 30 percent commission,
 02 would Tinder have been able to offer its products at
 03 a lower price than its current prices?

63. PAGE 84:05 TO 84:06 (RUNNING 00:00:04.948)

05 A. If Apple allowed it, Tinder would be
 06 able to do that.

64. PAGE 84:22 TO 85:03 (RUNNING 00:00:12.596)

22 Q. So if Apple didn't require pricing
 23 parity --
 24 A. Yeah. That's correct.
 25 Q. -- Tinder could have offered lower
 00085:01 prices without having to share 30 percent of its
 02 revenue with Apple?
 03 A. Correct.

65. PAGE 85:05 TO 85:07 (RUNNING 00:00:05.227)

05 Q. Same answer as to in-app purchases;
 06 correct?
 07 A. Yes. Yes.

66. PAGE 120:12 TO 120:13 (RUNNING 00:00:07.334)

12 Q. The question was, there are portable
 13 gaming devices in existence; is that correct?

67. PAGE 120:16 TO 120:21 (RUNNING 00:00:15.582)

16 A. I don't think they work once you leave
 17 the house unless it's got a SIM card in it, or
 18 unless you automatically transfer to another WiFi
 19 network.
 20 Q. Right. But the question was portable
 21 gaming devices exist; correct?

68. PAGE 120:24 TO 120:25 (RUNNING 00:00:04.919)

24 A. I think portable is one thing. Mobile

25 is completely different.

69. PAGE 121:02 TO 121:04 (RUNNING 00:00:08.747)

02 A. I don't think I can use a Nintendo
03 Switch and maintain connectivity while I'm driving
04 from one place to the next -- to another.

70. PAGE 152:04 TO 152:23 (RUNNING 00:01:37.081)

04 Q. So let's go back to Plaintiff's Exhibit
05 865.
06 A. 8-6-5.
07 Okay.
08 Q. So on the e-mail with Sheree Chang,
09 under the second topic, revenue share, there's a
10 bullet point that begins, "Apple drove minimal new
11 discovery, approximately █ percent."
12 Do you see that?
13 A. Yes. Yes.
14 Q. The rest of this sentence reads, "While
15 the majority were users organically looking for
16 apps, approximately █ percent"; is that correct?
17 A. That's right.
18 Q. Where did that data come from?
19 A. It came from a combination of Apple's
20 own analytics and, I believe, App Annie data.
21 Q. How do you know that?
22 A. It was -- I was informed by the
23 analytics team who pulled that information.

71. PAGE 158:04 TO 159:14 (RUNNING 00:03:06.126)

04 Q. How does Match Group inform users of the
05 option to purchase content outside of the -- of the
06 iOS app, if at all?
07 A. Yeah. I mean, the user essentially has
08 to know about it. The user has to essentially know
09 about it because Apple doesn't let us send push
10 notifications or do any marketing by the app.
11 I mean, I think the guideline states
12 directly or indirectly. So the user would
13 essentially have to know about it.
14 Q. Has Tinder ever tried to communicate
15 with Apple about the possibility of communicating
16 the purchase option outside of the iOS app?
17 A. I've had conversations with Apple about
18 that.
19 Q. So you have tried to communicate with
20 Apple about the possibility of communicating with
21 users about the purchase option outside of the iOS
22 app?
23 A. Yes, but I was misinformed during that
24 conversation, or what I recall of that conversation
25 because I believe we were told we could e-mail users
00159:01 because it was outside of the app, but when I read
02 the guidelines and we requested -- when we clarified
03 with app business management, they told us you could
04 not e-mail them if you collected that e-mail address
05 via Apple.
06 So if the user signed up via the iOS
07 app, which the majority did have, then you would not
08 be able to use that information because it was
09 collected during the iOS sign-up process.
10 So essentially, what that means is
11 we could stick up a bunch of billboards, we could
12 spend millions on TV commercials, but we can't send
13 e-mails, and we can't send push notifications

14 because that would be within the app, so...

72. PAGE 162:03 TO 162:22 (RUNNING 00:01:11.091)

03 Have you had conversations with
04 Apple about whether users are entitled to refunds?
05 A. I've had conversations flagging the
06 concern that we're not able to refund the users
07 effectively, that people are complaining about not
08 getting refunds, and that, really, Apple doesn't --
09 number one, doesn't have the information to make
10 that decision, because they don't have customer data
11 that we have, or the customer profile, or the
12 customer behavior that they've exhibited.
13 And for us, I think -- you know, we
14 have policies that are extremely lenient. We can do
15 all sorts of different -- we can offer prorated
16 refunds. We can offer compensation. We can give
17 free add-ons or consumables.
18 We can do a lot of things to ensure
19 that we retain the customer, but we don't have full
20 control of our customer relationship.
21 I've communicated that fact to Apple
22 on multiple occasions.

73. PAGE 167:01 TO 167:04 (RUNNING 00:00:19.844)

00167:01 Q. My question is: Could Tinder provide a
02 coupon, a gift card, or some other valuable
03 consideration to customers who have asked for
04 refunds?

74. PAGE 167:06 TO 167:20 (RUNNING 00:00:49.032)

06 A. Again, in order to send out a gift card,
07 we would need to collect some of the customer's
08 information, and Apple's got data minimization
09 policies that prevent us from collecting some of
10 that information.
11 If Apple wants to collect that
12 payment -- Apple collected the payment credentials
13 from the user -- collect the payment from the user,
14 did not refund the user, or refused to refund that
15 user, and then somehow you're asking the developer
16 to somehow issue a coupon of some sort after the
17 customer has already been frustrated by Apple not
18 providing the refund in the first place.
19 I think the onus is on Apple,
20 especially when you're charging 30 percent.

75. PAGE 169:24 TO 170:08 (RUNNING 00:00:40.959)

24 Q. Okay. Now, earlier you discussed sex
25 offender screening; correct?
00170:01 A. Correct.
02 Q. The Match Group brands use credit card
03 payment processing on Android; is that correct?
04 A. Many of them do, yes.
05 Q. Does Tinder?
06 A. Yes, in addition to Google Play.
07 Q. Does Match?
08 A. Yes.

76. PAGE 170:10 TO 170:19 (RUNNING 00:00:36.703)

10 So for those customers that use the
11 Android credit card purchasing system, does Match
12 Group screen for sex offenders using that
13 information?
14 A. Using Google Play or using Tinder's

15 payment credit card system on Android?
16 Q. Does Match Group screen for sex offender
17 risk using information collected from the credit
18 card purchasing process via Android?
19 A. Yes, we do.

77. PAGE 171:14 TO 172:16 (RUNNING 00:02:03.542)

14 Q. Have you ever asked Apple whether they
15 would share with you credit card data for the
16 purpose of sex offender screening?
17 A. Yes. And also for age verification
18 because we have users who are under 18 who are able
19 to download the Tinder app, even though Apple has a
20 date of birth, which is under 18.
21 So both age verification issues and
22 registered sex offenders, we have discussed with
23 Apple.
24 Q. And who at Apple did you discuss this
25 with?
00172:01 A. We discussed it with multiple folks.
02 There was more than five people from the Apple side,
03 but there was Chip on the app business management
04 team. I believe last name Canter.
05 Who else? Folks from app business
06 management, and then some of the other folks were
07 developers or product folks from Apple, but I can't
08 I can't -- I can't recall their names.
09 Q. When did this conversation take place?
10 A. We've had it multiple times. We've had
11 it recently as within the last year. And there have
12 been multiple conversations about that, but we've
13 brought it up in private conversations to that as
14 well.
15 But I think there have been more
16 conversations about it in the last 12 months.

78. PAGE 172:18 TO 173:06 (RUNNING 00:01:01.544)

18 What did these individuals from
19 Apple tell you during these conversations?
20 A. They see our concerns. They see -- they
21 feel that it's a good point, but they have to be --
22 they have to think about that Apple payment system,
23 and how it potentially could affect other developers
24 as a whole, and, again, you know, this is -- this is
25 a story about Apple's payment system needing to be a
00173:01 one-size-fits-all for the developers that feels it
02 needs to charge -- feels it needs to force to use
03 IAP, whereas if we were to manage our own payment
04 system or at least were given that option, we're
05 building payment systems and safety-related systems
06 that are relevant for our users.

79. PAGE 182:20 TO 183:25 (RUNNING 00:01:38.542)

20 Q. You testified that on Tinder's iOS app,
21 the price of the basic subscription is \$9.99 per
22 month.
23 At which price is that same
24 subscription offered through the web browser
25 currently in the United States?
00183:01 A. At what price?
02 Q. Yes.
03 A. I don't recall the specific price, but
04 it could be -- it varies by market, so they can be
05 priced -- I've seen instances where it's 10 percent
06 cheaper. I've seen instances where it's 15 percent

07 cheaper. I've seen instances where it's 20
08 percent-plus cheaper, but I don't recall -- I don't
09 recall the US-specific web price.

10 Q. When you say it depends on the markets,
11 you're talking about the different countries, not
12 within regional markets within the same country;
13 correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Same question, just in case you know off
16 the top of your head. You testified that on
17 Tinder's iOS app, the price of the Gold subscription
18 is \$29.99 per month.

19 To your knowledge, at what -- which
20 price is that same subscription offered through the
21 web browser currently in the United States?

22 A. Yeah. Same answer as I had prior. I
23 don't recall the specific, but I know that by market
24 or by country, it can vary anywhere between 10 to,
25 you know, 20 percent-plus, I've seen.

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)**Deposition Designation of Phillip Shoemaker (Volume 1 & 2)****(January 12, 2021)****(January 14, 2021)****Time**

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
41 minutes 22 seconds	16 minutes 41 seconds



Δ DEFENDANT A	United States District Court Northern District of California
	Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR
	Case Title <u><i>Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.</i></u>
	Exhibit No. Depo. 10
	Date Entered _____
	Susan Y. Soong, Clerk
	By: _____, Deputy Clerk

Shoemaker, Phillip B. (Vol. 01) - January 12, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:46:50.303)****76 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:46:50.303)****1. PAGE 19:13 TO 19:15 (RUNNING 00:00:02.505)**

13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Will the reporter please
 14 swear in the witness.
 15 Thank you.

2. PAGE 19:17 TO 19:21 (RUNNING 00:00:11.132)

17 PHILLIP B. SHOEMAKER,
 18 having been first duly sworn by the reporter, was
 19 examined and testified as follows:
 20
 21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

3. PAGE 20:08 TO 20:09 (RUNNING 00:00:05.125)

08 Please state your full name for the record.
 09 A My name is Phillip Burton Shoemaker.

4. PAGE 28:24 TO 29:01 (RUNNING 00:00:07.143)

24 Q And it says that you worked at Apple
 25 beginning at March 2009; is that right?
 00029:01 A That's correct.

5. PAGE 31:03 TO 31:05 (RUNNING 00:00:06.347)

03 Q And what was your job description, as
 04 explained to you at the time?
 05 A To build the App Store Review team.

6. PAGE 35:22 TO 36:01 (RUNNING 00:00:16.825)

22 Q And what were the qualifications of the
 23 then existing reviewers?
 24 A Qualifications were they could breathe,
 25 they could think, and typically they came from the
 00036:01 App Store -- or sorry, the Apple genius stores.

7. PAGE 36:02 TO 37:05 (RUNNING 00:01:30.290)

02 They were ex-Apple geniuses that we'd pull into the
 03 team.
 04 Q And what kind of training did they have for
 05 their role as reviewers?
 06 A We did a -- once they joined the company,
 07 we put them through a multi-month process of them
 08 learning the tools that we used to review apps, and
 09 then go through the Wiki or knowledge base, if you
 10 will, of what we allow in apps and what we don't
 11 allow in apps.
 12 And then a lot of the process focused on
 13 who to send the app to when you have questions, who
 14 to send the app to when you've done reviewed it and
 15 you're happy and you want to approve it, and who to
 16 send the app to when you're unhappy with the app and
 17 want to reject it.
 18 So it came a lot around understanding what
 19 Apple would tolerate and what they wouldn't tolerate
 20 with regards to features within the app.
 21 Q Okay.

22 And you mentioned a multi-month process and
23 a Wiki, et cetera. Was all that in place already
24 when you arrived, or are these things that you
25 instituted?
00037:01 A Some of it was in place. I refined most of
02 that over time. The multi-month process became a
03 two-week process under my helm, and we put out
04 guidelines rather than us having to guess at what's
05 allowed and what's not allowed.

8. PAGE 37:24 TO 38:07 (RUNNING 00:00:27.317)

24 Q And what were the hiring criteria for new
25 team members?
00038:01 A That they understood how to use a Mac, that
02 they understood how to use an iPhone, that they
03 understood a little about the Apple brand. In that
04 first year, we were literally only hiring people
05 that had iPhones, had Macs, and came out of
06 somewhere within Apple, whether it was the Apple
07 stores or Apple corporate.

9. PAGE 38:08 TO 38:18 (RUNNING 00:00:31.740)

08 Q And have those criteria changed over time?
09 A Yes. They changed over time because we
10 found that people outside of Apple could understand
11 how to protect the Apple brand. We didn't have to
12 rely on people that had drunk the Kool-aid, so to
13 speak.
14 And we wanted to make sure that -- that
15 there were people that we could bring from all walks
16 of life to be able to review apps. It wasn't just
17 an Apple employee thing. It's something we could
18 roll out to a larger audience.

10. PAGE 44:03 TO 44:05 (RUNNING 00:00:09.501)

03 Q How many times were you deposed in your
04 capacity as an Apple employee?
05 A Roughly, I believe, about five times.

11. PAGE 44:17 TO 44:20 (RUNNING 00:00:10.379)

17 Q And do you recall generally what topics
18 were you asked by Apple to be deposed as, as Apple's
19 representative?
20 A Always App Store related.

12. PAGE 45:24 TO 46:02 (RUNNING 00:00:09.578)

24 Fair to say that your understanding is that
25 during your tenure, Apple considered you a trusted
00046:01 representative of the company?
02 A Yes, that is correct.

13. PAGE 56:13 TO 56:17 (RUNNING 00:00:15.988)

13 How long does the human review process
14 typically take?
15 A The numbers we've quoted in the past are
16 about 13 minutes per app when it's a new app. About
17 six minutes per app when it's an updated app.

14. PAGE 57:05 TO 57:06 (RUNNING 00:00:04.030)

05 I have been gone for five years. Right.
06 So a lot may have changed.

15. PAGE 63:22 TO 63:24 (RUNNING 00:00:13.946)

22 MR. EVEN: So I would like to introduce
 23 Exhibit 98. That's Tab 36, Amal.
 24 And Exhibit 99. That's Tab 37.

16. PAGE 64:01 TO 64:12 (RUNNING 00:00:22.341)

00064:01 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 98 was
 02 marked for identification and
 03 attached hereto.)
 04 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 99 was
 05 marked for identification and
 06 attached hereto.)
 07 BY MR. EVEN:
 08 Q So while Amal is making that available to
 09 you, the first article I'm referring to is an
 10 article from December 2017 named, "A Modern Content
 11 Store."
 12 Is that an article that you wrote?

17. PAGE 64:13 TO 64:20 (RUNNING 00:00:25.971)

13 A Yes, it is.
 14 Q In this article, one of the predicates of
 15 it, you begin by saying that there's been no radical
 16 innovation in the way app stores operate over the
 17 past 10 to 20 years.
 18 Has there been any radical innovation in
 19 app stores since 2017?
 20 A I don't believe so.

18. PAGE 66:01 TO 66:24 (RUNNING 00:01:31.341)

00066:01 And is this a correct copy of your
 02 December 2017 article?
 03 A It appears to be, yeah.
 04 Q And if you look at the end of the first
 05 paragraph and the beginning of the second paragraph,
 06 after you point out that there has been no radical
 07 innovation, you say (as read and/or reflected:)
 08 Today we are in dire need of a
 09 revolution. We need digital stores
 10 that service multiple platforms,
 11 et cetera.
 12 Do you see that?
 13 A Yes, I do.
 14 Q And you wrote that?
 15 A Yes, I did.
 16 Q In your view, and based on your experience,
 17 how would a content store or an app store servicing
 18 both iOS and Android, for example, which I get is
 19 what you say by "multiple platforms," affect
 20 competition between Apple and Google?
 21 A Well, I think the first thing is that this
 22 would give us an alternate app store, which we can
 23 download apps for our devices. Right now there's
 24 only one for iOS.

19. PAGE 66:25 TO 67:04 (RUNNING 00:00:16.010)

25 For Android, there's numerous, but for iOS,
 00067:01 there's only one.
 02 I'm not sure how that would change or
 03 affect competition between the two platforms. I'm
 04 not really certain.

20. PAGE 67:06 TO 67:09 (RUNNING 00:00:11.118)

06 Could a Multiplatform App Store at least

07 make switching between the two platforms easier for
08 users?
09 A Yes, I believe it would.

21. PAGE 69:20 TO 70:03 (RUNNING 00:00:26.616)

20 Q If we go to page 3 of this article, at the
21 top you write (as read and/or reflected:)
22 Over time I realized that the
23 rules were often arbitrary,
24 arguable, and created by middle
25 aged white man ...
00070:01 Which you are one, as am I. So ...
02 Turning to arbitrary first, which rules did
03 you consider to be arbitrary?

22. PAGE 71:12 TO 71:24 (RUNNING 00:00:45.684)

12 At the time a good one is App
13 Recommendation Apps. Right. Apple was fine for the
14 first five years of their life of the App Store life
15 with having app -- an app list apps that they
16 recommend for you to download.
17 But Apple got tired of that space because
18 it was driving more volume than their own App Store
19 was, their App Store charts, and decided to remove
20 that whole category of apps.
21 And many companies went out of business
22 because of that change. They built entire company
23 around this feature that Apple decided to change.
24 So that was another arbitrary decision.

23. PAGE 72:01 TO 72:15 (RUNNING 00:00:40.350)

00072:01 You also called the rules arguable.
02 What did you mean by that?
03 A Well, it's objectionable material. Right.
04 If you look at what's porn. Right. I'll see when
05 I -- I'll know it when I see it. Those were a lot
06 of the guidelines. If you look at the guidelines
07 and you read them, you'll see that most are written
08 in a gray, a very subjective manner.
09 And developers read them one way, create
10 time, spend time, spend money to build an app and
11 submit it and we reject it because we interpret that
12 line differently.
13 When they're arguable, they're really
14 difficult to enforce, and it gets -- it breeds a lot
15 of anger, hence, my numerous death threats.

24. PAGE 72:17 TO 73:20 (RUNNING 00:01:42.660)

17 Is there a reason why Apple, to your
18 understanding, have you heard discussions as to why
19 Apple moderates content on the App Store but not on
20 the phone more generally through, for instance,
21 Safari?
22 A Well, I mean, it's tough. Right. The
23 content -- when you're in Safari, you don't say,
24 okay, Apple has vetted all the content I can find
25 out on the Internet. Right. They -- that would be
00073:01 ludicrous. Right. You can't do that.
02 On the App Store, Apple from Day 1 says, we
03 want to protect our customers. And so they will
04 moderate content that goes through the App Store.
05 Apple has control of that. Apple has no control
06 over what websites are created and what content is
07 going to be put on them.
08 Now, sure they could do some of these

09 ridiculous services that turn everything Disneyesque
 10 that you can find on your iPhone, but that will
 11 eliminate a large percentage of the population.
 12 I think the Internet is intended to be free
 13 to some extent, whereas, the App Store is about --
 14 one of the key things we learned building the App
 15 Store is that approving something that makes Apple
 16 look really bad hurts.
 17 It hurts Apple. It hurts their stock
 18 price. It hurts the shareholders. It can be very
 19 bad. So the App Store is a vetted, curated store,
 20 whereas, the Internet is not curated by anyone.

25. PAGE 73:21 TO 74:05 (RUNNING 00:00:29.477)

21 Q And so if I understand you correctly, what
 22 you're saying is that Apple believes anything that
 23 goes through the Apple App Store essentially has the
 24 impromptu of Apple on it because of the approval
 25 process?
 00074:01 A That is correct.
 02 Q Okay.
 03 And would the same impromptu attach to an
 04 app downloaded from a different store?
 05 A No. I can't imagine it would.

26. PAGE 75:14 TO 77:02 (RUNNING 00:02:02.262)

14 Is that an article that you've penned
 15 around late March 2019?
 16 A Yes, it is.
 17 Q If you go to page 5. At the penultimate
 18 paragraph, you see it begins with (as read and/or
 19 reflected:)
 20 Over the years, Apple has
 21 struggled with using the App Store
 22 as a weapon against competitors.
 23 A Yes, I see that.
 24 Q What did you mean by that?
 25 A Yeah. Interesting line, in retrospect.
 00076:01 The App Store was -- for a while was one of
 02 those places that everyone wanted to purchase space,
 03 everyone wanted to have an app from the App Store.
 04 And we saw that through the review process, the
 05 number of submissions, et cetera.
 06 There were times when competing apps, apps
 07 that we could arguably say compete with Apple in
 08 some way or another, like Google Voice or
 09 Rhapsody -- or Rhapsody Music subscription, faced a
 10 lot of barriers in getting approved.
 11 And, to me, that was, you know, it was
 12 curious. Other apps didn't have this problem, but
 13 we spent a lot of time thinking on what the slippery
 14 slope implications were of approving an app like
 15 Google Voice.
 16 Does that mean that people will stop using
 17 the phone as a phone?
 18 Will your phone number disappear?
 19 Will the iPhone disappear, right, in guise
 20 of a Google phone or something like that?
 21 There was always a lot of talk and
 22 conjecture about that internally.
 23 But Google Voice and Rhapsody faced
 24 daunting -- Google Voice took a year to approve. A
 25 year. And I had to call the developer every couple
 00077:01 of weeks, or get an angry phone call from the
 02 developer every couple of weeks.

27. PAGE 78:13 TO 78:24 (RUNNING 00:00:31.039)

13 Q On page 6 you note that Apple Arcade is the
 14 type of app that Apple has consistently disallowed
 15 on the store.
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A Yes, I do.
 18 Q What is the guideline that Apple Arcade
 19 violates, in your view?
 20 A A store within a store. It was an
 21 overarching rule that Apple had for many years, you
 22 could not have a store within a store. An app that
 23 made other apps available within it was absolutely
 24 not allowed.

28. PAGE 79:13 TO 80:10 (RUNNING 00:01:08.107)

13 Going to page 8 under the heading (as read
 14 and/or reflected:)
 15 Apple needs to play fair.
 16 You write (as read and/or reflected:)
 17 With the App Store being the
 18 only way to install apps on the
 19 iPhone and iPad, Apple has complete
 20 and unprecedented power over their
 21 customers' devices.
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A Yes, I do.
 24 Q What are the options of a developer that's
 25 unhappy with Apple to just leave the iOS platform
 00080:01 and move to another platform?
 02 A They can move to Android. That's
 03 80 percent of the devices in the world. Right. I
 04 mean, that's one alternative is to just pull
 05 everything out of iOS and put it entirely on
 06 Android. That gets the majority of the world's
 07 apps. Right.
 08 Q In your experience, did most app developers
 09 consider that a viable option for them?
 10 A No. No, they didn't.

29. PAGE 80:20 TO 81:01 (RUNNING 00:00:29.753)

20 Q Have you ever heard of developer
 21 considering leaving iOS to move to a game console?
 22 A No, I have not.
 23 Q Did there come a time when you were
 24 interviewed by congressional staffers as part of an
 25 investigation by U.S. Congress?
 00081:01 A I recall.

30. PAGE 84:16 TO 85:08 (RUNNING 00:01:14.294)

16 Q The report also states that you recalled an
 17 instance when an app developer's compliant
 18 application was rejected from the App Store, and
 19 then the technology was appropriated by Apple for
 20 its own offerings.
 21 Do you recall saying that to the staffers?
 22 A The technology wasn't appropriated. The
 23 idea was appropriated. The technology was still
 24 inherent in the app, but Apple released a feature, a
 25 similar feature about a year later.
 00085:01 Q And your understanding was that that
 02 rejection from the App Store was not justified under
 03 the guidelines?
 04 A That is correct.
 05 Q And so this would be an example of Apple
 06 making sure it has a first-mover advantage through

07 the review process?
08 A Yeah, I think so.

31. PAGE 88:02 TO 88:08 (RUNNING 00:00:30.521)

02 Do you remember when you thought that Apple
03 executives found reasons you thought were pretextual
04 for the non-approval of apps, the rejection of apps?
05 A Yes.
06 Q Can you give me an example of an app that
07 you thought was rejected on pretextual grounds?
08 A Google Voice.

32. PAGE 88:09 TO 88:10 (RUNNING 00:00:08.180)

09 Q Any others?
10 A That's the only one I can remember.

33. PAGE 100:15 TO 100:18 (RUNNING 00:00:09.760)

15 Q What were the numbers by the time you left
16 Apple?
17 A By the time I left Apple, we were reviewing
18 about 100,000 apps per week.

34. PAGE 101:03 TO 101:10 (RUNNING 00:00:18.913)

03 Q And you also say that this leads to an
04 increased number of mistakes being made.
05 Do you see that?
06 A Yes, I do.
07 Q And mistakes are when apps are being
08 approved that should be rejected?
09 A Apps that are being approved that should be
10 rejected and rejected that should be approved, yes.

35. PAGE 108:10 TO 110:07 (RUNNING 00:02:47.800)

10 Q Why does the review team need a set of
11 rules that are not open to the developers?
12 A We crafted the guidelines to be very
13 subjective. So we did not -- so we allowed
14 developers to try stuff, right, to push the
15 envelope, to try to show us something that's
16 allowable. And we learned over the years that
17 developers will try interesting things, some of
18 which we like, and some of which we don't like.
19 But if we had very black and white rules,
20 developers would not have typically pushed the
21 envelope and tried to get interesting things into
22 the store.
23 So we wanted the guidelines to be
24 subjective for a while in order to see what type of
25 content, what type of apps we were going to get.
00109:01 Now, having said that, look, one of the
02 very first apps that we had an issue with was called
03 "Baby Shaker." It was in the first three weeks of
04 my hiring. And for all intents and purposes, that
05 didn't violate any guidelines, and three sets of
06 eyes.
07 This is when three reviewers would review
08 it. They approved it. Apple stock went down. I
09 got a call from Steve. I got a call from Al Gore's
10 office. We got -- we had people picketing outside
11 of Apple because of one app approval that should not
12 have been approved.
13 And it was about quieting a baby by gently
14 shaking the phone, but if you shook it really hard,
15 you killed the baby.
16 And so that is the reason why we needed to

17 have more refined guidelines internally because
 18 reviewers, they don't see the forest for the trees.
 19 This was a dumb app.
 20 If you shook it, it put X's over
 21 the baby -- a picture of the baby's eyes. No baby
 22 was harmed in the making of this app.
 23 But perception was that Apple's okay with
 24 shaking babies. So we'd have to reject -- or so we
 25 got picketed. And so we got a lot of bad press from
 00110:01 that. That's why we needed something a little more
 02 defined than just the guidelines because the
 03 guidelines are subjective.
 04 Q Is one of the goals of the review process
 05 to protect -- to protect Apple's goodwill?
 06 A Yes. It's to protect Apple's brand for
 07 sure.

36. PAGE 117:01 TO 117:19 (RUNNING 00:00:49.499)

00117:01 Q In Marketing Text, there's a guideline
 02 about cross-platform information.
 03 Do you see that?
 04 A Yes, I do.
 05 Q What is the goal of this guideline?
 06 A Well, for the guideline specifically, I can
 07 address some points of it. Not -- it won't be
 08 complete.
 09 But one of the issues that we always had is
 10 that developers that create a cross-platform app
 11 like to put in the marketing text for the App Store,
 12 iOS App Store, they want to tell them -- tell you
 13 about the features in their Android app. It made no
 14 sense.
 15 So we didn't want that kind of information
 16 in the iOS App Store.
 17 Q Did you have any list of bad words that
 18 were searched for, such as Android or Windows?
 19 A I'm sure we did.

37. PAGE 117:20 TO 117:22 (RUNNING 00:00:08.196)

20 Q And were apps generally prohibited from
 21 pointing to their availability on other platforms?
 22 A Yes, they were.

38. PAGE 124:17 TO 124:22 (RUNNING 00:00:18.446)

17 Q If you turn to Exhibit 102. This is a
 18 document dated March 13, 2009.
 19 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 102
 20 was marked for identification and
 21 attached hereto.)
 22 MR. EVEN: It's APL-APPSTORE_01964696-707.

39. PAGE 125:02 TO 125:15 (RUNNING 00:00:44.859)

02 Q Do you recall writing this document titled,
 03 "My iPhone Developer Experience"?
 04 A Barely. Vaguely. Yes.
 05 Q Let me take a step back. Did you write
 06 this document; right?
 07 A Yes, I did. Yes, I did.
 08 Q And you wrote it as part of your general
 09 ordinary course of duties at Apple?
 10 A Yes. I started on March 9th, 2009. This
 11 was four days later. I was asked by Ron to write up
 12 my developer experience working with the App Store
 13 because -- because that's part of the reason they
 14 hired me is what did I go through to get onto the

15 App Store.

40. PAGE 126:20 TO 126:23 (RUNNING 00:00:11.750)

20 Q How often did you hear developers
21 complaining about Apple's criteria being unclear
22 while you were at Apple?
23 A Every day probably.

41. PAGE 133:20 TO 134:19 (RUNNING 00:01:23.257)

20 Q You mentioned earlier that you believed
21 that in your later years at Apple, the accuracy of
22 the review or the error rate went down.
23 Do you remember that?
24 A Yes, I do.
25 Q And do you recall quoting to your
00134:01 executives numbers around the 15 percent error rate
02 around the 2015-16 time frame?
03 A Yes, I do.
04 Q And you mentioned earlier that you reviewed
05 about, I think you said, 100,000 apps a week; is
06 that right?
07 A Yes.
08 Q So that would still mean about 15,000
09 mistakes each week; correct?
10 A That is correct.
11 Q If you turn to Exhibit 104.
12 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 104
13 was marked for identification and
14 attached hereto.)
15 BY MR. EVEN:
16 Q That is an e-mail exchange, dated
17 January 4, 2006. The top e-mail -- the last e-mail
18 is from you. And it bears Bates
19 APL-APPSTORE_00058136-1838.

42. PAGE 135:01 TO 138:03 (RUNNING 00:03:36.626)

00135:01 Q Is this an e-mail that you wrote around
02 early 2016?
03 A It looks to be.
04 Q And it's an e-mail that you wrote as part
05 of your ongoing business and employment at Apple; is
06 that right?
07 A Yes, that's correct.
08 Q And you are forwarding an e-mail from a
09 Mr. Sasser to Mr. Schiller, dated the same day,
10 January 4th, 2016.
11 Do you see that?
12 A I do see that.
13 Q Who is Mr. Sasser?
14 A I don't recall. A developer from Panic.
15 Panic was a popular developer or a developer that
16 had popular apps on the store.
17 Q Okay.
18 And they had apps for both iOS and Mac; is
19 that right?
20 A I believe so. Yes.
21 Q And the review process applied both to the
22 Mac Store and the iOS Store; is that right?
23 A Yes. My team reviewed apps for the Watch,
24 for the App Store and for the Mac Store, that's
25 correct.
00136:01 Q If you turn to the second page of the
02 document, at the bottom do you see that Mr. Sasser
03 is saying that -- and this is underlined (as read
04 and/or reflected:)

05 The app store takes parts --
 06 sorry -- of our job that we're
 07 already extremely good at -- like
 08 customer support, quick updates,
 09 easy refunds -- and makes them all
 10 more stressful and difficult, in
 11 exchange for giving Apple
 12 30 percent of our revenue.
 13 Do you see that?

14 A Yes, I do.

15 Q What's your understanding as to how the App
 16 Store made customer support more difficult for a
 17 developer like Panic?

18 A Well, if you look at the way the App Store
 19 works, technically Panic doesn't have any users.
 20 Apple has users. Right. Apple has customers.

21 And those customers are able to purchase
 22 access to an app like Panic, but Panic doesn't get
 23 to know who they are. They don't know their name.
 24 They don't have the credit card billing details.
 25 They don't know really anything about them.

00137:01 So it's a level of indirection. And it's
 02 very difficult for a company like Panic to know, you
 03 know, if I write to Panic directly, say I bought
 04 your app, they can basically say, prove it. I don't
 05 have any record of you buying my app.

06 They have to go through the Apple channel
 07 to make that happen. It's very difficult to connect
 08 the dots once you're running into customer
 09 service-related issues.

10 Q Okay.

11 And if somebody wants to give a 1 star
 12 rating to Panic, can Panic do anything about it,
 13 talk directly to the customer, explain to them what
 14 they're not understanding about the app or anything
 15 like that?

16 A No, not directly.

17 Q How does the App Store make easy refunds
 18 more difficult for developers?

19 A Well, giving a refund from Apple is real
 20 easy. You just go up to the app -- you just request
 21 a refund through a standard channel with Apple Care.

22 The problem is that the developer doesn't
 23 really know about it. Right. I mean, if somebody
 24 requests -- if they go directly to Panic, in this
 25 instance, and say, I want a refund, Panic can't do

00138:01 it. They say you have to go to Apple to get the
 02 refund. And so they can get a refund from Apple.

03 But it's another level of indirection.

43. PAGE 138:04 TO 138:07 (RUNNING 00:00:10.190)

04 But I think -- I'm not sure what he means
 05 by that because honestly I've never had problems
 06 with getting a refund out of Apple on the App Store,
 07 but it's difficult for them to know.

44. PAGE 138:18 TO 138:21 (RUNNING 00:00:08.049)

18 Q And fair to say that this created another
 19 level of friction between developers and their
 20 users?

21 A Yeah, I would say so.

45. PAGE 144:10 TO 144:23 (RUNNING 00:00:46.869)

10 Q Did Apple have a policy against the
 11 disclosure to consumers of the 30 percent commission

12 that developers were paying?
13 A I never saw anything in writing in the
14 guidelines, but, yes, that is an accurate statement.
15 We did not like to see that in the marketing text.
16 Q And when you say did not like to see it,
17 that means that an app could get rejected for
18 putting something like that in the marketing text or
19 in an app itself?
20 A Yes. If an app were to say the monthly
21 subscription is 6.99, that's an extra 30 percent
22 because of Apple or something like that, yes. We
23 would absolutely have them remove that.

46. PAGE 149:12 TO 149:14 (RUNNING 00:00:12.811)

12 Q Have you ever heard anybody voice concerns
13 about the security of other in-app purchase APIs?
14 A I have not.

47. PAGE 149:15 TO 150:05 (RUNNING 00:00:52.440)

15 Q Based on your understanding, is IAP, in
16 fact, safer than, for instance, PayPal?
17 A I believe it is, but I don't have any data
18 to back that up. It just feels like it would be
19 more secure.
20 Q And why do you think it feels more secure?
21 A Because when you use in-app purchase,
22 you're using services that are built in on the phone
23 versus a third-party library that may or may not
24 have malware in it. Right.
25 People can use infected libraries to give
00150:01 you third-party functionality. And then your
02 password and user name are out there.
03 Whereas, I know if it's using the built-in
04 services of the iPhone, people can't be tracking
05 that information. They can't be capturing it.

48. PAGE 150:22 TO 151:06 (RUNNING 00:00:33.090)

22 Q Has the functionality of IAP involved
23 during your time at Apple in any material way?
24 A It evolved in a variety of ways, including
25 things like extra protections in place so people
00151:01 could not make accidental purchases. Right. Or
02 their children making accidental purchases so -- or
03 purchases.
04 Requiring the password to be reentered
05 after 15 minutes. Certain features like that
06 changed over time.

49. PAGE 151:09 TO 151:18 (RUNNING 00:00:30.470)

09 Q You mentioned earlier that there came a
10 time when you and maybe others thought that maybe 30
11 percent was too high.
12 Do you remember that?
13 A I do remember that.
14 Q When was that discussion?
15 A I would probably say late in my time at
16 Apple, 2015, 2016, developers were complaining about
17 the 30 percent. I started hearing more and more
18 complaint about it.

50. PAGE 171:14 TO 173:21 (RUNNING 00:02:25.040)

14 Q We talked earlier about a store within a
15 store.
16 Do you remember that?
17 A Yes, I do.

18 Q And you said that Apple had a general
 19 policy not allowing that; right?
 20 A That's correct.
 21 Q And that was for some time in a more
 22 internal policy that became more explicit and public
 23 facing over time; is that fair?
 24 A That is correct.
 25 Q And do you -- what's your understanding of
 00172:01 the rationale for the prohibition on a store within
 02 a store?
 03 A Apple always believed in -- well, there
 04 were multiple rationales. One is that App Store was
 05 to be the only way that you could install apps
 06 into -- onto the iPhone. Right.
 07 And there was technological reasons for it.
 08 There was privacy reasons, et cetera, but the only
 09 way to get an app onto your phone was through the
 10 App Store.
 11 So that was issue No. 1. Right. We didn't
 12 want anyone else to pretend that they were
 13 downloading an app, et cetera. And we didn't want
 14 them to use other things like the enterprise
 15 guidelines or enterprise certificates and
 16 side-loading certificates. They could only do it
 17 through this one.
 18 The other one was a little different. It
 19 was about meritocracy.
 20 So the idea for the App Store has always
 21 been that the best apps will rise to the top because
 22 of reviews, ratings, and downloads. Right. The
 23 apps that tend to get a lot of downloads, they'll
 24 chart; right.
 25 And if they are getting a lot of downloads,
 00173:01 it's trending. It means it's got some value. And
 02 those will rise up the charts because people, you
 03 know, especially now when there's 2 million apps in
 04 the store, it's very difficult to find apps.
 05 And so you know what the hot ones are by
 06 watching the charts and things that rise in the
 07 charts.
 08 Now, when you have a store in a store or
 09 these app recommendation apps, you have third
 10 parties meddling with that and people can pay to
 11 place.
 12 So let's say I go to one of these app
 13 recommendation apps and I say I'll give you \$10,000
 14 put me at the top of your list, they'll put you at
 15 the top of their list and suddenly that terrible app
 16 is trending.
 17 And that app is changing the Apple charts
 18 and people are downloading this piece of garbage
 19 over and over and over.
 20 That was kind of the reason. Those are the
 21 two reasons that I recall.

51. PAGE 175:04 TO 175:13 (RUNNING 00:00:27.216)

04 Let me introduce Exhibit 111. That's an
 05 e-mail chain, Bates stamped APL-APPSTORE 09425339.
 06 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 111
 07 was marked for identification and
 08 attached hereto.)
 09 BY MR. EVEN:
 10 Q That's another e-mail chain you wrote in
 11 the ordinary course as part of your job at Apple;
 12 right?
 13 A Yes, it is.

52. PAGE 175:14 TO 175:16 (RUNNING 00:00:08.003)

14 Q And you're given here ERB meeting notes.
15 Do you see that?
16 A Yes, I do.

53. PAGE 175:17 TO 176:07 (RUNNING 00:00:36.129)

17 Q And do you see at the top of the second
18 page there's an app name called The Web Store,
19 discover the top fun and useful or whatever from
20 developer Orange?
21 Do you see that?
22 A Yes, I do.
23 Q And you say it's rejected. And in the
24 comment you say (as read and/or reflected:)
25 We do not want apps that
00176:01 replace our store with web apps.
02 Do you see that?
03 A Yes, I do.
04 Q What was the rationale for not wanting a
05 web app store?
06 A I think the comments sum that up. They
07 don't want to replace the store with web apps.

54. PAGE 180:22 TO 181:03 (RUNNING 00:00:28.489)

22 Q So while this is updating, let me introduce
23 Exhibit 113. That's a document dated November 23,
24 2011.
25 A Okay.
00181:01 Q Again, an e-mail chain and it's
02 APL-APPSTORE_05267651.
03 If you can take a look at that.

55. PAGE 181:04 TO 181:12 (RUNNING 00:00:11.455)

04 A Okay. I see it.
05 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 113
06 was marked for identification and
07 attached hereto.)
08 BY MR. EVEN:
09 Q This is another e-mail that you wrote and
10 received as part of your ordinary course of
11 employment at Apple; right?
12 A Yes, it is.

56. PAGE 181:13 TO 181:23 (RUNNING 00:00:17.800)

13 Q And on the second page, the very first
14 e-mail in the chain, you're saying, (as read and/or
15 reflected:)
16 I'm removing the Big Fish
17 games app immediately. I have no
18 guideline to remove their app, but
19 have been asked by the ERB to hide
20 it. I will be doing so
21 immediately.
22 Do you see that?
23 A Yes, I do.

57. PAGE 181:24 TO 182:01 (RUNNING 00:00:07.250)

24 Q What do you mean by "hide it"?
25 A It means remove it. Just remove it from
00182:01 the App Store so nobody can see it.

58. PAGE 182:23 TO 183:09 (RUNNING 00:00:32.380)

23 What do you mean by (as read and/or
24 reflected:)

25 I have no guideline to remove
 00183:01 their app On.
 02 A I don't recall.
 03 Q Doesn't it mean that there is no guideline
 04 that actually supports the ERB's decision that you
 05 can point to and say to the developer, here's the
 06 problem?
 07 A That's how it reads, but it's 2011. I
 08 figured there were guidelines at the time that
 09 disallowed this. Maybe not. I don't recall.

59. PAGE 184:07 TO 184:11 (RUNNING 00:00:17.311)

07 Q So let's turn to Exhibit 114. Let me
 08 introduce it.
 09 That's a November 23, which is the same
 10 date, November 23, 2011, and it's e-mails from you.
 11 This is APL-APPSTORE_05267654.

60. PAGE 184:12 TO 184:18 (RUNNING 00:00:05.409)

12 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 114
 13 was marked for identification and
 14 attached hereto.)
 15 BY MR. EVEN:
 16 Q That's another e-mail that you wrote in the
 17 ordinary course of your employment at Apple; right?
 18 A Yes.

61. PAGE 184:19 TO 185:20 (RUNNING 00:00:53.936)

19 Q And it's a little more lively in its
 20 language?
 21 A Yes, it is.
 22 Q And Mr. Neumayr -- I hope I'm not
 23 butchering his name -- says (as read and/or
 24 reflected:)
 25 If we clearly said to them "we
 00185:01 removed it because we do not allow
 02 app stores in an app inside the App
 03 Store."
 04 Which is a quote from your e-mail that
 05 we've just seen.
 06 A Yeah.
 07 Q (As read and/or reflected:)
 08 Why wouldn't we also say this
 09 publicly as a statement?
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A Yes, I do.
 12 Q And you respond (as read and/or reflected:)
 13 Because it's chicken shit. We
 14 don't have a guideline for this.
 15 Do you see that?
 16 A Yes, I do.
 17 Q Fair to say that at the time you thought
 18 that there was no guideline that supported this
 19 decision?
 20 A I -- yes. I would trust what I said then

62. PAGE 185:21 TO 185:22 (RUNNING 00:00:05.130)

21 about the guidelines then than I would now. I don't
 22 remember those guidelines.

63. PAGE 185:24 TO 185:24 (RUNNING 00:00:01.497)

24 So if we turn to 115.

64. PAGE 185:25 TO 186:15 (RUNNING 00:00:58.977)

25 ///
 00186:01 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 115
 02 was marked for identification and
 03 attached hereto.)
 04 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 05 BY MR. EVEN:
 06 Q Now we're jumping two years forward. So
 07 this is a February 5, 2013 e-mail.
 08 APL-APPSTORE_07087422-4224.
 09 That's another e-mail exchange that you had
 10 as part of your ordinary course of employment at
 11 Apple; is that right?
 12 A Yes, it is.
 13 Q And this is, again, concerning Big Fish; is
 14 that right?
 15 A Yes.

65. PAGE 186:24 TO 187:04 (RUNNING 00:00:13.814)

24 Q And that's about some other iOS application
 25 that Big Fish submitted; correct?
 00187:01 A That is correct.
 02 Q Not the one that was removed back in 2011;
 03 right?
 04 A That's correct. Yes.

66. PAGE 188:10 TO 188:25 (RUNNING 00:00:33.098)

10 Q Going all the way to the top, you write
 11 again (as read and/or reflected):
 12 Big Fish Unlimited is seen as
 13 a game store within an app. This
 14 is not allowed. Phil and Eddy have
 15 been adamant about this, despite my
 16 protests. We have no clear
 17 guidelines around this.
 18 Do you see this?
 19 A Yes, I do.
 20 Q And this is now February 2013 and still
 21 there are no guidelines; correct?
 22 A So it appears, yes.
 23 Q And Phil and Eddy are Phil Schiller and
 24 Eddy Cue; correct?
 25 A Yes, that is correct.

67. PAGE 189:07 TO 189:11 (RUNNING 00:00:14.280)

07 Q And so as of February 2013, you thought
 08 that a game subscription is a promising business
 09 model that should be allowed?
 10 A Personal belief, probably -- yes, that is
 11 correct.

68. PAGE 195:09 TO 195:11 (RUNNING 00:00:00.031)

09 (Whereupon Shoemaker Exhibit 116
 10 was marked for identification and
 11 attached hereto.)

69. PAGE 195:16 TO 195:22 (RUNNING 00:00:18.916)

16 Q This is an e-mail dated July 18, 2011.
 17 Is this another e-mail that you wrote
 18 during your employment at Apple?
 19 A I believe so. Yes, it looks like it.
 20 Q And it was part of the ordinary course of
 21 fulfilling of your duties at Apple?
 22 A Yes.

70. PAGE 196:10 TO 196:25 (RUNNING 00:00:33.925)

10 Q And Ms. Doerr writes in the second sentence
 11 (as read and/or reflected:)
 12 The system is not perfect and
 13 scams can still perpetuate in the
 14 App Store where reviews can be
 15 gamed in short term and even
 16 possibly long-term monetary gains
 17 can be made by unscrupulous
 18 developments.
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A Yes, I do.
 21 Q Do you agree that that's a correct
 22 statement? The system was never perfect and scams
 23 did still perpetuate the App Store from time to
 24 time?
 25 A Sure. Yes.

71. PAGE 204:02 TO 204:10 (RUNNING 00:00:26.803)

02 Was there anything about the App Review
 03 process that was not susceptible to replication by
 04 another App Store should another App Store decide to
 05 do it?
 06 A No, I don't think so.
 07 Q It was just a matter of investing the money
 08 and taking the time and thinking about the problem
 09 and addressing it?
 10 A That's right.

72. PAGE 214:23 TO 215:02 (RUNNING 00:00:17.520)

23 Q Would you agree with me that there were
 24 instances that malware got onto iPhones?
 25 A Yes, I agree with that.
 00215:01 Q And malware got onto the App Store?
 02 A Yes.

73. PAGE 216:03 TO 216:14 (RUNNING 00:00:41.402)

03 Q Do you recall an instance where a foreign
 04 government had managed to put some malware into the
 05 App Store?
 06 A Yes, I do.
 07 Q What was that instance?
 08 A A researcher from a university in China
 09 submitted an app that when you played the game, it
 10 would randomly go into your contact list and replace
 11 all the phone numbers with 8s. 88888888.
 12 And Chinese government brought that to our
 13 attention to say -- to criticize us for our review
 14 process.

74. PAGE 229:20 TO 229:23 (RUNNING 00:00:22.715)

20 MR. EVEN: If you turn to Exhibit 119.
 21 Q And scroll to page 367. This document is
 22 even bigger than the Wiki, I believe.
 23 A Yeah. Yeah, it is.

75. PAGE 230:03 TO 231:03 (RUNNING 00:01:14.277)

03 Q At the top of the page, there's a paragraph
 04 starting with (as read and/or reflected:)
 05 Subcommittee staff learned
 06 that Apple has engaged in conduct
 07 to exclude rivals ...
 08 Do you see that?
 09 A Yes, I do.

10 Q And do you see that it says (as read and/or
 11 reflected:)
 12 For example, Mr. Shoemaker
 13 explained that Apple's senior
 14 executives would find pretextual
 15 reasons to remove apps from the App
 16 Store, particularly when those apps
 17 competed with Apple services.
 18 A Yes, I do.
 19 Q Do you recall sharing those views with the
 20 staffers?
 21 A Not in so many words, but I had a lot of
 22 conversations with them. I -- I do recall saying
 23 that -- yes. I guess, yes, I did have that
 24 conversation with them.
 25 Q And we saw some examples of instances like
 00231:01 that today about Google Voice and some of the Big
 02 Fish situation and things like that; is that fair?
 03 A Yes.

76. PAGE 248:13 TO 251:04 (RUNNING 00:03:16.905)

13 are listening, what is the difference between a web
 14 app and an iOS app for the App Store?
 15 A So an iOS app is an application that has
 16 been written in a specific programming language like
 17 Objective-C and Swift.
 18 And you write it on a Mac -- on a Mac or
 19 other type of computer. And you access specific
 20 APIs to do the functionality that you want.
 21 You want to put buttons on the screen. You
 22 do that with Objective-C or Swift.
 23 If you want to get access to the contacts
 24 or access to any of the deeper functionality in iOS,
 25 you use an app for that.
 00249:01 Now -- I'm sorry. You use an API for that
 02 to access it within your app.
 03 So you can have a lot of functionality,
 04 full integration with the hardware device, access to
 05 the camera, access to the screen, drawing pixels on
 06 the screen, creating games, et cetera. And it's a
 07 full, robust type of development environment on
 08 which you develop. And that's available on iOS.
 09 When you go to the web and you do a web
 10 app, you're creating what's called "lowest common
 11 denominator functionality." You're now creating an
 12 app -- an app with HTML and JavaScript.
 13 So, first of all, you have much slower
 14 processing. It's a slower app because it's the same
 15 stuff you see on a website. It's the HTML and
 16 JavaScript. So you have limited functionality where
 17 you can put a pixel on the screen. It's not as
 18 powerful.
 19 You don't have access to all of those APIs
 20 built into the underlying operating system because
 21 your lowest common denominator. You want it to run
 22 on iOS. You want it to run on windows. You want it
 23 to run on Mac, and you want it to run on Android.
 24 So suddenly you're eliminating a lot of
 25 functionality for that.
 00250:01 Now, these operating systems can expose a
 02 little stuff that can be -- expose some of these
 03 deeper APIs to be used by web apps, but doing so
 04 also opens up security problems, a way, a back door
 05 into getting to the code.
 06 You want to expose as little as you can to
 07 these web apps because web apps don't go through a

08 review process. Websites don't go through a review
09 process.

10 If you launch a website and it can access
11 underlying functionality like maybe your contacts,
12 suddenly every website you go to has the potential
13 of stealing your information. Stealing your data.
14 And that's something that we want to disallow.

15 So a web app essentially is a website that
16 you say make a web app version of this. And all
17 that does is it takes all of these files, these
18 HTML, these JavaScript files, and puts it into a
19 small container, and it lives on the springboard, on
20 the home screen, if you will, of your iOS device.

21 It looks like an app. It's an icon. But
22 it's a web app. You're not going to have a lot of
23 functionality there. You click it. It's just like
24 saving a Safari link on your desktop and launching
25 an app. So there's a lot of limited functionality.

00251:01 You can't do as much there.

02 Q So at bottom, would you say that a web app
03 is no substitute for a true iOS app?

04 A Yes, I would.

Shoemaker, Phillip (Vol. 02) - January 14, 2021

1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:11:37.692)

20 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:11:37.692)**1. PAGE 356:05 TO 356:13 (RUNNING 00:00:13.228)**

05 THE REPORTER: Raise your right hand,
 06 please.
 07
 08 PHILLIP BURTON SHOEMAKER,
 09 recalled as a witness by counsel for Plaintiff, being
 10 first duly sworn, testified as follows:
 11
 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
 13 THE REPORTER: Thank you.

2. PAGE 452:09 TO 452:15 (RUNNING 00:00:24.733)

09 And this is Bates Stamp 04 -- 00424815.
 10 Exhibit 176. It is an e-mail from you,
 11 Mr. Shoemaker, to Peter stone. It is dated
 12 March 6th, 2013. New app process.
 13 Is this an e-mail that you would have sent
 14 in the course of your employment at Apple?
 15 A. Yes.

3. PAGE 452:19 TO 452:25 (RUNNING 00:00:24.269)

19 Q. And this is a discussion about whether the
 20 apps were reviewed for viruses.
 21 And according to this e-mail, the apps are
 22 reviewed for -- are reviewed -- are scanned -- I'm
 23 sorry. Are scanned with the Norton iAntivirus and
 24 the ClamXAV; is that correct?
 25 A. That is correct.

4. PAGE 453:17 TO 454:04 (RUNNING 00:00:34.895)

17 Q. Okay. And do you know how iTunes scanned
 18 for viruses, other than through the Norton and the
 19 ClamXAV?
 20 A. No. I did not.
 21 Q. So do you know if they did a scan for the
 22 .exes?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Before I left, I know they were scanning the
 25 binaries for anything inside of the .zip file, which
 00454:01 is also an app. They would scan those. Whether they
 02 had .exes or .dlls in there, they would scan them for
 03 viruses -- well-known viruses using tools like Norton
 04 antivirus.

5. PAGE 480:07 TO 480:15 (RUNNING 00:00:31.532)

07 So yesterday you mentioned an instance where
 08 Apple rejected an app and then released a similar
 09 feature on a tone.
 10 Do you recall that?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. And what was the feature in question?
 13 A. It was wireless syncing of -- of data.
 14 Q. Wireless syncing between which devices?
 15 A. iPhone and your Mac.

6. PAGE 484:20 TO 485:17 (RUNNING 00:01:40.097)

20 Q. You mentioned yesterday that there were
21 generally no viruses on iOS; is that correct?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And I think you have stated that that is
24 because unlike Windows and, to some extent, Mac OS,
25 iOS is a more modern OS; is that right?
00485:01 A. Yes. That is correct.
02 Q. And I think you said that -- one aspect that
03 is relevant to the issue of susceptibility to viruses
04 was that iOS has what you called a sandbox model; is
05 that right?
06 A. Yes. That is correct.
07 Q. And sandbox model, if I understand
08 correctly, it that essentially each application
09 remains in its own little compartment and can't reach
10 out of that unless the user or app allows it; is that
11 right?
12 A. Yes. That is correct.
13 Q. And if I understand in your answers then
14 when it comes to malware, iPhones are -- are, you
15 know, super safe because iOS in the sandbox model are
16 very robust.
17 A. That is correct.

7. PAGE 487:06 TO 487:11 (RUNNING 00:00:24.101)

06 And so what you are telling me is that for
07 viruses, sandbox -- a sandbox model is very effective
08 and human review is not. And for malware, really,
09 neither one is very effective because it is just very
10 hard to catch. It is just a real problem.
11 A. I would agree with that.

8. PAGE 488:02 TO 488:11 (RUNNING 00:00:30.522)

02 Q. Now, Apple does allow other app stores on
03 Mac OS; is that right?
04 A. Yes, they do.
05 Q. And Apple does allow direct download of
06 applications, what is called siloing onto Mac
07 computer; right?
08 A. Yes, they do.
09 Q. And an iOS, even though it is more secure,
10 Apple does not allow app stores for siloing; right?
11 A. That is correct.

9. PAGE 488:12 TO 488:16 (RUNNING 00:00:27.722)

12 Q. So would you agree with me that to extend --
13 to the extent anyone claims that Apple needs a close
14 guard on iOS to prevent viruses, for instance, that
15 is just not true?
16 A. For viruses, yes. That is correct.

10. PAGE 490:13 TO 490:19 (RUNNING 00:00:25.029)

13 Q. You mentioned yesterday that there were some
14 dumb decisions made by some reviewers who put certain
15 apps on halt.
16 Do you recall that?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. And that was with respect to apps that
19 supported a competing watch; right?

11. PAGE 490:20 TO 491:07 (RUNNING 00:00:42.115)

20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And so we covered yesterday that competing

22 apps sometimes faced issues at the ERB because of
 23 positions taken by your superiors; is that right?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And based on the story of this competing
 00491:01 watch, I understand that competing apps also
 02 sometimes faced problems with the review process
 03 because of your -- of your underlings, the people who
 04 reported to you.
 05 Is that fair?
 06 A. Yes. Overzealous reviewers, yes. That is
 07 correct.

12. PAGE 491:11 TO 491:21 (RUNNING 00:00:26.310)

11 They are they are overzealous in protecting
 12 Apple; right?
 13 A. I would say they are more overzealous in
 14 protecting themselves and their job. They were
 15 afraid they would get fired if they did something
 16 incorrect.
 17 Q. Okay. And they thought that they might get
 18 fired because they thought that Apple would not want
 19 to approve things that are competing against Apple;
 20 is that right?
 21 A. That is my understanding, yes.

13. PAGE 510:01 TO 510:12 (RUNNING 00:00:32.890)

00510:01 Q. Okay. And would a jail broken iPhone still
 02 have sandboxing as part of its iOS?
 03 A. No. It would not.
 04 Q. Okay. So again, you had spoken earlier with
 05 Mr. Even about how sandboxing was the be all/end all
 06 safeguard against viruses.
 07 But would that safeguard exist in jail
 08 broken iPhones?
 09 A. It would not, no.
 10 Q. And how seriously did Apple, during your
 11 time there, take the threat of jail breaking?
 12 A. Very seriously.

14. PAGE 517:21 TO 518:15 (RUNNING 00:01:02.276)

21 Q. And did Apple or the App Store review
 22 process ever make changes or modifications in
 23 response to developer feedback?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And how frequently did that occur?
 00518:01 A. A lot of things changed based on feedback.
 02 As far as the process was concerned, we were
 03 continually refining the process based on feedback.
 04 The guidelines were -- were one of the clearest forms
 05 of -- of feedback causing changes at Apple. When
 06 developers would complain about one of our
 07 guidelines, the executives, the ERB, we would all get
 08 together and discuss those guidelines and ultimately
 09 make changes to them if we found they were warranted
 10 or not if we didn't, and we would release those
 11 guidelines -- updated versions of those guidelines;
 12 so that -- that happened -- those guidelines changed
 13 probably twice a year, but that was -- that was just
 14 one of the ways in which we would -- we would change
 15 based on feedback.

15. PAGE 551:12 TO 552:10 (RUNNING 00:01:04.607)

12 Q. Going back to the question, Mr. Shoemaker.
 13 Why were you concerned that there would be
 14 an exodus of developers from iOS to Android?

15 A. The -- the Apple App Store was -- was built
 16 for our customers, our consumers, the people
 17 downloading apps. And we never had -- you know, we
 18 never had consumers complaining about -- about the
 19 app review process; right?
 20 Consumers never did that. That was
 21 developers.
 22 But -- but my concern was if we didn't
 23 improve the app review process, developers might
 24 start pulling out and then making their games or
 25 their apps only available on the -- the Android
 00552:01 store. It was just a -- to me, it was always -- you
 02 know, it was always the concern. You always want to
 03 strive to be better than you were the day before.
 04 And so, for me, I was always concerned about that,
 05 and I didn't want to be the reason why something like
 06 that happened.
 07 Q. And did developers ever threaten to take
 08 their apps off of iOS and move exclusively to
 09 Android?
 10 A. Yes.

16. PAGE 555:02 TO 555:13 (RUNNING 00:00:27.350)

02 Q. Okay. And speaking of it being heated,
 03 I note that on the bottom of this e-mail on page
 04 there he concludes by saying:
 05 "If Apple keeps treating developers that
 06 way, all of the small and medium developers
 07 will run away to other platforms. The
 08 developers are the future of Apple."
 09 Is this a complaint that you heard -- or
 10 a threat, I should say, that you heard from other
 11 developers?
 12 A. Yes. We -- we -- I had heard this threat
 13 before.

17. PAGE 562:14 TO 562:19 (RUNNING 00:00:09.507)

14 MS. AHMAD: Nineteen, yes.
 15 MR. PHILLIPS: Okay.
 16 (Defense Exhibit Number DX-19
 17 was marked for identification.)
 18 BY MS. AHMAD:
 19 Q. Mr. Shoemaker, will you pull up Exhibit 19?

18. PAGE 562:21 TO 563:08 (RUNNING 00:00:45.486)

21 Q. So this is an e-mail exchange between you,
 22 P.B. Shoemaker direct, and Zenus Song at Apple.
 23 Is this an exchange that you had in the
 24 regular course of your work for Apple?
 25 A. Okay. Yes, it is.
 00563:01 Q. And who are you writing to when you address
 02 it team and send it to P.B. Shoemaker direct?
 03 A. So those were my direct reports; so my
 04 managers in my organization.
 05 Q. All right. And I wanted to -- well, take
 06 a look at the e-mail and tell me if you recall
 07 generally the subject matter that you recount here.
 08 A. Yes. I do -- I do recall this.

19. PAGE 565:07 TO 565:10 (RUNNING 00:00:10.008)

07 Q. Well, what was your understanding from these
 08 conversations with Android users as to why they had
 09 more concerns on Android than they would have had on
 10 an iOS?

20. PAGE 565:13 TO 565:25 (RUNNING 00:00:41.015)

13 THE WITNESS: Because the users -- I'm
14 sorry. Because -- because Android didn't -- I'm
15 sorry. Google did no checks. If you submit an app
16 to the -- the store, it basically made it onto the
17 store after going through some of the automation
18 stuff, but malware and privacy apps would get in
19 pretty easily -- private -- I'm sorry. When I say
20 privacy, I mean apps that can affect your privacy,
21 that would take information, et cetera, would often
22 make it into the store. There are hundreds of news
23 articles about those kinds of apps. And we felt our
24 users felt it was much more comfortable doing that on
25 the App Store.

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)**Deposition Designation of Eddy Cue
(February 8, 2021)****Time**

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
33 minutes 13 seconds	1 minute 40 seconds

Cue, Eddy (Vol. 01) - February 8, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:34:52.201)****94 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:34:52.201)****1. PAGE 24:12 TO 24:14 (RUNNING 00:00:07.380)**

12 Q Mr. Cue, what's your job title at present?
 13 A I'm the senior vice president of Internet
 14 services and software at Apple.

2. PAGE 25:13 TO 25:19 (RUNNING 00:00:33.399)

13 What are your job responsibilities at
 14 present?
 15 A I manage a lot of Apple services, examples
 16 being Maps, iCloud, along with our media, which is
 17 Apple TV+, Apple Music. I manage an engineering
 18 team for Apple Arcade. I manage Apple Pay, Apple
 19 Card.

3. PAGE 26:12 TO 27:17 (RUNNING 00:01:39.583)

12 Have you had any job responsibilities that
 13 related to the App Store at all since you became
 14 vice president of Internet services in approximately
 15 the mid 2005ish time frame?
 16 A I did.
 17 Q And what were those responsibilities at
 18 that time?
 19 So we're going back now approximately to
 20 sort of around 2005, 2007, in that time.
 21 A Yeah.
 22 Well, let's just start from the beginning
 23 of the App Store, which is roughly around that time.
 24 I don't know the exact dates, but when the App Store
 25 was started, my team did the engineering work of
 00027:01 creating the App Store, the back-end parts of the
 02 App Store.
 03 And then we also were programming the App
 04 Store. What I mean by "programming" is which apps
 05 were featured when you opened certain pages.
 06 And those were my two primary
 07 responsibilities.
 08 Q Did those responsibilities for the App
 09 Store change at all over time?
 10 A They have.
 11 Q And in what ways have they changed?
 12 A The responsibility for managing the
 13 features and what I would call running the store on
 14 a day-to-day basis are managed by Phil Schiller.
 15 I still manage all of the engineering
 16 components, meaning the engineers that do the work
 17 for creating it and maintaining it.

4. PAGE 45:11 TO 45:14 (RUNNING 00:00:06.240)

11 Q And one of the things that makes the iPhone
 12 attractive to users is a robust set of apps.
 13 Would you agree with that?
 14 A I do.

5. PAGE 47:15 TO 47:19 (RUNNING 00:00:08.456)

15 Q At the time that the iPhone was launched,
16 there weren't native apps that were being written
17 for the iPhone by third-party developers; is that
18 right?
19 A That's correct.

6. PAGE 61:25 TO 62:01 (RUNNING 00:00:03.605)

25 Q Would Android -- do Android apps work on
00062:01 the iOS platform?

7. PAGE 62:03 TO 62:05 (RUNNING 00:00:06.220)

03 THE WITNESS: Again, Android is something
04 completely different and wouldn't work. So I don't
05 understand.

8. PAGE 63:05 TO 63:06 (RUNNING 00:00:03.442)

05 Is it the case that Android apps do not
06 work on the iOS platform?

9. PAGE 63:08 TO 63:09 (RUNNING 00:00:05.606)

08 THE WITNESS: Again, the Android app itself
09 is written to the Android SDK and wouldn't run.

10. PAGE 63:10 TO 63:12 (RUNNING 00:00:08.083)

10 But many Android app developers build iOS
11 apps using RSDK, and so many of the apps are
12 available on both platforms.

11. PAGE 64:03 TO 64:04 (RUNNING 00:00:05.409)

03 Let's take a look at PX 403. PX 403, if
04 the witness has it.

12. PAGE 64:07 TO 64:12 (RUNNING 00:00:10.186)

07 This is a document, single-page document
08 that is dated 3 January 2010, bearing the Bates
09 number at the bottom -00120802.
10 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 403 was
11 marked for identification and
12 attached hereto.)

13. PAGE 65:13 TO 65:18 (RUNNING 00:00:11.694)

13 And do you see that you are a cc on this
14 document?
15 A I do.
16 Q And do you believe that you received it on
17 or about 3 January 2010?
18 A I'm sure I did.

14. PAGE 67:13 TO 67:19 (RUNNING 00:00:28.815)

13 Q Let's turn to PX 404, if you have that,
14 Mr. Cue. I'll identify it for the record.
15 It's a document, two-page document, from
16 Mr. Cue to Mr. Cook and Mr. Schiller, subject: Back
17 to School next year, bearing the Bates number at the
18 bottom -09114427 through -28, dated 15 February
19 2013.

15. PAGE 67:23 TO 67:23 (RUNNING 00:00:01.034)

23 THE WITNESS: I do have that.

16. PAGE 68:01 TO 68:02 (RUNNING 00:00:02.315)

00068:01 Let me know when you've had an opportunity
02 to review the document.

17. PAGE 68:03 TO 68:13 (RUNNING 00:00:22.384)

03 A Okay. I have.
04 Q All right.
05 Do you see that in the first paragraph, you
06 say (as read and/or reflected:)
07 Getting customers using our
08 stores (iTunes, App and iBookstore)
09 is one of the best things we can do
10 to get people hooked to the
11 ecosystem.
12 Do you see that?
13 A I do.

18. PAGE 70:15 TO 70:20 (RUNNING 00:00:19.121)

15 Q And so is it fair to say that part of what
16 you're saying here is that in order for a consumer
17 to buy a Samsung, they might have to spend hundreds
18 of additional dollars in order to have the same
19 content on a new Samsung device as they already had
20 on their iPhone?

19. PAGE 70:22 TO 70:25 (RUNNING 00:00:08.155)

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. In the case of, it's --
23 if they were buying a Samsung phone, they would have
24 to buy some of these things again if they wanted to
25 have the exact same thing there.

20. PAGE 79:04 TO 79:06 (RUNNING 00:00:08.867)

04 Now, the App Store, do you believe it's
05 been financially successful since it was first
06 introduced?

21. PAGE 79:08 TO 79:11 (RUNNING 00:00:04.700)

08 THE WITNESS: To whom?
09 BY MS. FORREST:
10 Q To Apple.
11 A Yes.

22. PAGE 84:01 TO 84:09 (RUNNING 00:00:30.836)

00084:01 Would you agree with me that there are
02 different ways in which the App Store has been able
03 to create revenue streams?
04 For instance, through subscriptions --
05 A Oh --
06 Q -- or IAP or ad search, things like that.
07 A Yes. We have come up with different ways
08 over time to allow developers to charge customers in
09 different ways.

23. PAGE 85:10 TO 85:12 (RUNNING 00:00:08.453)

10 Q Does Apple obtain revenue through IAP?
11 A There is a commission revenue share with
12 in-app purchase, yes.

24. PAGE 85:16 TO 85:17 (RUNNING 00:00:14.330)

16 Does Apple make revenue through the
17 subscription sales that developers are able to make?

25. PAGE 85:19 TO 85:22 (RUNNING 00:00:09.036)

19 THE WITNESS: In addition to -- in addition
20 to in-app purchase, developers are able to sell
21 digital subscriptions in which there is a rev share
22 of commission as well.

26. PAGE 87:23 TO 88:06 (RUNNING 00:00:29.991)

23 When a search -- when a user enters a
24 search query in the App Store --
25 A Yes.
00088:01 Q -- the first result that is now returned is
02 a monetized ad; correct?
03 A If an ad is available, that's correct.
04 Q And Apple obtains revenue from the
05 monetization of those ads; is that correct?
06 A That's correct.

27. PAGE 89:01 TO 89:05 (RUNNING 00:00:09.391)

00089:01 Would you agree with me that Apple has made
02 over a billion dollars in revenue from the
03 monetization from the first search result in the App
04 Store?
05 A I do.

28. PAGE 89:13 TO 89:21 (RUNNING 00:00:17.467)

13 So PX 406 is from Mr. Cue to Mr. Schiller,
14 dated 15th July 2009. And it bears the Bates number
15 at the bottom -06216718.
16 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 406 was
17 marked for identification and
18 attached hereto.)
19 BY MS. FORREST:
20 Q And if you would let me know, Mr. Cue, when
21 you have had an opportunity to review this document.

29. PAGE 89:22 TO 90:07 (RUNNING 00:00:24.138)

22 A I have.
23 Q Okay.
24 And is this a document that you wrote to
25 Mr. Schiller on or about the 15th of July 2009?
00090:01 A It is.
02 Q Okay.
03 And the second e-mail below yours is from
04 Mr. Schiller to you -- actually to Mark, which I
05 take it as Mark Donnelly, who is indicated as a cc
06 on this document?
07 A That's correct.

30. PAGE 90:09 TO 91:13 (RUNNING 00:00:58.863)

09 And it says (as read and/or reflected:)
10 Mark, Steve has asked if we
11 could send him the data for the App
12 Store financial model. He wants to
13 understand the profits and costs
14 (the assumption is that it is at
15 best slightly positive given all
16 the free apps, which is fine).
17 Thanks, Phil.
18 Do you see that?
19 A I do.
20 Q Do you -- to the best of your -- did you
21 understand the Steve here to be Steve Jobs?
22 A That's what I believed.
23 Q Okay.

24 And you respond, quote (as read and/or
 25 reflected:)
 00091:01 We are definitely making money
 02 so we are fine and Mark can send
 03 you the data.
 04 Is that right?
 05 A That's correct.
 06 Q Okay.
 07 And when you said, "We are definitely
 08 making money," what did you mean?
 09 A Again, we were taking high-level business
 10 models of the amount of revenue coming in versus
 11 some of the costs associated with running the store.
 12 And it wasn't -- it was -- it was not in the red.
 13 It was in the positive.

31. PAGE 91:17 TO 91:20 (RUNNING 00:00:17.047)

17 Do you remember a point in time when there
 18 was a debate as to whether or not iMessage should be
 19 opened to Android, and Android users would be able
 20 to utilize iMessage on an Android platform?

32. PAGE 91:22 TO 92:09 (RUNNING 00:00:35.118)

22 THE WITNESS: I remember the time of
 23 wanting to do an iMessage app on Android ourselves
 24 so that you could -- on Android Talk to iMessage.
 25 So we would do the app.
 00092:01 BY MS. FORREST:
 02 Q So that would be Apple writing on the
 03 Android platform an iMessage app?
 04 A That's correct.
 05 Q Would there have been -- in that version,
 06 would there have been cross-compatibility with the
 07 iOS platform so that users of both platforms would
 08 have been able to exchange messages with one another
 09 seamlessly?

33. PAGE 92:11 TO 92:12 (RUNNING 00:00:04.212)

11 THE WITNESS: That was certainly the
 12 discussion and the view that I had.

34. PAGE 92:13 TO 92:16 (RUNNING 00:00:12.055)

13 That wouldn't be the case over time because
 14 of the features that were added to Messages, but at
 15 that time, I think we could have made a version on
 16 Android that worked with iOS.

35. PAGE 92:17 TO 93:01 (RUNNING 00:00:21.741)

17 BY MS. FORREST:
 18 Q And there were several individuals,
 19 including Mr. Schiller, who disagreed with you; is
 20 that right?
 21 A That's correct.
 22 Q And Mr. Schiller's view prevailed; is that
 23 right?
 24 A Yeah. I mean, you can say -- I mean,
 25 obviously he didn't think we should do it, and we
 00093:01 didn't do it, so you could say he prevailed. But I

36. PAGE 93:02 TO 93:02 (RUNNING 00:00:03.147)

02 don't think he was instrumental in the decision.

37. PAGE 96:07 TO 96:21 (RUNNING 00:00:40.051)

07 PX 407 is a document that is dated 8 April

08 2013, from Mr. Federighi, F-e-d-e-r-i-g-h-i, to
 09 Mr. Cue, copying Mr. Schiller and Mr. Cook. It's a
 10 document that bears the Bates numbers -09702122
 11 through -23.
 12 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 407 was
 13 marked for identification and
 14 attached hereto.)
 15 MS. FORREST: Exhibit 408 is a document
 16 from Mr. Schiller to Mr. Cue, copying Mr. Federighi
 17 and Mr. Cook, dated 8 April 2013, bearing the Bates
 18 numbers -09702116 through -118.
 19 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 408 was
 20 marked for identification and
 21 attached hereto.)

38. PAGE 97:08 TO 97:11 (RUNNING 00:00:12.710)

08 Do you recognize, first, what's been marked
 09 as PX 407, which is the 8 April 2013 document from
 10 you to Mr. Federighi -- I'm sorry -- from
 11 Mr. Federighi to you?

39. PAGE 97:12 TO 97:12 (RUNNING 00:00:00.771)

12 A I do.

40. PAGE 97:14 TO 99:23 (RUNNING 00:01:56.198)

14 And do you see in the middle of the page
 15 there, there's a message from you dated April 7,
 16 2013, where you said (as read and/or reflected:)
 17 We really need to bring
 18 iMessage to Android. I have had a
 19 couple of people investigating this
 20 but we should go full speed and
 21 make this an official project.
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A I do.
 24 Q Okay.
 25 And was that a belief that you held at that
 00098:01 time in April of 2013?
 02 A That was, yes.
 03 Q Okay.
 04 And then above that at 10:04 p.m. on the
 05 same day, you say (as read and/or reflected:)
 06 Do we want to lose one of the
 07 most important apps in a mobile
 08 environment to Google? They have
 09 search, mail, free video and
 10 growing quickly in browsers. We
 11 have the best messaging app and we
 12 should make it the industry
 13 standard. I don't know what ways
 14 we can monetize it but it doesn't
 15 cost us a lot to run.
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A I do.
 18 Q And did you believe that statement when you
 19 wrote it?
 20 A I did.
 21 Q Okay.
 22 Then Mr. Federighi writes to you and he
 23 says (as read and/or reflected:)
 24 Do you have any thoughts on
 25 how we would make switching to
 00099:01 iMessage (from WhatsApp) compelling
 02 to masses of Android users who
 03 don't have a bunch of iOS friends?

04 iMessage is a nice app/service, but
 05 to get users to switch social
 06 networks we'd need more than a
 07 marginally better app. (This is
 08 why Google is willing to pay
 09 \$1 billion--for the network, not
 10 for the app).
 11 And then it goes on (as read and/or
 12 reflected:)
 13 In the absence of a strategy
 14 to become the primary messaging
 15 service for to bulk of cell phone
 16 users -- that's a mistake in the
 17 text -- I am concerned the iMessage
 18 on Android would simply serve to
 19 remove an obstacle to iPhone
 20 families giving their kids Android
 21 phones.
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A I do.

41. PAGE 100:17 TO 101:04 (RUNNING 00:00:41.916)

17 Q Let's turn to PX 408. And this is another
 18 series of texts.
 19 This one, if you look at the bottom of the
 20 page, the first page of PX 408, you'll see that it's
 21 the continuation of the discussion that's just been
 22 left behind in PX 407.
 23 And you'll see that Mr. Schiller is writing
 24 to you, and he says (as read and/or reflected:)
 25 iMessage was created as a
 00101:01 feature of iOS that brings value to
 02 our iPhone users.
 03 Do you see that?
 04 A I do.

42. PAGE 102:20 TO 102:23 (RUNNING 00:00:18.766)

20 Q Do you -- in your view, do you believe that
 21 not having iMessage on Android has created an
 22 obstacle to families giving their kids Android
 23 phones?

43. PAGE 102:25 TO 102:25 (RUNNING 00:00:01.439)

25 THE WITNESS: No, not at all.

44. PAGE 109:04 TO 109:18 (RUNNING 00:00:45.516)

[REDACTED]

45. PAGE 109:19 TO 110:17 (RUNNING 00:01:21.644)

[REDACTED]

46. PAGE 114:14 TO 114:19 (RUNNING 00:00:22.575)

14 MS. FORREST: PX 416 is a two-page document
15 that is dated 4 March 2016 from Mr. Cook to Mr. Cue
16 and Mr. Federighi. And it bears the Bates numbers
17 at the bottom -02970610 through -11.
18 Q Tell me when you've had an opportunity to
19 review this document, Mr. Cue.

47. PAGE 114:20 TO 115:02 (RUNNING 00:00:14.418)

20 A I've reviewed it.
21 Q All right.
22 Did you receive this document on or about
23 the 4th of March 2016?
24 A I did.
25 Q And did you receive it in connection with
00115:01 your duties and responsibilities at Apple?
02 A I did.

48. PAGE 115:17 TO 116:08 (RUNNING 00:00:49.309)

17 PX 413 is a document that is from Sanjay,
18 S-a-n-j-a-y, Mathur, M-a-t-h-u-r, to Eddy Cue and
19 Mr. Schiller, dated 14 November 2020. It bears the
20 Bates numbers at the bottom -05589233, running
21 consecutively through -240.
22 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 413 was
23 marked for identification and
24 attached hereto.)
25 ///
00116:01 BY MS. FORREST:
02 Q And the next document is PX 414, which is
03 from Todd Teresi, T-e-r-e-s-i, to Mr. Cue and
04 Mr. Schiller, dated 2 September 2019, bearing the
05 Bates numbers at the bottom -09654732 through -746.
06 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 414 was
07 marked for identification and
08 attached hereto.)

49. PAGE 117:13 TO 117:19 (RUNNING 00:00:15.560)

13 Q And did you receive PX 413 on or about the
14 14th of November 2020?
15 A Yes.
16 Q And you received it in connection with your

17 duties and responsibilities at Apple?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And if we turn to PX 414, this is for an

50. PAGE 117:24 TO 118:01 (RUNNING 00:00:10.190)

24 Is this also one of those same weekly
25 reports relating to search ads?
00118:01 A Yes, it is.

51. PAGE 120:20 TO 121:01 (RUNNING 00:00:18.759)

20 Did you receive a copy of Exhibit 80 with
21 Exhibit 79 on or about the 20th of June 2013?
22 A I did.
23 Q And did you receive that -- those materials
24 in connection with your duties and responsibilities
25 at Apple?
00121:01 A I did.

52. PAGE 126:20 TO 126:25 (RUNNING 00:00:13.211)

20 Q Let me just sort of try the question again.
21 Putting aside the reasons why, did you ever
22 try to move your library of movies and filmed
23 entertainment from an iPhone to an Android?
24 A I did not because I know that that doesn't
25 work.

53. PAGE 128:07 TO 128:25 (RUNNING 00:00:44.325)

07 So Exhibit 415 is a document from Mr. Cue
08 to a number of individuals, the first of whom is
09 Mr. Jeff Robbin, R-o-b-b-i-n; it's dated 3 September
10 2013. Subject (as read and/or reflected):
11 9 smart and useful features of
12 Apple's iPhone ecosystem that make
13 it hard to switch-tech news and
14 analysis.
15 Bearing the Bates numbers at the bottom
16 -09184163 through -66.
17 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 415 was
18 marked for identification and
19 attached hereto.)
20 BY MS. FORREST:
21 Q My first question to you, Mr. Cue, when
22 you've had an opportunity to review this is whether
23 you recognize it.
24 A Again, I don't recall, but I'm sure I sent
25 it.

54. PAGE 135:08 TO 136:14 (RUNNING 00:01:42.311)

08 How was the 30 percent arrived at?
09 A Back when we started the App Store, we
10 wanted to look at what the markets were for
11 distributing software and what the commission rates
12 were at those times.
13 And so we looked at the industry that was
14 out there selling mainly hard goods of software.
15 There wasn't really any kind of App Store. Again,
16 we were -- something that was brand-new that was
17 created by us, but there were other ways to
18 distribute software before us.
19 And so we looked at those models, and they
20 all tended to be anywhere from 40 to 50 percent,
21 plus there was some significant cost in returns and
22 other things that wouldn't happen in our App Store.
23 And so looking at the different market, we
24 came up with 30 percent, which was a huge decrease

25 to what everyone was paying at the time. And we
 00136:01 thought we'd get developers really excited about
 02 participating in the platform.
 03 Q Who were the individuals who were involved
 04 in the decision as to what percentage commission to
 05 charge in that regard?
 06 A I believe the primary members, as I recall,
 07 was myself and Steve.
 08 Q And you say "Steve," you mean Steve Jobs?
 09 A Sorry. Yes. I meant Steve Jobs.
 10 Q Anyone else?
 11 A Again, I think that the decision, I'm sure,
 12 was made by myself and Steve. There were -- there
 13 could have been others that participated in it, but
 14 I think the decision was left to the two of us.

55. PAGE 137:23 TO 138:14 (RUNNING 00:00:48.648)

23 Q Do you recall whether or not the costs of
 24 development of the SDKs, for instance, that
 25 developers were going to be using to write apps
 00138:01 figured into the choice of the 30 percent
 02 commission?
 03 A I don't recall. I don't know.
 04 Q Do you know whether or not the costs of any
 05 tools were used as part of the decision-making
 06 process as to what level of commission to charge?
 07 A Again, I don't recall, it may have been,
 08 but, again, wasn't the primary vehicle we used.
 09 Q Do you recall whether any additional
 10 developer services and the cost of those services
 11 was factored into the selection of the amount of the
 12 commission?
 13 A Again, it may have but wasn't the primary
 14 vehicle.

56. PAGE 139:05 TO 139:14 (RUNNING 00:00:25.670)

05 piece. I am sure that somebody from finance would
 06 look or decide whether that price was -- we would
 07 lose a lot of money. So I'm sure that that was
 08 viewed as a price that would lose a lot of money
 09 from that viewpoint.
 10 But, again, I don't recall it from that
 11 point. We wanted to do something that was highly
 12 competitive so that developers would join.
 13 And so we wanted it to be cheap compared to
 14 anything that they had experienced before.

57. PAGE 141:13 TO 141:20 (RUNNING 00:00:25.501)

13 So I guess what I'm trying to figure out is
 14 between the time that you and Steve Jobs came up
 15 with the 30 percent commission until today, have you
 16 been involved in any discussions where people have
 17 exchanged either through in-person meetings or
 18 e-mail exchanges, here's our breakdown as to why we
 19 need the 30 percent cost or the 30 percent
 20 commission?

58. PAGE 141:22 TO 142:09 (RUNNING 00:00:31.597)

22 THE WITNESS: Sorry. If you phrased in
 23 that way, the answer would be no. The discussions
 24 that would have taken place, and, again, I -- not my
 25 primary thing so I wouldn't have paid attention to
 00142:01 it.
 02 We obviously monitor our costs and what our
 03 costs are in running Apple at different points and

04 different locations and different pieces of it. So
 05 I'm sure there are people that are looking at the
 06 cost of doing things around it.
 07 As it relates to the 30 percent of, like,
 08 here's our justification for doing that, no, I don't
 09 recall having a conversation like that.

59. PAGE 143:25 TO 144:06 (RUNNING 00:00:18.722)

25 So we've marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 417
 00144:01 a document from Mr. Schiller to Mr. Cue, dated 28
 02 July 2011, bearing the Bates numbers at the bottom
 03 -00138494 through -97.
 04 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 417 was
 05 marked for identification and
 06 attached hereto.)

60. PAGE 145:06 TO 145:13 (RUNNING 00:00:20.866)

06 Did you receive this document on or about
 07 the 28th of July 2011?
 08 A I did.
 09 Q And did you receive it in connection with
 10 your duties and responsibilities at Apple?
 11 A I did.
 12 Q Do you recall receiving this document?
 13 A I don't, but seeing it now, I'm sure I did.

61. PAGE 150:05 TO 150:12 (RUNNING 00:00:19.396)

05 Q So at you sit here today, because I want to
 06 make sure I move away from what might be possible to
 07 what you can actually recall, are you aware of any
 08 developers who have said that they would not launch
 09 a native iOS app because of the 30 percent
 10 commission structure?
 11 A Yes. I'm aware that some developers have
 12 said that.

62. PAGE 151:18 TO 152:12 (RUNNING 00:00:48.257)

18 So let's take a look at PX 418. I'll
 19 identify it while you take a look at it.
 20 It's to Eddy Cue from Matt Fischer, dated 7
 21 March 2011, bearing the Bates number at the bottom
 22 -45793 through -45794.
 23 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 418 was
 24 marked for identification and
 25 attached hereto.)
 00152:01 BY MS. FORREST:
 02 Q If you could let me know when you've had an
 03 opportunity to look at this, I would be
 04 appreciative.
 05 A I've looked at it.
 06 Q Okay.
 07 Did you receive a copy of what's been
 08 marked as PX 418 on or about the 7th of March 2011?
 09 A I do.
 10 Q And you received that in connection with
 11 your job at Apple?
 12 A I did.

63. PAGE 153:23 TO 154:02 (RUNNING 00:00:13.769)

23 So you -- the document indicates that Kazaa
 24 was not going to launch a native iOS app because of
 25 the 30 percent commission, but the only information
 00154:01 you have about that is what's contained in this
 02 document, which is PX 418; is that right?

64. PAGE 154:04 TO 154:04 (RUNNING 00:00:01.722)

04 THE WITNESS: That's all I recall, yes.

65. PAGE 154:07 TO 154:12 (RUNNING 00:00:21.732)

07 Are you aware that there was a time when
08 Netflix ran a series of experiments to determine
09 whether or not IAP was, in fact, increasing the
10 number of subscribers it was obtaining in various
11 geographies?
12 A I am.

66. PAGE 154:25 TO 155:03 (RUNNING 00:00:17.650)

25 And do you recall that Netflix indicated to
00155:01 Apple that IAP customers had much shorter
02 subscription lives due to voluntary churn than
03 non-IAP customers?

67. PAGE 155:05 TO 155:05 (RUNNING 00:00:01.471)

05 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm aware of that.

68. PAGE 163:11 TO 163:15 (RUNNING 00:00:21.798)

11 Q Are you aware of anyone, as you sit here
12 today, who has switched from using an iPhone to an
13 Android because of the -- a particular availability
14 of an app on Android that was not available on iOS?
15 A Again, I can't name somebody, no.

69. PAGE 164:03 TO 164:19 (RUNNING 00:00:53.045)

03 Are you aware that there was a point in
04 time in August of 2020 when Epic Games began to
05 include an additional payment processing method
06 within the Fortnite app?
07 A Yeah. Let me -- just to make sure we agree
08 on terminology here, they came up with a new
09 payment -- a direct payment method to them.
10 I -- when you say "payment processing,"
11 it's whatever, I don't know what you mean by that.
12 But, again, they provided a direct payment
13 mechanism to them. So I am aware of that.
14 Q Okay.
15 Are you aware of any studies that have
16 occurred or analyses as to whether or not there were
17 any security vulnerabilities introduced onto any
18 iPhone as a result of that direct payment method
19 from Epic?

70. PAGE 164:21 TO 164:21 (RUNNING 00:00:02.138)

21 THE WITNESS: I don't recall anything.

71. PAGE 168:07 TO 168:18 (RUNNING 00:00:22.438)

07 You are aware of apps which have sold
08 things to customers, and the customers have claimed
09 they have been defrauded by those apps; correct?
10 A Correct.
11 Q Okay.
12 A Correct.
13 Q And that has occurred from time to time
14 since the beginning of apps that were available to
15 sell things to consumers; is that right?
16 A Since we've built our App Store, you mean?
17 Q Yeah.
18 A Yes.

72. PAGE 169:01 TO 169:04 (RUNNING 00:00:09.475)

00169:01 There have been apps which have been in the
02 App Store, which you have received complaints from
03 time to time, have been defrauding customers; is
04 that right?

73. PAGE 169:06 TO 169:09 (RUNNING 00:00:12.822)

06 THE WITNESS: We have had apps in the store
07 that have defrauded customers that have potentially
08 taken their data, you know, all kinds of security
09 and privacy issues.

74. PAGE 169:12 TO 169:15 (RUNNING 00:00:10.377)

12 And when Apple learns of those issues,
13 Apple attempts to take action, responsive action, to
14 eliminate those issues; is that right?
15 A That's correct.

75. PAGE 170:09 TO 170:12 (RUNNING 00:00:10.878)

09 Are you aware of an instance in which a
10 direct payment method has resulted in specific
11 software changes that have introduced a security
12 vulnerability?

76. PAGE 170:14 TO 170:14 (RUNNING 00:00:01.854)

14 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure.

77. PAGE 171:23 TO 172:01 (RUNNING 00:00:14.751)

23 Are you aware of any of the credit card
24 platforms that you have used as having introduced
25 particular security vulnerabilities onto the iPhone
00172:01 hardware?

78. PAGE 172:03 TO 172:09 (RUNNING 00:00:15.357)

03 THE WITNESS: No. I don't think that would
04 be possible.
05 BY MS. FORREST:
06 Q And how about for PayPal? Are you aware of
07 the utilization of PayPal in connection with IAP in
08 any way as having introduced a security
09 vulnerability onto the hardware?

79. PAGE 172:11 TO 172:12 (RUNNING 00:00:03.099)

11 THE WITNESS: Again, onto the hardware
12 itself, I don't believe that's possible.

80. PAGE 173:05 TO 173:09 (RUNNING 00:00:13.514)

05 Q As you sit here today, can you recall any
06 studies or analyses that Apple has done that
07 examines potential performance differences between
08 Web apps and native apps?
09 A Again, I don't recall.

81. PAGE 188:02 TO 188:09 (RUNNING 00:00:18.726)

02 But you're aware that consumers from time
03 to time spend money on both apps and in-app
04 purchases, aren't you?
05 A Yes, I am.
06 Q Okay.
07 Do you have any information that indicates
08 to you what the average consumer spends on apps over
09 the life cycle of an iPhone?

82. PAGE 188:11 TO 188:13 (RUNNING 00:00:04.977)

11 THE WITNESS: No, I don't recall. But
 12 there may have been something published, but I don't
 13 recall, no.

83. PAGE 188:25 TO 189:03 (RUNNING 00:00:12.150)

25 Are you aware of any marketing material
 00189:01 that Apple publishes that indicates how much the
 02 average consumer can expect to spend on apps over
 03 the life cycle of a phone?

84. PAGE 189:05 TO 189:05 (RUNNING 00:00:01.775)

05 THE WITNESS: Again, I don't know.

85. PAGE 189:18 TO 189:22 (RUNNING 00:00:11.361)

18 So as you sit here today, you're unaware of
 19 any analyses within Apple that look at the amount
 20 that the average consumer would spend on apps; is
 21 that right?
 22 A Correct. I don't recall any.

86. PAGE 190:04 TO 192:16 (RUNNING 00:02:32.040)

04 MS. FORREST: Exhibit 420 is from Mr. Peter
 05 Stern to Mr. Phil Schiller and Mr. Eddy Cue,
 06 subject: Netflix, dated July 25th, 2018. And it
 07 bears the Bates number -02026598.
 08 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 420 was
 09 marked for identification and
 10 attached hereto.)
 11 MS. FORREST: And PX 421 is a two-page
 12 document from Mr. Stern to Mr. Schiller, copying
 13 Mr. Cue and Mr. Fischer, subject: Timely (Netflix),
 14 July 30th, 2018. And it bears the Bates numbers
 15 -02026861 through -62.
 16 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 421 was
 17 marked for identification and
 18 attached hereto.)
 19 BY MS. FORREST:
 20 Q We'll start with PX 420, Mr. Cue.
 21 Do you recognize this document?
 22 A I do.
 23 Q And did you receive it on or about
 24 July 25th, 2018, in connection with your duties and
 25 responsibilities at Apple?
 00191:01 A I did.
 02 Q Okay.
 03 It says, in the beginning (as read and/or
 04 reflected:)
 05 Phil and Eddy,
 06 Matt and I met with Bill
 07 Holmes from Netflix (among others)
 08 today to hear the results of their
 09 IAP tests in ten countries. Here
 10 were their takeaways as they
 11 conveyed them.
 12 The good news: Netflix saw
 13 significant incremental volume from
 14 IAP: 37 percent of subscribers we
 15 captured were incremental to what
 16 they would have captured via Web
 17 alone.
 18 The bad news: Apple IAP
 19 customers have much shorter lives
 20 due to voluntary churn than non-IAP

21 customers - resulting in our
22 incremental customers being worth
23 30 percent as much as subscribers
24 they capture themselves.
25 Do you see that?
00192:01 A I do.
02 Q Okay.
03 And we spoke very briefly about this
04 earlier today.
05 And my question is whether Apple conducted
06 its own study to determine whether or not the
07 statement here that Apple IAP customers have much
08 shorter lives due to voluntary churn than non-IAP
09 customers was accurate or not.
10 A Yes. That -- "study" is the wrong word.
11 We didn't do any study that I'm aware of, but we
12 looked at other developers or had conversations with
13 other developers, and we discovered some things that
14 we were doing in the process of subscriptions that
15 were not what I would call best in the industry
16 practices.

87. PAGE 192:17 TO 192:22 (RUNNING 00:00:19.796)

17 And so in reality, this e-mail was actually
18 good news, good news, because the bad news was
19 something we could correct. And over time we have
20 corrected it and actually have a much higher rate
21 of -- or I should say a much lower rate of voluntary
22 churn based on all of the changes that we've made.

88. PAGE 194:18 TO 194:20 (RUNNING 00:00:09.791)

18 Let's turn to PX 421. And let me ask if
19 you've received this document on or about July 30th,
20 2018, in connection with your job at Apple?

89. PAGE 194:21 TO 194:21 (RUNNING 00:00:01.037)

21 A Yes.

90. PAGE 201:24 TO 201:25 (RUNNING 00:00:07.524)

24 Q Is there any plan right now to allow Web
25 apps to be offered in the Apple Arcade?

91. PAGE 202:02 TO 202:03 (RUNNING 00:00:03.158)

02 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I haven't
03 heard of any.

92. PAGE 247:15 TO 247:20 (RUNNING 00:00:15.950)

15 Q Do you know -- well, has Apple, to your
16 knowledge, conducted any studies as to the relative
17 pricing of apps on the App Store vis-a-vis the
18 Google Play Store?
19 A I'm not aware of any study that I can
20 recall.

93. PAGE 248:13 TO 248:20 (RUNNING 00:00:29.905)

13 Are you aware of anyone who has ever
14 switched from an iPhone to an Android because they
15 perceived there to be some difference in the pricing
16 of apps across the two platforms?
17 A I don't recall ever hearing that.
18 Q Is that something that Apple has studied,
19 to your knowledge?
20 A No. I don't recall ever seeing that.

94. PAGE 333:16 TO 334:09 (RUNNING 00:01:07.276)

16 MS. MANIFOLD: Let's look at Exhibit 438,
17 which is an exhibit dated February 6, 2011. It's
18 from Mr. Jobs to you. It's called Mag- -- easy for
19 me to say -- "Magazine subscription write-up." It's
20 Bates stamped APL-APPSTORE 07175768.
21 (Whereupon Cue Exhibit 438 was
22 marked for identification and
23 attached hereto.)
24 BY MS. MANIFOLD:
25 Q I'll give you a minute to look at it, but
00334:01 my main question to you, is this an exchange that
02 you had with Mr. Jobs in or about February 6th of
03 2011?
04 A It is.
05 Q And did you receive this exchange in the
06 ordinary course of business as part of your duties
07 and -- did you receive this document as part of your
08 duties and responsibilities at Apple?
09 A I did.

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)**Deposition Designation of Scott Forstall (Volume 1 & 2)
(March 8, 2021)****Time**

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
36 minutes 12 seconds	32 minutes 5 seconds



Δ DEFENDANT Δ	United States District Court Northern District of California
	Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR
	Case Title <i>Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.</i>
	Exhibit No. Depo. 9
	Date Entered _____
	Susan Y. Soong, Clerk
By: _____	Deputy Clerk

Forstall, Scott (Vol. 01) - March 8, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 01:03:58.057)****82 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 01:03:58.057)****1. PAGE 13:13 TO 13:15 (RUNNING 00:00:03.000)**

13 SCOTT FORSTALL,
 14 having been administered an oath, was examined and
 15 testified as follows:

2. PAGE 14:05 TO 14:06 (RUNNING 00:00:04.273)

05 Please state your full name for the record.
 06 A. Scott James Forstall.

3. PAGE 22:02 TO 22:05 (RUNNING 00:00:09.750)

02 Q. And so going back to the date I mentioned
 03 earlier, your departure from Apple was publicly
 04 announced in late October 2012; is that right?
 05 A. Correct.

4. PAGE 37:23 TO 38:01 (RUNNING 00:00:07.715)

23 Q. Understood. So let me clarify. Was Xcode
 24 an integrated development environment when it was
 25 released in 2003?
 00038:01 A. Yes.

5. PAGE 38:06 TO 38:08 (RUNNING 00:00:09.027)

06 Q. And was Xcode used internally at Apple to
 07 develop applications for the Mac?
 08 A. Yes.

6. PAGE 40:08 TO 40:09 (RUNNING 00:00:03.915)

08 Did Apple ever charge third party developers
 09 for OS X?

7. PAGE 40:12 TO 40:15 (RUNNING 00:00:18.096)

12 So while I was there, you're asking was the
 13 IDE a free download?
 14 Q. Yes, that's what I'm asking.
 15 A. Yes, I believe it was.

8. PAGE 40:24 TO 41:04 (RUNNING 00:00:23.060)

24 Q. And you understood at the time that the
 25 more -- the better applications that developers could
 00041:01 offer for Mac, that would help Apple make its
 02 customers, its Mac customers, happier and hopefully
 03 enlarge the number of Mac -- Mac customers that Apple
 04 has, correct?

9. PAGE 41:06 TO 41:13 (RUNNING 00:00:24.598)

06 THE WITNESS: Having more robust platform
 07 with nominal applications from Apple and third party
 08 developers is good for the platform, the customers
 09 and the developers.
 10 BY MR. EVEN:
 11 Q. And when you say it's good for the platform,
 12 it's good for Apple it's going to sell more
 13 computers, right?

10. PAGE 41:15 TO 41:18 (RUNNING 00:00:07.937)

15 THE WITNESS: It would likely sell more
 16 computers. It also may make customers who've already
 17 bought a computer happier because they have that
 18 application.

11. PAGE 52:21 TO 53:23 (RUNNING 00:02:05.600)

21 Q. When did you become involved with
 22 development of the iPhone?
 23 A. You're asking when I became or when Apple
 24 started or the year, part of the project, what --
 25 Q. I'm asking when you became, that was my
 00053:01 question. When did you become involved?
 02 A. Well, I helped start the project itself. So
 03 from day one.
 04 Q. And what year was that?
 05 A. I think it would -- it's hard to capture
 06 exactly when you consider the iPhone piece of it,
 07 'cause we actually started by developing for a tablet
 08 and then we shifted to developing a phone and put the
 09 tablet on hold and then came back and developed the
 10 iPad post iPhone.
 11 I think it was around 2003, 2004, when that
 12 work began.
 13 Q. When you say "that work began," you're
 14 referring to the early work on a tablet?
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. And when did that work morph into a work --
 17 into work on a phone?
 18 A. 2004, 2005, I think.
 19 Q. And were you tasked with creating the
 20 operating system for that phone?
 21 A. Yes. I was tasked with creating the
 22 operating system and the user interface for all the
 23 software.

12. PAGE 54:06 TO 54:13 (RUNNING 00:00:44.285)

06 Q. And was macOS 10 used as the basis for that
 07 operating system that you oversaw building?
 08 A. Broadly speaking, yes. There's many aspects
 09 of macOS 10. Some of those code bases were modified
 10 to be used as the basis of iPhone OS 1.0. Some of
 11 the code bases were cleaved. Some of the code bases
 12 were replaced. It was on a functionality and module
 13 basis.

13. PAGE 57:02 TO 57:05 (RUNNING 00:00:11.899)

02 Q. And who was the main proponent of using the
 03 macOS 10 as the basis for the operating system for
 04 the phone?
 05 A. I was.

14. PAGE 58:07 TO 58:17 (RUNNING 00:00:50.406)

07 What did you view as the main advantage of
 08 using macOS 10 as the basis for a phone operating
 09 system?
 10 A. We built macOS 10 specifically to be a
 11 modern operating system as different from, as we
 12 talked earlier, macOS 7, macOS 8, macOS 9. So many
 13 of the facilities for protected memory, preemption
 14 are available in macOS 10.
 15 So it had exactly the modern operating
 16 system facilities we would want to use in any
 17 project.

15. PAGE 62:11 TO 62:14 (RUNNING 00:00:09.940)

11 Q. Mr. Forstall, let me mark as Exhibit 869 a
12 document Bates stamped APL-EG 00422472.
13 (Exhibit 869 was marked for identification
14 and is attached hereto.)

16. PAGE 63:02 TO 63:05 (RUNNING 00:00:17.341)

02 Q. Mr. Forstall, do you see this is a December
03 31, 2006 e-mail from Ms. Meriko Borogove to you and
04 copying some others?
05 A. Yes.

17. PAGE 64:19 TO 64:21 (RUNNING 00:00:12.623)

19 Q. Was the ultimate phone released with an
20 operating system that's based on macOS 10?
21 A. Yes.

18. PAGE 65:18 TO 66:10 (RUNNING 00:01:04.590)

18 Who was Ms. Borogove?
19 A. She was an engineering manager in my team.
20 Q. And she writes in the second paragraph
21 (as read):
22 Our security model around
23 preventing third parties from
24 installing and running their own
25 code ...
00066:01 And she continues. Do you see that
02 sentence?
03 A. I do.
04 Q. And so at that time, the security approach
05 taken by Apple was to not allow any third party apps
06 to be installed on the phone, correct?
07 MS. MOYE: Object to the form.
08 THE WITNESS: Our plan for the first release
09 of the iPhone was not to enable native compiled third
10 party apps to install and run on the iPhone.

19. PAGE 66:12 TO 66:20 (RUNNING 00:00:50.833)

12 Q. And Ms. Borogove then described some of the
13 steps that were taken by Apple to make sure that
14 native compiled apps cannot be installed on the
15 phone, correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And Apple needed to take many steps to
18 prevent such installation because macOS 10 was built
19 in part to allow native compiled applications to be
20 installed on it, correct?

20. PAGE 66:22 TO 66:23 (RUNNING 00:00:09.042)

22 THE WITNESS: MacOS 10 enabled developers to
23 compile, install, and run applications.

21. PAGE 77:16 TO 77:20 (RUNNING 00:00:28.671)

16 And so my question was: With respect to
17 third party applications, was there a difference of
18 view among executives at Apple as to whether Apple
19 will or will not open the iPhone for such
20 applications after it had released the first iPhone?

22. PAGE 77:22 TO 77:23 (RUNNING 00:00:04.390)

22 THE WITNESS: On this particular question,
23 it's a great example where the specificity matters.

23. PAGE 77:24 TO 78:12 (RUNNING 00:00:58.365)

24 There were executives at Apple that thought we should
 25 never release the ability for third parties to do any
 00078:01 natively compiled applications.
 02 There were executives who thought -- and
 03 they thought we should just have web applications
 04 and -- and then websites running with web standards
 05 inside of the browser or browsers on the platform,
 06 the browser.
 07 There were executives who thought we should
 08 have a hybrid model of some web technologies and some
 09 native abilities. And then there were executives who
 10 thought we should provide a platform to enable third
 11 parties to build fully native applications on the
 12 platforms.

24. PAGE 78:16 TO 79:06 (RUNNING 00:01:08.107)

16 Who are the executives who fell into the
 17 first bucket that you mentioned that felt that Apple
 18 should never open up the platform to third party
 19 native applications?
 20 A. Steve Jobs was the most prominent of those.
 21 I don't remember specifically who else argued that
 22 point. But Steve -- Steve thought that we should not
 23 enable third party app development at all, as needed
 24 app development.
 25 Q. And is it fair to say that you stood on the
 00079:01 other side of this, the other end of the spectrum on
 02 that particular issue?
 03 A. I was probably the -- the most vocal
 04 advocate for enabling third party app development in
 05 an App Store, and this is discussions Steve and I had
 06 multiple times, heated ways.

25. PAGE 81:02 TO 84:06 (RUNNING 00:05:25.230)

02 Q. And you believed that native apps are going
 03 to, as you say here, provide a better experience for
 04 iPhone users, correct?
 05 A. Correct.
 06 Q. And looking back 15 years later, do you have
 07 any doubt that you were right at the time?
 08 A. No.
 09 Q. And why did you think that native apps will
 10 provide a better experience?
 11 A. There are many, many reasons. If you build
 12 a native app, you get to use the built-in frameworks
 13 as they were intended, as they were designed for a
 14 touch interface. You have all the facilities we
 15 built to quickly build, iterate, debug these native
 16 applications.
 17 I mean, I can go on and on and on for the
 18 benefits of native application versus a web
 19 application, and they are voluminous. They -- they
 20 are faster. They use less memory. They can take
 21 advantage of the native graphics, libraries, in a way
 22 that is either not available or would have to be
 23 shoehorned in for a web app or a different kind of
 24 application.
 25 So you can go -- you can go through and we
 00082:01 can go through for hours the advantages, but I would
 02 say the most telling reason is when we were building
 03 the original iPhone, we were building most of the
 04 built-in apps as native apps. So mail, calendar, we
 05 were building these as native apps. And they
 06 performed fantastically, the behavior felt right.

07 They loaded quickly. They -- you could switch
08 between applications quickly. It was an exceptional
09 experience.

10 We wanted web applications, because Steve
11 had not agreed with me to enable third party apps in
12 the first version, I still had the team building it
13 as a platform so that we could quickly enable third
14 party apps. This was part of my direction to the
15 team the whole time, even though Steve had said no.

16 But we wanted to make it so third party apps
17 that were based on web technologies and would be
18 enabled in version 10 would work as -- as best as we
19 could possible make them, because I still wanted
20 these to be a good experience, the best experience
21 they could be.

22 So we built a few of our own apps. I think
23 it was like weather, stocks, maybe the calculator, I
24 think there was like three of those that we built as
25 web technology apps, and they were similar to what a
00083:01 third party could have built when we shipped.

02 And, in fact, in January of 2007 when we had
03 the keynote and launched the iPhone, those were
04 web-based apps at the time of that launch, and they
05 did not perform well. We could tell using it that
06 they were not as good as performing as the built-in
07 apps.

08 Now, you can always through software start
09 to try to improve things, make its launch a little
10 better, use a little less memory, get a faster
11 processor, get more memory in the next iteration of
12 the iPhone. You can do things to try to make it can
13 better.

14 But because of the architecture, it sits as
15 an extra layer on top of the native layer, and
16 therefore, it's never going to be faster than the
17 native layer. There might be some advantages about
18 how the code loads in a modular fashion or something
19 else. But it just, for us, it wasn't as good as the
20 native ones.

21 And therefore, after we announced the iPhone
22 and demonstrated the iPhone between that and June 29,
23 we rewrote all those apps as native apps and they --
24 they shipped as native apps on the first version of
25 the iPhone.

00084:01 So even though there are arguments people
02 can and did make for using web technologies as the
03 sole way for third parties to build apps, my
04 experience was very clear that those apps would not
05 be as good as native apps, and I wanted to have the
06 best possible apps in the platform we could.

26. PAGE 85:01 TO 85:09 (RUNNING 00:00:42.650)

00085:01 Q. Fair to say that pretty quickly after the
02 launch of the iPhone, it became pretty clear that
03 there was huge demand from developers for the ability
04 to build native apps for the iPhone?

05 A. Yes.

06 Q. And one of the ways that this became clear
07 was that third party developers approached you and
08 asked whether they could do that; is that right?

09 A. Yes.

27. PAGE 85:19 TO 85:24 (RUNNING 00:00:28.145)

19 Q. And was one indicator that there were
20 constant attempt by hackers to essentially remove all
21 the protections that Ms. Borogove presented to us

22 awhile -- in the e-mail we read a little bit ago and
23 start loading third party applications, native
24 applications on to jail broken phones?

28. PAGE 86:01 TO 86:05 (RUNNING 00:00:21.761)

00086:01 THE WITNESS: After we shipped, developers
02 started jailbreaking phones and writing native
03 applications and I took that as an indication of
04 their passion to build applications, native
05 applications, for the iPhone.

29. PAGE 87:13 TO 88:14 (RUNNING 00:02:10.071)

13 Q. Fair to say that at the time you understood
14 that the attempts to block this tsunami of attempt
15 of -- of third party obligations was futile and
16 better for Apple to join in, rather than fight these
17 attempts?

18 MS. MOYE: Object to the form.

19 THE WITNESS: So I would not say it that
20 way.

21 BY MR. EVEN:

22 Q. How would you --

23 A. I would say we were very concerned about
24 people building viruses or malware for the phone, and
25 so any activity that I saw that involved jailbreaking
00088:01 and then trying to create malicious code, we would
02 vigilantly respond to and were not concerned, even if
03 it were a tsunami that we would give up on that.

04 We were going to be vigilant for all time as
05 protecting people in the security and the privacy of
06 their phones. I thought as I'd argued a year earlier
07 and -- and beyond that, that we should be creating a
08 platform and both enable and encourage developers to
09 build native apps for the phones.

10 So I did not see this as a bad thing that
11 developers wanted to dedicate their time and energy
12 and lives to building something cool for our
13 platform. If that cool thing was not malware or a
14 virus or something problematic.

30. PAGE 89:02 TO 89:25 (RUNNING 00:01:32.960)

02 Q. And one concern with jailbreaking I take it
03 was that just like the mechanisms that Ms. Borogove
04 wrote about that were not discriminating between
05 malware and so-called good applications, once a phone
06 is jail broken, all third party applications can go
07 on it without any distinguishing between malware or
08 malicious applications and good applications,
09 correct?

10 MS. MOYE: Object to the form.

11 THE WITNESS: The danger with jailbreaking
12 is, it breaks down, depending on how it's done,
13 potentially all of the consumer protections build
14 into the operating system.

15 Now, jailbreaking in general like this can't
16 be done accidentally. So consumers are still
17 protected in general, but if you do these certain
18 things which involve plugging into a computer and --
19 and going through a set of machinations, it does not
20 only allow maybe some positives the consumer might
21 believe or the developer might perceive of installing
22 an application, a game in this case, but it has the
23 very dangerous and significant downsides for
24 consumers of opening their phone up to potential
25 viruses or malware.

31. PAGE 90:19 TO 90:22 (RUNNING 00:00:09.891)

19 Q. Got it. What was your official title at the
20 time?
21 A. Senior vice-president of software, iPhone
22 software something.

32. PAGE 98:15 TO 103:15 (RUNNING 00:09:40.910)

15 Q. Mr. Forstall, let me mark as Exhibit 873 a
16 document Bates stamped APL-EG_00460878, and this is
17 an October 1 chain between yourself and Mr. Lamiraux,
18 if I'm pronouncing that right, and the subject is:
19 Re: Cocoa Touch apps.
20 (Exhibit 873 marked for identification and is
21 attached hereto.)
22 BY MR. EVEN:
23 Q. My first question is, is this an e-mail
24 chain you exchanged with Mr. Lamiraux in early
25 October 2007 in the ordinary course of your work at
00099:01 Apple?
02 A. Give me a minute to look it over.
03 Q. Sure.
04 A. Okay. Yes, this is an e-mail I received
05 during the normal course of business.
06 Q. This is an e-mail you received and an e-mail
07 that you sent, right, it's an exchange of e-mails
08 between you and Mr. Lamiraux, correct?
09 A. There is an e-mail that I sent to Henri and
10 there is his response as well.
11 Q. So let's start with the subject. What is
12 Cocoa Touch?
13 A. Cocoa Touch is a name we used for the frame
14 works, notably normally the high level frame works
15 for Cocoa on the iPhones, the native frame works.
16 Now, it's used in multiple ways, sometimes
17 it's used to mean all the frame works, sometimes it's
18 used just to mean the user interface level.
19 Q. Okay. And when you wrote here: Cocoa Touch
20 apps as the subject of your e-mail, that pertains to
21 native apps, third party apps on the iPhone, correct?
22 A. Right. I'm distinguishing here between web
23 apps which we had and continue to have and this is
24 talking about natively compiled iPhone apps for third
25 parties using the Cocoa Touch frame works.
00100:01 Q. And -- you're writing (as read):
02 I'm trying to capture the issues
03 with taking Cocoa Touch public.
04 What am I missing.
05 Do you see that?
06 A. I do.
07 Q. And so -- and below, you try to capture the
08 issues with, that you've identified with opening up
09 the -- the iPhone for third party native apps,
10 correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And what was the role of Mr. Lamiraux?
13 A. Henri led the team, the engineering team, he
14 was an engineering director, reporting directly to
15 me. He was responsible for some of the native
16 frameworks and many of the native apps.
17 Q. When you say "the native apps" you mean
18 Apple developed native apps, correct?
19 A. The apps that shipped on the iPhone as part
20 of iPhone OS, correct.
21 Q. And first you point to several risks in
22 making Cocoa Touch public, correct?
23 A. Correct.

24 Q. And you say, for example, the risks of
25 viruses. That's one you identify, correct?
00101:01 A. Correct.
02 Q. Another one is: Harder to switch
03 processors.
04 Why is it harder to switch processors?
05 A. Yeah, this is a really big deal. When you
06 have a native app, it is compiled into the
07 instruction set of a specific processor. For
08 instance, if you're on a Windows machine now-a-days,
09 it's probably compiled into an Intel instruction set.
10 And what we had found when I -- you know,
11 I've worked at NeXT and we had actually switched
12 processors and then at Apple we had switched
13 processors again, if you have natively compiled apps
14 out there, that native binary will not just run on
15 your new processor. You have multiple options for
16 this.
17 And so we talked earlier about this when we
18 brought up macOS 10 that we had, you know, like
19 Classic, but that's this, this blue box Classic
20 emulation mode that tries to take those processor
21 instructions and convert them into one that can run
22 on the new processor.
23 So in this case when I'm talking about was a
24 risk, well, if Apple is building only natively
25 compile applications and third parties are building
00102:01 web applications, a huge advantage to those third
02 parties of those web apps is no matter what Apple
03 does with the processor, those keep running, because
04 they're interpreted.
05 So each time you get a new, if Apple
06 switches iPhone -- this is true today. If Apple
07 switches to a new processor those web apps have this
08 big advantage that they just keep running going
09 forward, because interpreted on the -- on the
10 processor.
11 And if Apple is running all -- all native
12 apps come from Apple, then to introduce a new phone
13 with a new processor, all you need to do is Apple
14 will recompile every one of those apps, the source
15 code to those apps, to the new processor and then
16 release it.
17 The liability here is if you now have third
18 party natively compiled apps and you want to bring
19 out a new processor which you think will be faster,
20 more security, whatever, and there will be advantages
21 this new processor might have, and there are third
22 party native apps in the marketplace that customers
23 are relying upon, you have to find some solution for
24 those customers.
25 The solution could be convince the
00103:01 developers to take that source code and recompile it
02 for the new processor. Which might work. But if
03 that, let's say that company is out of business or no
04 longer is staffing that app any more, doesn't want to
05 put in the amount of money and time and effort it
06 would take to recompile that, you get stuck.
07 So then you -- look, do you simulate it also
08 or do you have customers now who are left not being
09 able to buy a new iPhone because doing so would then
10 disable functionality in the form third party apps
11 they've come to rely upon for their business.
12 Q. So essentially you get breakage with some of
13 the third party apps potentially if you switch
14 processors?
15 A. Correct?

33. PAGE 108:22 TO 108:24 (RUNNING 00:00:10.324)

22 Q. Let me now mark Exhibit 875, APL-EG_0098292.
 23 (Exhibit 875 was marked for identification
 24 and is attached hereto.)

34. PAGE 109:12 TO 109:23 (RUNNING 00:00:30.342)

12 Q. First question was, what is "MacOS X
 13 Embedded"?
 14 A. I think the authors of this document took it
 15 to mean iPhone OS which would be used on the iPhone
 16 and it was to be used to iPod Touch at the time, but
 17 I think they're taking it to mean the same thing.
 18 Q. Okay. And is this a document you had
 19 received in the ordinary course of your work at
 20 Apple?
 21 A. Likely. I mean, I don't see a e-mail trail
 22 anything, but this -- I would have expected to have
 23 received this document.

35. PAGE 110:08 TO 110:13 (RUNNING 00:00:15.971)

08 Q. And the document is prepared by three
 09 people, Mitch Adler, John Wright, and Dallas
 10 De Atley.
 11 Do you see that?
 12 A. Well, it says "et al." So it's prepared by
 13 more than just them, but three named authors.

36. PAGE 111:02 TO 111:09 (RUNNING 00:00:33.826)

02 Q. And were they -- was part of their -- was
 03 part of their job to oversee security?
 04 A. Part of their job was to oversee security.
 05 Q. And did they oversee security on both
 06 macOS 10 and iPhone or just one of them?
 07 A. I believe they were in groups that oversaw
 08 security on both platforms and I do believe they
 09 oversaw security on both platforms.

37. PAGE 111:10 TO 112:20 (RUNNING 00:02:19.911)

10 Q. So going to the first page, do you see that
 11 the document begins by saying (as read):
 12 The transition from a closed
 13 system to one with a more open
 14 developer model demands answers to
 15 questions of control and security.
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A. I do.
 18 Q. Going further down under applications, they
 19 say they assume the (as read):
 20 Existence of a robust sandbox to
 21 contain applications and developers.
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A. By the way, I would not have characterized
 24 the way they characterized that first statement, for
 25 the record.
 00112:01 So what's your second question.
 02 Q. What do you mean by you would not have
 03 characterized the way they characterized, sorry?
 04 A. The statement you read said: The transition
 05 from a closed system to one with more open
 06 developer -- a more open developer model demands
 07 answers to questions of control and security.
 08 Q. Got it.
 09 A. And I would characterize ours as not a
 10 closed system, because we did have both a web

11 browser. So all web applications ran, and we
 12 supported these web apps. I don't remember if the
 13 web apps by this time could be placed on the home
 14 screen as well, which I thought was important enough
 15 that I think I'm the lead patent holder on that
 16 patent. So that was an important thing.
 17 So -- so calling it a closed system, which
 18 is their words, not mine, I would not say that. I
 19 would say that we were going to a -- more developer
 20 opportunities with native apps.

38. PAGE 117:13 TO 117:18 (RUNNING 00:00:09.016)

13 Q. And they say (as read):
 14 Distribution through the web
 15 should be supported, but Apple will
 16 provide no transfer protection.
 17 Do you see that?
 18 A. I do.

39. PAGE 117:25 TO 118:02 (RUNNING 00:00:09.934)

25 Q. And "through the web" here means through a
 00118:01 website operated by the developer or through a store
 02 operated by a third party, correct?

40. PAGE 118:04 TO 118:05 (RUNNING 00:00:05.019)

04 THE WITNESS: Well, it doesn't say, but it
 05 would be through a mechanism that is not iTunes.

41. PAGE 118:07 TO 118:08 (RUNNING 00:00:06.753)

07 Q. And not the App Store, correct?
 08 A. And not the App Store. The Apple App Store.

42. PAGE 118:25 TO 119:17 (RUNNING 00:00:53.803)

25 Q. And if you go to appendix C, developer
 00119:01 scenarios, the first one is: Guy in his basement.
 02 Do you see that?
 03 A. I do.
 04 Q. And I gather this is their speak for small
 05 time developers, stand alone developer, correct?
 06 A. Yes.
 07 Q. And under 3: Decide you have final version
 08 to deploy, do you see that they say what the
 09 developer needs to do, A -- or 3.1, sorry (as read):
 10 Submit to Apple for signing and
 11 then get signed image and deploy as
 12 you wish.
 13 Do you see that?
 14 A. I do.
 15 Q. And deploy as you wish here again, means
 16 distribute in whichever way you believe best serves
 17 your interests, correct?

43. PAGE 119:19 TO 119:24 (RUNNING 00:00:14.296)

19 THE WITNESS: I could define it as you wish,
 20 but you get assigned image and you deploy it
 21 yourself.
 22 BY MR. EVEN:
 23 Q. And "deploy" here means distribute, correct?
 24 A. Correct.

44. PAGE 125:12 TO 125:12 (RUNNING 00:00:01.979)

12 Exhibit 877. And tab 877 -- sorry, PX877 is

45. PAGE 125:13 TO 125:15 (RUNNING 00:00:05.791)

13 APL-EG_01025133.
14 (Exhibit 877 was marked for identification
15 and is attached hereto.)

46. PAGE 127:03 TO 127:08 (RUNNING 00:00:34.474)

03 Q. And this, too, came from your files, fair to
04 assume that this, too, is a document that you would
05 have received back in 2007?
06 A. If you're correct about the date it was
07 created, I would have received it sometime around
08 when it was created, I'll expect.

47. PAGE 129:08 TO 129:24 (RUNNING 00:00:49.273)

08 Q. Under Distribution Method, on page 2 you see
09 that it says (as read):
10 We will distribute third party
11 applications through the iTunes
12 Music Store. However, our model
13 will allow for third parties to
14 distribute their own applications
15 and for enterprise customers to
16 deploy to their own devices.
17 Do you see that?
18 A. I do.
19 Q. And do you recall that there was a time
20 around October or November of -- of 2007, sorry,
21 where that was the plan of record at Apple, that
22 third parties could sign their applications as we've
23 seen before and then distribute as they wish, as this
24 last document we saw --

48. PAGE 130:05 TO 131:12 (RUNNING 00:01:28.868)

05 THE WITNESS: Let me start with the first.
06 This statement says (as read):
07 We will distribute third party
08 applications through the iTunes
09 Music Store.
10 Okay. Second sentence says (as read):
11 However, our model will allow for
12 third parties to distribute their
13 own applications ...
14 It does not say our policy is to allow that.
15 This is a technical document from a technical team
16 who is building the security infrastructure, and so
17 their statement here is that the model -- the
18 technical infrastructure they're building will allow
19 for other distribution mechanisms.
20 BY MR. EVEN:
21 Q. Good. Thank you.
22 And then it goes -- if you go further below,
23 do you see it says (as read):
24 Signing does not imply a specific
25 distribution method, and it's left
00131:01 as a policy decision as to whether
02 Apple signed application are posted
03 to the online store, or we allow
04 developers to distribute on their
05 own.
06 Do you see that?
07 A. I do.
08 Q. And do you recall that there was a time
09 around October or November 2007 when that policy
10 decision has not yet been made, it is up in the air?
11 A. There was a time when that decision had not

12 yet been made.

49. PAGE 142:24 TO 145:08 (RUNNING 00:05:36.701)

24 Q. Do you recall that there was a debate within
25 Apple about whether Apple should allow distribution
00143:01 only through the App Store or whether it should allow
02 developers to distribute native apps through other
03 means?

04 A. So there were discussions about what the
05 distribution mechanisms could be, and as you pointed
06 out in one of the white papers we looked at, it
07 talked about potential mechanisms in the operating
08 system for how to make each of these secure in
09 different ways.

10 And then there were discussions about how
11 effective those different mechanisms could be and
12 what mechanisms we should enable for our customers.

13 Q. Fair to say that there was a contingent
14 within Apple that thought that developers should be
15 able to distribute their apps through a different
16 mechanism than the App Store?

17 MS. MOYE: Objection to the form.

18 THE WITNESS: There were discussions about
19 how we could enable developers to distribute their
20 apps, one being the App Store, another being
21 distribute them sort of directly the way, say, people
22 do on Windows. Although, I think Windows might have
23 an App Store also now. But distribute, you know,
24 through Windows. Back in the day, you had to
25 distribute through shrink wrap at a physical store.

00144:01 So we had discussions about the merits and
02 dangers of distributing in different ways, within a
03 company, and then beyond the company.

04 BY MR. EVEN:

05 Q. And you don't recall arguments about whether
06 Apple should or should not allow distribution through
07 the web, for example?

08 A. I remember going through the various
09 options. I can't point to a specific conversation
10 about some of these mechanisms, but I can recall my
11 thinking on the reasons for doing certain ways and
12 why certain mechanisms might be better or worse than
13 others, and why we came to the conclusion that we
14 did.

15 And I'm certain there were people giving
16 input and opinions on the merits for each of these
17 different mechanisms, and that's just responsible to
18 consider different mechanisms and the pros and cons
19 of them.

20 MR. EVEN: Jessica, can you bring up 478,
21 please.

22 Q. Who were the main proponents of distribution
23 only through the App Store?

24 A. Sorry. Is there a document I'm supposed to
25 be looking at?

00145:01 Q. Nope.

02 A. Okay. Sorry. I thought you said -- who
03 were the proponents? After we had gone through the
04 discussion, I think basically all of the execs were
05 proponents of the App Store, plus our enterprise
06 distribution models as being the two best mechanisms
07 to protect our mutual customers and get wide
08 distribution for developers.

50. PAGE 161:20 TO 162:04 (RUNNING 00:00:42.406)

20 Q. Do you recall you gave a presentation, I

21 think we discussed that earlier, in March 2008,
 22 introducing the SDKs for the iPhone?
 23 A. In 2008, we had an event where we launched
 24 and publicly announced the iPhone SDK, in App Store.
 25 Q. And you personally presented in that -- in
 00162:01 that event and specifically the portion about the
 02 SDK, correct?
 03 A. Correct.
 04 Q. If you look at Exhibit 880.

51. PAGE 162:05 TO 162:12 (RUNNING 00:00:18.729)

05 (Exhibit 880 was marked for identification
 06 and is attached hereto.)
 07 BY MR. EVEN:
 08 Q. Do you recognize this as a transcript
 09 prepared by Apple of the event on March 6, 2008,
 10 launching the iPhone SDK?
 11 A. Yeah. This appears to be a transcript of
 12 that event.

52. PAGE 162:13 TO 162:16 (RUNNING 00:00:12.098)

13 Q. After you were done introducing the SDKs,
 14 you turned the -- the baton over to Mr. Jobs to
 15 present the App Store; is that right?
 16 A. Yes.

53. PAGE 163:14 TO 164:11 (RUNNING 00:01:17.544)

14 Q. If you go to the page ending in 075.
 15 A. Okay.
 16 Q. And you see that in the fourth paragraph
 17 beginning: "Now, developers."
 18 Do you see that paragraph?
 19 A. I do.
 20 Q. And in the middle of the paragraph, Mr. Jobs
 21 says (as read):
 22 When we sell the app through the
 23 App Store, the developer gets
 24 70 percent of the revenues right off
 25 the top. We keep 30 to pay for
 00164:01 running the App Store.
 02 Do you see that?
 03 A. I do.
 04 Q. And going to the next paragraph he says,
 05 second full sentence after the second question mark
 06 (as read):
 07 So when a developer wants to
 08 distribute their app for free, there
 09 is no charge for free apps at all.
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. Followed by "applause." Yep.

54. PAGE 164:12 TO 164:25 (RUNNING 00:00:36.304)

12 Q. And do you see that in the next paragraph,
 13 Mr. Jobs said -- talks about some apps that will not
 14 be allowed. And then he says (as read):
 15 ... we have exactly the same
 16 interest as the vast majority of our
 17 developers, which is to get a ton of
 18 apps out there for the iPhone and we
 19 think we've invented an incredibly
 20 great way to do it ...
 21 Do you see that?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. You were there and heard all that being said
 24 at the time, right?

25 A. Yes.

55. PAGE 165:01 TO 166:14 (RUNNING 00:02:04.050)

00165:01 Q. Now, if you go to the page ending in 079.
 02 A. Okay.
 03 Q. And Mr. Jobs is being asked what sorts of --
 04 the bottom half of the page (as read):
 05 What sorts of safeguards have you
 06 built in to make sure that all these
 07 apps and applications that are going
 08 to be coming on to the iPhone are
 09 secure?
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. I do.
 12 Q. And Mr. Jobs says how are we going to do
 13 that, and first he explains the way we're going to do
 14 it is that developers have to register with us, and
 15 for that \$99 that they paid to join the program they
 16 actually get an electronic certificate, and that
 17 tells us who they are, and so if they write a
 18 malicious app we can track them down, we can tell
 19 their parents.
 20 Do you see that?
 21 (Reporter clarification.)
 22 BY MR. EVEN:
 23 Q. Do you see that?
 24 A. I do.
 25 Q. And that is a version of the same signing
 00166:01 mechanism that we have discussed now over multiple
 02 documents, correct?
 03 A. That is part of this, yes.
 04 Q. And then on the next page, Mr. Jobs says
 05 (as read):
 06 The other thing we can do since
 07 the distribution of their
 08 applications is going to be through
 09 the App Store, if we're alerted to a
 10 malicious app that we didn't catch,
 11 we'll turn off the spigots so no
 12 more people download it.
 13 Do you see that?
 14 A. Yes.

56. PAGE 171:05 TO 171:16 (RUNNING 00:00:37.901)

05 Q. So let's look at that question, and that's
 06 on page 081. And the question is at the top third --
 07 third sort of bullet, third paragraph (as read):
 08 Isn't the fact that Apple is
 09 going to be the exclusive
 10 distributor for all these
 11 applications raise some questions
 12 about monopolies and so forth? What
 13 if a developer doesn't want to
 14 distribute through the App Store?
 15 Do you see that question?
 16 A. I do. I didn't realize that you attended

57. PAGE 173:05 TO 174:07 (RUNNING 00:01:25.966)

05 Q. Mr. Forstall, going down the page, you see
 06 that there's some back and forth, and then Mr. Jobs
 07 said (as read):
 08 Also, just to make it a little
 09 clearer, we don't intend to make
 10 money off the App Store.
 11 Do you see that statement?

12 A. I see that statement on the page.
 13 Q. And do you see that then Mr. Jobs then
 14 explained that Apple doesn't make a lot of money off
 15 of iTunes. Do you see that?

16 A. I do.
 17 Q. And then he says -- I'm reading (as read):
 18 ... in the case of the iTunes
 19 Music Store, we give all the money
 20 to the content owners and we are
 21 basically giving all the money to
 22 the developers here and if that 30
 23 percent of it pays for running the
 24 store, well that will be great.
 25 Do you see -- did I read that correctly?

00174:01 A. Yes.
 02 Q. And the 30 percent that Mr. Jobs is alluding
 03 to is the 30 percent commission that Apple keeps when
 04 there's a distribution of a paid app through the
 05 store, correct?
 06 A. It's 30 percent of the gross revenue of an
 07 app through the App Store.

58. PAGE 174:08 TO 174:10 (RUNNING 00:00:12.992)

08 Q. You understand that for the past decade or
 09 so, the 30 percent that Apple keeps does much more
 10 than pay for running the store, correct?

59. PAGE 174:12 TO 174:13 (RUNNING 00:00:06.450)

12 THE WITNESS: I understand that app -- the
 13 30 percent is making Apple a profit.

60. PAGE 183:22 TO 184:01 (RUNNING 00:00:12.132)

22 Q. So with that, Mr. Forstall, if you can go to
 23 Exhibit 882, which is APL-EG_00260094.
 24 (Exhibit 882 was marked for identification
 25 and is attached hereto.)
 00184:01 MR. EVEN: This document is a e-mail

61. PAGE 184:02 TO 184:07 (RUNNING 00:00:21.793)

02 correspondence between Mr. Forstall and Mr. Schiller,
 03 dated January 21, 2008.
 04 Q. Mr. Forstall, is this an e-mail chain that
 05 you sent and received as part of the ordinary course
 06 of your employment at Apple?
 07 A. Yes.

62. PAGE 187:21 TO 188:07 (RUNNING 00:00:42.051)

21 Q. Okay. And I think you mentioned earlier
 22 today when talking about, for instance, something
 23 like HTML5, you mentioned that HTML5 is sort of
 24 agnostic to the underlying processor because you --
 25 the developers write for HTML5, right? And so HTML5
 00188:01 is a cross-platform platform in that sense?
 02 A. HTML5 standards are interpreted code so they
 03 are agnostic to the specific processor on which they
 04 run.
 05 Q. And in that sense they serve as a
 06 cross-platform platform for web app developers,
 07 correct?

63. PAGE 188:09 TO 188:12 (RUNNING 00:00:12.655)

09 THE WITNESS: For web app developers and web
 10 developers in general, they can serve as a
 11 cross-platform development platform, which sometimes

12 can work very well.

64. PAGE 188:13 TO 189:03 (RUNNING 00:01:00.060)

13 Now, they run inside of a browser generally,
14 and browsers have been built up with an enormous
15 amount of security over time. I mean, even though
16 you see viruses sometimes come through web browsers,
17 but the more mature ones are getting better and
18 better at it.

19 Just as an aside, sometimes that works
20 really great and it's interesting like today we're
21 doing this deposition and we are using a native app,
22 which is Zoom so we can see each other, and then
23 we're using a web app to exchange documents.

24 Well, those documents, you know, that's an
25 important way to go and they're secure and that's
00189:01 being done through an app inside of a web browser,
02 too, HTML5 and beyond standards, so both mechanisms
03 of building can work well.

65. PAGE 189:21 TO 190:08 (RUNNING 00:00:27.436)

21 Q. And so back then, too, you thought that what
22 they're planning is really a cross-platform platform
23 as you called it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And you then say (as read):

00190:01 While I would prefer developers
02 use web standards -- you mention a
03 couple -- or go native if they want
04 more, I'm not sure we shouldn't take
05 the high ground and let them build
06 it and complete.
07 Do you see that?

08 A. I do.

66. PAGE 192:23 TO 193:02 (RUNNING 00:00:17.436)

23 Q. And Mr. Schiller has taken -- upon hearing
24 it has taken the initial opposite view to yours,
25 correct?

00193:01 A. It sounds like his initial opinion is very
02 different from mine.

67. PAGE 193:03 TO 194:08 (RUNNING 00:01:23.379)

03 Q. And at the end of the day, Mr. Schiller also
04 says (as read):

05 In the grand scheme of things --
06 of APIs we could choose to support
07 beyond our own, if we ever did
08 support another (which I don't
09 recommend), Yahoo's Widget API is
10 not even close to the most important
11 one we would pick, some of the other
12 ones I listed above (like Flash) are
13 way more important ...

14 Do you see that?

15 A. I do.

16 Q. Flash was another cross-platform platform?

17 A. In some ways. I mean, Flash is a pretty big
18 conversation in and of itself.

19 Q. I understand. I'm not trying to hear the
20 entire Flash story.

21 A. Well, there's a long Flash story in here
22 which is -- I mean, yeah. 'Cause we tried to work
23 with them also. Yes. Flash can be used as a
24 cross-platform platform as well.

25 Q. And then Mr. Schiller (as read):
00194:01 Besides, we have a way to do
02 Widgets that competes with theirs,
03 so who cares?
04 Do you see that?
05 A. I do.
06 Q. And did Apple end up supporting the Yahoo
07 widget engine?
08 A. We did not.

68. PAGE 194:09 TO 194:20 (RUNNING 00:00:44.060)

09 Q. Did you end up supporting Flash?
10 A. We did not ship Flash. We tried to make
11 Flash work. We helped Adobe. We -- we definitely
12 were interested. Again, this is one where I thought
13 if we could help make it work, this could be great.
14 Flash has been such a problem because it -- the way
15 that it hooks into systems, it's been a virus
16 nightmare on -- on Windows, even on the Mac.
17 And when we got it running on iOS, the
18 performance was just abysmal and embarrassing and it
19 could never get to something which would be consumer
20 value add.

69. PAGE 194:21 TO 194:22 (RUNNING 00:00:03.632)

21 Q. And so you never shipped with Flash either?
22 A. We did not.

70. PAGE 195:01 TO 195:10 (RUNNING 00:00:26.039)

00195:01 Q. Did you support Java?
02 A. We did not.
03 Q. And he also mentioned Adobe's Air. Do you
04 support Adobe Air?
05 A. I do not believe so.
06 Q. What about Microsoft Silverlight?
07 A. We did not support that. I don't even know
08 if that exists anymore, but we did not support that.
09 Q. And Qualcomm's Brew?
10 A. We did not support that.

71. PAGE 195:22 TO 196:03 (RUNNING 00:00:26.779)

22 Q. I wasn't suggesting that. I asked whether
23 you recall that there were cross-compilers available
24 from third parties that allowed people to develop
25 apps that would run on iOS.
00196:01 A. I think people were trying to create
02 cross-compilers. I don't remember if any of those
03 were used in the real world.

72. PAGE 196:04 TO 196:07 (RUNNING 00:00:14.590)

04 Q. Do you recall that Apple at some point
05 decided to ban the use of cross-compilers for
06 developing apps for the -- for iOS?
07 A. Yes.

73. PAGE 198:10 TO 198:14 (RUNNING 00:00:14.132)

10 Q. Cross-compilers are used for cross-platform
11 development, right?
12 A. In general they can be used for a couple
13 things, but yes, they can be used for cross-platform
14 development.

74. PAGE 206:14 TO 206:21 (RUNNING 00:00:12.042)

14 (Exhibit 886 was marked for identification)

15 and is attached hereto.)
 16 BY MR. EVEN:
 17 Q. Do you see this is an e-mail from Philip
 18 Schiller to yourself, copying Mr. Jobs on July 16,
 19 2011?
 20 A. Give me a minute. There's a lot of e-mails
 21 in here, so I'm going to scan through it briefly.

75. PAGE 207:01 TO 207:06 (RUNNING 00:00:14.197)

00207:01 Q. Mr. Forstall, is this an e-mail that you
 02 received?
 03 A. Yes.
 04 Q. And is in an e-mail that you received as
 05 part of the ordinary course of your work at Apple?
 06 A. Yes.

76. PAGE 208:02 TO 208:03 (RUNNING 00:00:03.628)

02 And Mark here again is Mr. Zuckerberg?
 03 A. Yep.

77. PAGE 208:04 TO 208:06 (RUNNING 00:00:18.353)

04 Q. And so Facebook wanted to have either an
 05 embedded web view or links to web apps in its iPad
 06 native app, correct?

78. PAGE 208:08 TO 208:15 (RUNNING 00:00:23.502)

08 THE WITNESS: Facebook was looking in their
 09 iPad app to enable embedded apps with inside of that
 10 app.
 11 BY MR. EVEN:
 12 Q. And you told them they can't do that,
 13 correct?
 14 A. We said they should not include embedded
 15 apps inside of the native app.

79. PAGE 209:25 TO 210:11 (RUNNING 00:00:57.300)

25 Q. And the concern is that if Facebook did
 00210:01 this, if it did include these links, then it would
 02 operate as a storefront for web apps, correct?
 03 MS. MOYE: Objection to the form.
 04 THE WITNESS: The idea is if they were doing
 05 this -- I mean, there's many issues, it could be very
 06 confusing to users if they're making it appear to be
 07 an app store, but it's not taking you to the native
 08 apps you can download on to a platform. It's unclear
 09 exactly what the point of that directory of links
 10 with inside of an application would -- would present
 11 itself as.

80. PAGE 211:08 TO 212:01 (RUNNING 00:01:07.900)

08 Q. Mr. Forstall, what you told Mr. Zuckerberg
 09 is not to include embedded apps in the Facebook iPad
 10 app either in an embedded web view or as a directory
 11 of links that would redirect to Safari. This speaks
 12 to HTML5 web apps, correct?
 13 A. No --
 14 MS. MOYE: Objection to the form.
 15 THE WITNESS: This speaks to what Facebook
 16 would do in its native iPad app. Facebook when using
 17 HTML, HTML5, all web standards, as a website which
 18 is, you know, how you probably access Facebook when
 19 you're sitting on your Windows machine or your Mac,
 20 that uses web standards and works exactly how they
 21 built Facebook from day one.

22 This is talking about what do they do in the
23 native iPhone or iOS app and iPad app, in this case.
24 BY MR. EVEN:
25 Q. I understand that, but that wasn't my
00212:01 question, Mr. Forstall.

81. PAGE 212:02 TO 212:04 (RUNNING 00:00:15.815)

02 My question was: You told Mr. Zuckerberg
03 that Facebook should not embed or link to HTML5 apps
04 from its native app, correct?

82. PAGE 212:06 TO 212:09 (RUNNING 00:00:19.344)

06 THE WITNESS: I said -- the message that I
07 delivered was that Facebook in their native app
08 should not redirect to links that would take you to
09 Safari in this directory.

Forstall, Scott (Vol. 02) - March 8, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:07:40.616)****13 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:07:40.616)****1. PAGE 230:05 TO 230:11 (RUNNING 00:00:44.125)**

05 Q. Mr. Forstall, do you recall that after the
 06 App Store opened, there were developers who deployed
 07 mechanisms for collection of payments within their app;
 08 for instance, through opening an embedded web app,
 09 collect payment, things of that nature?
 10 A. I remember there was some sort of payment thing.
 11 I don't remember the specifics. I remember generally.

2. PAGE 230:16 TO 230:18 (RUNNING 00:00:16.143)

16 Q. Okay, but you were aware that developers found
 17 ways to -- to make sales within their app, and collect
 18 payment for those sales?

3. PAGE 230:20 TO 230:22 (RUNNING 00:00:08.518)

20 THE WITNESS: I remember a general concept
 21 that some developers were trying to collect payment
 22 through their apps.

4. PAGE 230:24 TO 231:02 (RUNNING 00:00:18.824)

24 Q. And do you recall there came a time when Apple
 25 decided to offer its own payment mechanism for
 00231:01 applications that sold digital content?
 02 A. Yes.

5. PAGE 231:06 TO 231:08 (RUNNING 00:00:12.291)

06 Q. And applications that sold physical goods remained
 07 free to use whatever other mechanisms they wanted.
 08 They couldn't use the Apple mechanism. Correct?

6. PAGE 231:15 TO 231:19 (RUNNING 00:00:18.786)

15 THE WITNESS: Apps could not use Apple's
 16 in-app purchase for the sale of physical goods.
 17 BY MR. EVEN:
 18 Q. But they could use other mechanisms. Correct?
 19 A. Yes.

7. PAGE 232:05 TO 232:07 (RUNNING 00:00:17.530)

05 Q. But apps that sold digital content were required
 06 to do so using the IAP API. Correct?
 07 A. Correct.

8. PAGE 234:08 TO 234:08 (RUNNING 00:00:02.128)

08 Q. If you look at Exhibit 888, Exhibit 888 is Bates

9. PAGE 234:09 TO 234:17 (RUNNING 00:00:43.244)

09 stamped APL-APPSTORE_10080247. And it's a cover
 10 email attaching a -- what appears to be a slide deck,
 11 with the tagline "App Commerce Models." Do you see
 12 that?
 13 A. I do.
 14 Q. And is that an email that you received together
 15 with its -- with its attachment on 11 December 2008 in

16 the ordinary course of your work at Apple?
17 A. Yeah.

10. PAGE 252:06 TO 252:13 (RUNNING 00:00:29.053)

06 Q. Okay. We discussed earlier that there were some
07 apps on the App Store prior to the release of IAP
08 that were using their own payment mechanisms for
09 different kinds of purchases made in the app. Correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And some of those then needed to switch over to
12 IAP once IAP was released. Correct?
13 A. At some time frame.

11. PAGE 252:16 TO 254:10 (RUNNING 00:03:25.791)

16 Do you recall, without divulging any legal advice,
17 all the reasons why Apple decided to require that all
18 digital sales must use API [sic]?
19 MS. MOYE: Do you mean to say "IAP"?
20 MR. EVEN: IAP. Sorry.
21 THE WITNESS: I mean, there are a number of
22 reasons we added IAP. It was to make it easier for
23 developers to sell digital goods.
24 If you're a game developer and you have an extra
25 level that you'd like to sell, but the customer has to
00253:01 enter a credit card, that could be a huge impediment to
02 the customer buying that extra level; whereas if it
03 just says, "Hey, click this button, and, for 99 cents,
04 you get another level," the user is much more likely to
05 click it. And Apple already has your credit card on
06 file, so it -- it really streamlines it. And it's a
07 huge win for the developer to have an easy mechanism
08 built in to -- to sell goods inside the app. So that
09 was -- that was the main reason we did it: To make it
10 much, much easier for developers to have another
11 revenue stream.
12 And, as the App Store -- as apps matured, we
13 just learned a lot more about different mechanisms for
14 how to help developers make money.
15 BY MR. EVEN:
16 Q. Any other reasons that you recall, without
17 divulging any legal advice?
18 A. Any other reasons for what?
19 Q. For requiring the use of IAP for in-app sales of
20 digital goods.
21 A. Well, another reason was to make it consistent
22 everywhere. So if users were to see a consistent
23 panel, they'd be more likely to accept that.
24 If, again, everything's different every time,
25 users might be afraid to click, you know, one -- one
00254:01 place and not another place, because they might think
02 they're going to get a credit-card form added. And so
03 if you had a standard panel across everything, that was
04 another.
05 Another was we did have this 70:30 revenue split
06 in the store for sales. And it was to avoid apps from
07 trying to basically circumvent that by having a free
08 download that wasn't actually free. It was -- Apple
09 would pay for everything for the download, and then
10 they would charge the customer.

12. PAGE 254:11 TO 254:13 (RUNNING 00:00:06.133)

11 Q. Any other reason?
12 A. I'm sure there are more that I'm not thinking of
13 right now.

13. PAGE 255:18 TO 256:02 (RUNNING 00:00:38.050)

18 Do you recall the year that the App Store was
19 launched?
20 A. 2008.
21 Q. And in 2008 what were your -- from a high level,
22 what were your general duties and responsibilities at
23 Apple?
24 A. I ran all software for the iPhone OS, so iOS,
25 plus I was responsible for macOS 10 releases, and all
00256:01 design of software user interface design, and a set of
02 other things.

Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)**Deposition Designation of C.K. Haun (Vol. 1 & 2)**
(January 13, 2021)
(January 14, 2021)**Time**

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
21 minutes 46 seconds	1 minute 49 seconds

Haun, CK (Vol. 01) - January 13, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:21:43.256)****32 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:21:43.256)****1. PAGE 6:17 TO 6:19 (RUNNING 00:00:07.775)**

17 C.K. Haun
 18 having been first duly sworn, was
 19 examined and testified as follows:

2. PAGE 11:01 TO 11:05 (RUNNING 00:00:15.464)

00011:01 So now I want to go to your starting to
 02 work at Apple. You gave me the exact date although
 03 I think I forgot to write it down, but January 15,
 04 and that was 1980?
 05 A. 1990.

3. PAGE 13:01 TO 14:05 (RUNNING 00:02:43.333)

00013:01 Q. Tell me about your career from then until
 02 around the period when Apple launched its App Store.
 03 Take me through the roles you played between that
 04 period and the time when Apple launched App Store.
 05 A. I was a developer technical support engineer
 06 until 1994. At that point I moved into the Macintosh
 07 system software engineering team and wrote and
 08 applied software fixes to various portions of the Mac
 09 operating system.
 10 In late 1995, I briefly left the company to
 11 join a startup; Be Incorporated. It is B as in
 12 baker, E as in echo, incorporated.
 13 I worked there for roughly six months, left
 14 that company, returned to Apple. At that point I was
 15 given responsibility for the engineering side of the
 16 Mac OS 8 system software release, so I managed the
 17 software engineering team for that operating system
 18 release.
 19 When that operating system release was
 20 completed, I worked on some of the design and
 21 foundational pieces of what would become Mac OS X,
 22 and in 1998 I was approached by the management of the
 23 Apple developer organization to take the director's
 24 job of developer technical support. I accepted and I
 25 have had that role since then.
 00014:01 Q. What did that role entail?
 02 A. My responsibilities at that point were to
 03 direct the team of developer technical support
 04 engineers in the appropriate areas to focus to assist
 05 our third-party developer community.

4. PAGE 16:10 TO 16:19 (RUNNING 00:00:37.630)

10 Q. In your work and in Apple's work to support
 11 developers, it supports both iOS developers and Mac
 12 developers; is that correct?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Your team in particular provides support
 15 both for Mac OS developers and iOS developers; is
 16 that correct?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Has your team grown since App Store opened?
 19 A. No.

5. PAGE 17:13 TO 17:24 (RUNNING 00:00:41.803)

13 Q. I'll move on. So you're saying the work --
 14 so the work to support an iOS developer is similar
 15 to the work to support a Mac OS developer?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So over the time since App Store has
 18 opened, the number of apps and the revenue Apple has
 19 generated from the App Store has grown
 20 substantially; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But over that time, your team didn't grow
 23 in size, correct?

24 A. Yes.

6. PAGE 18:08 TO 18:11 (RUNNING 00:00:14.671)

08 Q. Your team provides the same level of
 09 support for a Mac OS developer that it provides for
 10 an iOS developer?

11 A. They are substantially identical efforts.

7. PAGE 25:01 TO 25:12 (RUNNING 00:01:05.810)

00025:01 Q. Is there a process of signing Mac OS
 02 applications?

03 A. Yes.

04 Q. How does that work?

05 A. The process is again substantially similar
 06 to the iOS process. When a developer determines it's
 07 in their desire to produce a Mac application, they
 08 request a Mac developer identification certificate.
 09 It is issued to them from our developer portal. Then
 10 during the process of building their Mac application,
 11 that application is signed by our development tools
 12 with that developer I.D. certificate.

8. PAGE 25:23 TO 26:05 (RUNNING 00:00:42.372)

23 Q. What is the something I've heard referred
 24 to as Mac OS notarization; how does that work?

25 A. Notarization is a process where a Mac
 00026:01 developer creates his or her application, signs it
 02 with their developer I.D. certificate, and then
 03 chooses to take an additional step of having Apple
 04 software analyze and sign the application for
 05 distribution outside of the Mac App Store.

9. PAGE 27:09 TO 27:13 (RUNNING 00:00:25.497)

09 by an app reviewer. How long does an app reviewer
 10 review an application?

11 A. A typical review of a typical application
 12 provided for consideration for distribution in our
 13 online collection of apps takes minutes.

10. PAGE 28:21 TO 29:01 (RUNNING 00:00:21.126)

21 Q. Is there a fee to be a member of the app
 22 developer program?

23 A. There is a fee to be a member of the Apple
 24 Developer Program.

25 Q. What's that fee?

00029:01 A. Currently it is \$99 in U.S. dollars.

11. PAGE 29:18 TO 30:03 (RUNNING 00:00:48.139)

18 Q. In terms of technical support, there is
 19 certain technical support benefits they receive as a
 20 result of being a member?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And what are those benefits?
23 A. The specific technical benefits are provided
24 by my organization. A developer, as part of their
25 annual membership, receives the opportunity for no
00030:01 additional fee to consult with my engineers on two
02 specific technical areas that they would like
03 assistance, guidance or otherwise.

12. PAGE 31:12 TO 31:15 (RUNNING 00:00:12.314)

12 Q. There is an opportunity to get additional
13 support, there is a payment they can make to get
14 additional support; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.

13. PAGE 32:06 TO 32:07 (RUNNING 00:00:07.675)

06 Q. What is the charge for those additional --
07 A. \$99 per incident.

14. PAGE 32:16 TO 32:24 (RUNNING 00:00:26.998)

16 Q. But all this support provided to members
17 that develop native iOS apps are also provided to
18 Mac OS developers, correct?
19 A. Substantially similar. The technologies may
20 be different.
21 Q. And it's provided even if the Mac OS
22 developer distributes predominantly or even
23 exclusively outside of the Mac App Store?
24 A. Correct.

15. PAGE 32:25 TO 33:17 (RUNNING 00:01:31.167)

25 Q. Why does Apple support developers who are
00033:01 developing apps that aren't distributed through the
02 App Store?
03 A. Earlier in our conversation I described my
04 understanding of the benefits of a third-party
05 developer community to Apple. The answer to your
06 current question is similar to the answer I provided
07 then.
08 Distribution of Mac applications on other
09 platforms, other distribution mechanisms, provides
10 goods and services that consumers or businesses may
11 choose to use.
12 Q. What's the benefit to Apple of that again?
13 A. The benefit to Apple is to have goods and
14 services that a customer would like to use which
15 encourages a customer to consider Apple products as
16 products that they would choose to use in their
17 business or personal lives.

16. PAGE 36:09 TO 36:19 (RUNNING 00:01:10.465)

09 Q. And what's the -- why does Apple provide
10 for notarization of Mac iOS apps? What's it trying
11 to address?
12 A. One of the primary goals of application
13 notarization is to provide our customers with
14 information that Apple has done some level of
15 inspection of a Mac application and we are
16 communicating to that customer that we did not detect
17 any flaws or potential privacy or security-related
18 issues in that application, to the best of our
19 ability at the time.

17. PAGE 37:05 TO 37:13 (RUNNING 00:00:51.979)

05 Q. Could Apple use a notarization system in

06 iOS?
 07 A. The technologies associated with a
 08 notarization system -- I'm sorry, it's difficult to
 09 answer that question because I'm not -- are you
 10 asking if the software technology that we apply can
 11 be applied to an iOS application?
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 A. Yes. The answer is yes.

18. PAGE 142:20 TO 142:23 (RUNNING 00:00:10.156)

20 Exhibit 131 is an e-mail, and you're copied
 21 on one of the e-mails in the chain and it addresses
 22 the presence of a school shooting game on the App
 23 Store.

19. PAGE 143:07 TO 143:13 (RUNNING 00:00:34.177)

07 Q. Exhibit 131 describes the internal reaction
 08 after certain individuals at Apple learned that
 09 there was a school shooting game on the App Store
 10 that had been posted soon after the Parkland
 11 shooting, correct?
 12 A. I don't know if it was soon after Parkland
 13 or not, but I agree with your other characterization.

20. PAGE 145:10 TO 145:16 (RUNNING 00:00:15.800)

10 Q. The second sentence says: "So far all the
 11 evidence points to Armin was going too fast and
 12 missed all the signs to reject these apps for 1.1 or
 13 at least escalate."
 14 Do you see that?
 15 A. It says "signals," not "signs," and I do see
 16 that.

21. PAGE 146:03 TO 146:05 (RUNNING 00:00:07.576)

03 Q. And it states it took a total of 32 seconds
 04 to approve both apps. Do you see that?
 05 A. I do see that.

22. PAGE 147:21 TO 147:25 (RUNNING 00:00:13.689)

21 Q. Do you remember this incident involving
 22 this school shooting app on the App Store?
 23 A. As I mentioned when you first brought it up,
 24 I have a vague memory of it but not an in-depth
 25 understanding.

23. PAGE 168:22 TO 169:14 (RUNNING 00:00:45.217)

22 Q. What other devices other than the Mac do
 23 you play games on, if any?
 24 A. A PlayStation 4 and an Xbox, whatever the
 25 generation right before the one they just put out. I
 00169:01 can never remember Xbox's naming them schemes.
 02 Q. What about mobile devices; do you play
 03 games on mobile devices?
 04 A. On my iPad. Sorry, I forgot to mention
 05 that.
 06 Q. Sounds like you have multiple game
 07 consoles; is that right?
 08 A. Yes.
 09 Q. You also have a Mac on which you can play
 10 games?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Why do you have multiple devices on which
 13 to play games?
 14 A. Each device has different capabilities.

24. PAGE 170:13 TO 170:20 (RUNNING 00:00:24.903)

13 Q. What about mobile devices; do they have any
14 capabilities compared with the other platforms?

15 A. The definition of the platform, as you just
16 made, introduces the primary benefit, which is the
17 mobility.

18 Q. So you view mobility as a reason why you
19 would have a mobile device to play games?

20 A. Yes.

25. PAGE 170:23 TO 172:08 (RUNNING 00:01:45.229)

23 Is it important to you to have a device in
24 which you can play games that are mobile?

25 A. Yes.

00171:01 Q. Why is that important to you?

02 A. There are times in my day-to-day life when I
03 would like to either clear my mind or enjoy myself by
04 playing a game, and I may not have access to my Mac
05 PlayStation, Xbox. I may only have a mobile device
06 with me and that allows me to satisfy that desire.

07 Q. And so that would include circumstances in
08 which you are away from home and therefore away from
09 those gaming consoles?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You keep the gaming consoles at home,
12 right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. They've got to be hooked up to your TV in
15 your living room or some other room in your home,
16 right?

17 A. They have to be hooked up to a monitor, yes.

18 Q. What about your Mac; do you have a desktop
19 or laptop?

20 A. I have a laptop.

21 Q. What about a laptop; do you bring that with
22 you when you're going about your daily business away
23 from home?

24 A. Sometimes, yes.

25 Q. Do you ever pull out your laptop and play
00172:01 games while you're away from home?

02 A. No.

03 Q. Why don't do you that if you have it with
04 you?

05 A. In my opinion, the experience of playing
06 games away from a desk and a surface where I am able
07 to manipulate a mouse correctly, in my opinion, for
08 gaming, does not exist.

26. PAGE 185:12 TO 185:15 (RUNNING 00:00:07.352)

12 Q. So sandboxing, there are more aspects
13 implemented on iOS than Mac OS?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Why is that?

27. PAGE 185:18 TO 186:09 (RUNNING 00:01:28.919)

18 There have been behaviors that have become
19 part of Mac OS from '82 to now that in some cases are
20 difficult to change without understanding all the
21 ramifications, and the ramifications can be rather
22 broad, not from necessarily from the operating
23 system's perspective, but from the perspective of Mac
24 developers who have 30-some-odd years of history of
25 knowing how certain things work, whether that
00186:01 knowledge is accurate or not.

02 When we developed iPhone OS, we did not have

03 an established base of either developer knowledge or
 04 existing software applications that this intimate
 05 knowledge of what iOS or iPhone OS did, so we could
 06 begin a new platform with some enhanced goals and in
 07 this case enhanced security in sandboxing
 08 infrastructure without disrupting anything that had
 09 happened in the past.

28. PAGE 187:01 TO 187:13 (RUNNING 00:00:36.056)

00187:01 Q. Are there other benefits to sandboxing on
 02 iOS?
 03 A. Obviously from a consumer focus, the
 04 inability of application A to read the data created
 05 by application B is a huge benefit to our customers.
 06 Q. So for example, my messenger app cannot
 07 obtain data that my banking app may have; is that
 08 right?
 09 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. That would be a problem because that might
 11 compromise the safety of my personal information
 12 that is stored by another app?
 13 A. Correct.

29. PAGE 188:09 TO 188:12 (RUNNING 00:00:18.836)

09 Q. Are there important aspects of sandboxing
 10 that have been implemented on iOS and not on Mac OS?
 11 A. With the release of our latest version of
 12 Mac OS, I don't believe that is the case.

30. PAGE 238:07 TO 238:10 (RUNNING 00:00:01.621)

07 MS. COSCIA: This is 140.
 08 (The document referred to was marked as
 09 Exhibit 140 for identification and is attached
 10 hereto.)

31. PAGE 239:05 TO 239:08 (RUNNING 00:00:09.372)

05 Q. I want to start at the top of this e-mail.
 06 You wrote: "We review, we do not test. That's been
 07 a guiding principal in App Review since we conceived
 08 of it.

32. PAGE 239:17 TO 240:18 (RUNNING 00:02:20.135)

17 Q. Thank you, understood: "We review, we do
 18 not test." What's the difference between those?
 19 A. This is a particular -- as you can tell from
 20 my emphasis in the first line of this e-mail, in the
 21 software business, the word "test" has certain
 22 implications to both software engineers, quality
 23 assurance personnel and customers.
 24 "Test" implies or outright infers that the
 25 individual providing test has done a comprehensive
 00240:01 use of the application, exercising most if not all of
 02 the functionality of an application, and not only
 03 testing all the functionality of the application, but
 04 testing certainly much of the application under
 05 different conditions with a different data and by
 06 attempting to induce failure modes by, for example,
 07 trying to run an application on a Windows PC that
 08 does not have enough memory to do everything the
 09 application wants and see how the application fares
 10 under a test like that. That's the commonly accepted
 11 perception of what a test is.
 12 Review as started by the iOS App Review team
 13 is not testing. As I've described earlier, we run
 14 some automated tools on applications, and then a

15 reviewer will in general launch an app and do some
16 things with the app; not a comprehensive test.
17 That's why I made the emphasis here on that
18 differentiation.

Haun, CK (Vol. 02) - January 14, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:01:52.196)****4 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:01:52.196)****1. PAGE 276:22 TO 276:25 (RUNNING 00:00:14.632)**

22 Q. Okay. When you were running the App Store,
 23 on average how long did it take a reviewer to do the
 24 human review for an app coming into the App Store?
 25 A. Typically three to seven minutes.

2. PAGE 289:21 TO 289:22 (RUNNING 00:00:00.540)

21 (Exhibit 144 was marked for identification
 22 and is attached hereto.)

3. PAGE 290:11 TO 291:07 (RUNNING 00:01:10.533)

11 And you are shown as a recipient of at least
 12 one of the e-mails in the thread?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Okay. Does this refresh your recollection
 15 that XcodeGhost became a problem sometime around
 16 September 17th, 2015?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. Okay. And in it, in this thread, you are
 19 asked by Craig Bradley (as read):
 20 This all seems very technical to
 21 me, but the comment that "infected
 22 apps successfully passed app review
 23 concerns me, is this something we
 24 should worry about or actively scan
 25 for during app review."
 00291:01 Do you see where I'm reading?
 02 A. Yes.
 03 Q. Okay. So first question: Who is Mr.
 04 Bradley?
 05 A. Craig Bradley manages our worldwide
 06 developer relations activities in -- at that point,
 07 the southeast Asia and China markets.

4. PAGE 291:16 TO 291:20 (RUNNING 00:00:26.491)

16 Q. Well, both: What is XcodeGhost?
 17 A. XcodeGhost was a exploit which fooled our
 18 tool chain into including an inaccurate modified
 19 version of some SDK, software development kit,
 20 libraries.



Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR-TSH (N.D. Cal.)

**Deposition Designation of Eric Friedman (Vol. 1 & 2)
(February 1, 2021)
(February 2, 2021)**

Time

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
21 minutes 8 seconds	15 minutes 22 seconds

Friedman, Eric (Vol. 01) - February 1, 2021

1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:35:36.320)

62 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:35:36.320)**1. PAGE 12:14 TO 12:16 (RUNNING 00:00:06.525)**

14 ERIC FRIEDMAN,
15 having been first duly sworn, was examined and
16 testified as follows:

2. PAGE 38:21 TO 38:22 (RUNNING 00:00:07.005)

21 Q When did you join Apple?
22 A July of 2012.

3. PAGE 39:05 TO 39:19 (RUNNING 00:00:39.430)

05 Q Okay. And what role did you have at Apple
06 when you joined?
07 A Very briefly, software developer.
08 Q And what were you very briefly developing?
09 A commerce systems for at the time what was
10 called the iTunes Store.
11 Q Okay. At that time, the iTunes Store sold
12 apps as well as movies and music; is that right?
13 A That's right.
14 Q Okay. And you say you developed e-commerce
15 systems.
16 What would those systems do within the iTunes
17 Store?
18 A Well, I was specifically responsible for the
19 fraud engineering systems.

4. PAGE 49:13 TO 49:17 (RUNNING 00:00:09.651)

13 Q Okay. Has your role changed since then?
14 A Yes.
15 Q How has it changed?
16 A We took on responsibility for other kinds of
17 abuse.

5. PAGE 50:01 TO 50:15 (RUNNING 00:01:12.569)

00050:01 Q Okay. What kind of -- what other kinds of
02 abuse did you take the responsibility on for?
03 A Sure. And so I'm not -- in my answer, I'm
04 not going to distinguish between the things that
05 came from iCloud and the things that came in account
06 security.
07 So there was an area of discovery abuse that
08 we became responsible for. I mentioned account
09 security. And then at a later point, iMessage spam;
10 at a later point, mail spam, various other kinds of
11 spam in the iCloud infra-system, you know, phishing
12 virus, phishing in general, I should say. We did a
13 number of efforts that were -- it was broadly about
14 identifying abuse of behavior across services and
15 developer fraud.

6. PAGE 50:16 TO 51:08 (RUNNING 00:01:32.110)

16 Q What is developer fraud?
17 A Sure.
18 Q Sorry.

19 A That's okay. I was just about to answer that
 20 question, so good timing. So there are several
 21 kinds, but broadly speaking, it comes down to
 22 knowing who we're doing business with and making
 23 sure that those purposes are -- are not -- the --
 24 the privileges are not being misused for illicit
 25 distribution and for illegal activity like money
 00051:01 laundering.
 02 And then -- what was I going to say about
 03 developer fraud? There are compliance elements to
 04 it referring to OFAC. It -- with partners, extends
 05 it to the domains of malware and -- I think that's
 06 a -- a general view of the landscape. I'm sure if
 07 you have more precise questions, we'll be able to
 08 delve into that.

7. PAGE 57:20 TO 58:09 (RUNNING 00:00:57.657)

20 Q Let's talk about malware. How -- what do you
 21 consider malware to be?
 22 A I consider malware to be software which
 23 deceives an end user as to its function.
 24 Q And how does Apple prevent customers from
 25 obtaining malware?
 00058:01 A So in my domain, what we focus on is
 02 preventing illicit distribution.
 03 Q Well, what do you mean by illicit
 04 distribution?
 05 A Illicit -- sorry, distribution outside of the
 06 App Store.
 07 Q So do you perform any other function in order
 08 to prevent customers from obtaining malware?
 09 A No.

8. PAGE 58:10 TO 58:13 (RUNNING 00:00:06.771)

10 Q Okay. What about Apple? Does Apple perform
 11 any other function that prevents customers from
 12 obtaining malware?
 13 A Yes.

9. PAGE 59:10 TO 59:19 (RUNNING 00:00:23.962)

10 Q Okay. Does your team have a name?
 11 A Fraud engineering, algorithms and results --
 12 and risk. I'm sorry, risk. We like --
 13 Q Is that sometimes abbreviated FEAR?
 14 A That's right.
 15 Q Do people pronounce it "fear" within Apple?
 16 A They pronounce it "FEAR," uh-huh.
 17 Q Okay. And you -- are you the leader of that
 18 group?
 19 A Yes, I am.

10. PAGE 63:06 TO 63:08 (RUNNING 00:00:10.520)

06 Q In performing your role, have you had to
 07 interact with App Review within the App Store?
 08 A Yes, I do interact with App Review.

11. PAGE 68:05 TO 68:14 (RUNNING 00:00:34.993)

05 Q Okay. Sorry. Let's start with iOS first.
 06 How does your team prevent the illicit
 07 distribution of apps on iOS?
 08 A Sure. So we run several what we call
 09 crawling systems to identify illicit distribution
 10 activity.
 11 Q Okay. What are the systems crawling?
 12 A The internet.

13 Q And what are they looking for?
14 A Distribution outside the App Store.

12. PAGE 77:11 TO 77:12 (RUNNING 00:00:00.915)

11 (Exhibit 250 was marked for identification
12 and is attached hereto.)

13. PAGE 81:18 TO 81:25 (RUNNING 00:00:34.438)

18 Q Are you aware of developers requesting
19 five-star ratings?
20 A Yes.
21 Q Okay. Is that considered abuse?
22 A Well, again, I am not responsible for -- for
23 defining that exactly, but I refer to
24 Mr. Shoemaker's message above where he says a
25 request for five-star witness causes rejection.

14. PAGE 82:01 TO 82:04 (RUNNING 00:00:10.780)

00082:01 Q Okay. So that's something that, in your
02 understanding, should not have been permitted by App
03 Review?
04 A Correct.

15. PAGE 82:05 TO 83:03 (RUNNING 00:00:56.576)

05 Q And after Mr. Shoemaker emails you providing
06 that information, you write an email starting with
07 (as read):
08 "Pedraum, when can we talk about
09 this?"
10 A Uh-huh.
11 Q Who was -- was Pedraum that you're addressing
12 there?
13 A Pedraum Pardehpoosh at the time was -- I
14 don't remember the precise role, but he was on the
15 business side of App Store and so was someone we
16 conferred with about what the business rules should
17 be for the discovery features we were attempting to
18 protect --
19 Q Okay.
20 A -- discovery experiences. Excuse me,
21 experiences.
22 Q Understood. You write (as read):
23 "Pedraum, when can we talk about
24 this? App Review is bringing a
25 plastic butter knife to a gun
00083:01 fight."
02 Do you see that?
03 A I do.

16. PAGE 89:02 TO 89:05 (RUNNING 00:00:07.746)

02 Q And, Mr. Friedman, if you could access
03 Exhibit 251 and take a minute or two to read that,
04 please, and let me know when you've finished.
05 A All right.

17. PAGE 93:13 TO 93:19 (RUNNING 00:00:22.224)

13 Q You start "Regarding review processes,"
14 colon.
15 Do you see that?
16 A Uh-huh.
17 Q You're referring to App Review processes,
18 right?
19 A Looking at the final sentence, yes.

18. PAGE 94:09 TO 94:23 (RUNNING 00:00:32.897)

09 Q Let me -- let me repeat again (as read):
 10 "Please don't ever believe that they
 11 accomplish anything that would deter
 12 a sophisticated attacker."
 13 Do you see that?
 14 A I do.
 15 Q Is that an accurate assessment of App Review
 16 by you at the time?
 17 A Well, I think I spoke generally about review
 18 processes, but yes, this one is in the context of
 19 App Review.
 20 Q Okay. And you say (as read):
 21 "I consider them a wetware rate
 22 limiting service and nothing more."
 23 A Uh-huh.

19. PAGE 95:07 TO 95:11 (RUNNING 00:00:09.070)

07 Do you have an understanding of what wetware
 08 is and -- and how you used it there?
 09 A Yeah, uh-huh.
 10 Q Okay. What is it?
 11 A It's what's up here, the human brain.

20. PAGE 97:04 TO 97:16 (RUNNING 00:00:20.159)

04 Q Okay. You go on to say (as read):
 05 "Yes, they sometimes catch things."
 06 Do you see that?
 07 A Uh-huh.
 08 Q Implying sometimes they don't catch things;
 09 is that -- isn't that right?
 10 A Yeah, I think that's correct.
 11 Q Okay. (As read):
 12 "But you should regard them as
 13 little more than the equivalent of
 14 the TSA at the airport."
 15 Do you see that?
 16 A I do.

21. PAGE 97:20 TO 97:25 (RUNNING 00:00:16.493)

20 Is it fair to say you didn't have a very high
 21 opinion of what the TSA at the airport could
 22 accomplish?
 23 A I -- yeah, I think it's been proven that the
 24 TSA at the airport is not able to deflect any --
 25 deflect sophisticated attackers.

22. PAGE 98:01 TO 98:09 (RUNNING 00:00:14.307)

00098:01 Q Okay. You say --
 02 A And they are under pressure to move people
 03 through.
 04 Q Understood, understood. Much like App
 05 Review, right?
 06 A (No audible response.)
 07 Q Is that a yes? You --
 08 A Oh, I'm sorry. I'm nodding. Yes, much like
 09 App Review, yes.

23. PAGE 99:02 TO 99:24 (RUNNING 00:01:29.525)

02 Q Okay. And I -- I asked you -- when I was
 03 asking questions, I said we could focus first on
 04 January 2016, but I would be interested to know how
 05 things have changed since January 2016.
 06 Could you describe that for me, please.

07 A Well, as I mentioned, there have been a lot
08 of investments in tooling and systems and automation
09 to help them. So, you know, the -- fundamentally,
10 the App Review is governing its activity according
11 to a set of guidelines and in transparency about
12 those guidelines, and they do catch a lot of abuse.
13 And their ability to catch abuse has been augmented
14 by -- by these investments.

15 And there have been innovations like the one
16 that I described -- App Attest and Device Check.
17 Perhaps those are the ones I'm thinking about right
18 now -- that exist in this instance to defend a
19 legitimate developer against someone who is -- is
20 abusing a customer -- deceiving the customer.

21 Q Okay.

22 A So it's a multi -- you know, a lot has
23 changed since -- in the last five years, and six
24 days.

24. PAGE 100:07 TO 100:10 (RUNNING 00:00:09.539)

07 Q And, Mr. Friedman, if you could open what
08 we've marked as Exhibit 252, take a couple minutes
09 to read it, and then let me know when you've
10 finished.

25. PAGE 100:11 TO 100:15 (RUNNING 00:00:13.893)

11 A Okay, Mr. Byars.

12 Q Okay. Who is the person you are exchanging
13 emails with in this chain?

14 A Herve Sibert is on my team, and he runs the
15 FIRE team of which you asked earlier.

26. PAGE 105:16 TO 105:25 (RUNNING 00:00:34.130)

16 Q Okay. Is Mr. Sibert -- is he referring to an
17 app that appears to be a calculator when launched
18 but is actually -- performs some other function?

19 A Well, I don't -- you know, the -- there's
20 what's said, and then there's what -- the referent
21 of what's said is. And so I don't -- you know,
22 you'd have to ask Mr. Sibert what the referent was.
23 But since I don't recall it, I'm not -- I'm not able
24 to offer you an opinion about what that specific app
25 was or did.

27. PAGE 106:01 TO 106:15 (RUNNING 00:00:46.148)

00106:01 Q Okay. Sitting -- sitting here now, reading
02 this email, what do you understand him to be saying?
03 What kind of app is he describing?

04 A Okay. That's a question I can answer. So --

05 Q Okay.

06 A -- as I understand this, what he's describing
07 is a pattern where an app is submitted to App Review
08 and its behavior changes after it has gone through
09 App Review and is being distributed. And he is
10 specifically suggesting that such an app might be
11 one that you would not expect to draw a lot of
12 attention, a calculator. You know, people have
13 calculators have -- on their phones already. And
14 yet, the app draws tremendous attention, hence,
15 loads of downloads.

28. PAGE 111:02 TO 111:12 (RUNNING 00:00:21.862)

02 Q Okay. Thank you. And just to finish this --
03 this email that we were just reading, you write or
04 wrote (as read):

05 "They are more like the pretty lady
 06 who greets you with a lei at the
 07 Hawaiian airport than the drug
 08 sniffing dog who, well, never mind. ;)"
 09 Do you see that?
 10 A I do.
 11 Q And by that, you mean App Review, right?
 12 A In this context, yes.

29. PAGE 111:13 TO 111:24 (RUNNING 00:00:42.315)

13 Q Okay. Is this consistent with your opinion
 14 at the time that App Review was primarily designed
 15 to welcome developers and their apps rather than to
 16 keep harmful material out?
 17 A They are absolutely enforcing the guidelines
 18 of the store to the best of their ability, and the
 19 guidelines of the store prohibit the publication of
 20 harmful material. So they're absolutely concerned
 21 with that and with investments from, you know, the
 22 broad range of talent and expertise. Around Apple,
 23 they have gotten better, and they continue to get
 24 better in fulfilling that function.

30. PAGE 112:05 TO 112:09 (RUNNING 00:00:14.610)

05 Q -- which is, just looking at this sentence,
 06 was this consistent with the opinion you held at the
 07 time that App Review was more about welcoming
 08 developers and their apps into the App Store than
 09 about keeping out harmful material?

31. PAGE 112:14 TO 112:16 (RUNNING 00:00:05.756)

14 THE WITNESS: Mr. Byars, there's a premise in
 15 your statement that those two things are mutually
 16 exclusive. And they are not.

32. PAGE 113:08 TO 114:19 (RUNNING 00:01:48.720)

08 Q Okay. Well, if -- if App Review is enforcing
 09 guidelines, is that more like a pretty lady who
 10 greets you with a lei at the Hawaiian airport, or is
 11 that more like a drug sniffing dog?

12 A I think that that statement was glib and
 13 unfair and not sufficiently nuanced to describe all
 14 the functions that they perform.

15 Q Okay. So you've changed your opinion since
 16 this email about -- about App Review?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Okay.

19 A Certainly -- well, let me say this another
 20 way. Certainly that -- that analogy is not what I
 21 consider to be the case about App Review.

22 Q Sitting here today, this analogy you -- you
 23 believe is no longer accurate, whether or not you
 24 believed it was accurate at the time; is that
 25 your --

00114:01 A Correct.

02 Q -- testimony?

03 A That's correct.

04 Q Okay. When did you change your opinion?

05 A I can't point you to a specific date but, you
 06 know, as I've discussed more the investments that
 07 have been made in supporting App Review, I think
 08 that, you know, it's been a -- a journey for me and
 09 reflects investments from Apple that, you know,
 10 we've been able to participate in and support.

11 Q And those investments have been made after

12 this email and after this chain of emails, which
 13 means it would be in the last couple years, right?
 14 A Well, there are investments along the way at
 15 every point. So I don't know -- again, as I -- as I
 16 said, it was a journey for me. So at this time, I
 17 may not have had full understanding of everything
 18 that they're doing. Even as of today, I don't have
 19 full understanding of everything that they're doing.

33. PAGE 115:05 TO 115:06 (RUNNING 00:00:05.950)

05 Q Mr. Friedman, I'm going to ask you to take a
 06 look at what we've now marked as Exhibit 253.

34. PAGE 115:15 TO 115:18 (RUNNING 00:00:22.994)

15 Q Okay. Do you recall the purpose of creating
 16 this attached document?
 17 A It appears to be to enable informed
 18 decision-making on an identified abuse.

35. PAGE 115:23 TO 116:12 (RUNNING 00:00:58.148)

23 Q Okay. Great. Do you recall what that abuse
 24 was?
 25 A Yeah. So there was a problem at the time --
 00116:01 I guess the time frame is not one I have a lot of
 02 precision about -- where there were ads showing up
 03 in the store that were promoting virus detection
 04 software on the iPhone, which is nonsensical.
 05 There's no such -- you know, there's no need for
 06 that. There's no such thing as that.
 07 And so I recall being asked about this by the
 08 head of SEAR and -- and so, you know, we took a look
 09 at that and, apparently, drafted some -- some
 10 proposed mitigations so that an informed decision
 11 can be made about that kind of deceptive user
 12 visible information.

36. PAGE 118:06 TO 119:09 (RUNNING 00:01:38.277)

06 So I need to revise my earlier remarks.
 07 Q Okay.
 08 A So earlier, I spoke about the -- about the
 09 virus -- a virus scanner issue, but the median
 10 article actually covers a number of other abuses
 11 that were -- that are described here.
 12 And as I recall the specific -- I mean, the
 13 virus is certainly covered in here, but the specific
 14 thing that was associated with that was the -- on --
 15 where did you say the pages are numbered?
 16 Q At the bottom. You can use --
 17 A Oh, I see.
 18 Q -- what we call a Bates number.
 19 A Is that in the lower right-hand corner?
 20 Q That's right.
 21 A Okay. So if I look at the page ending in
 22 7762 --
 23 Q Uh-huh.
 24 A -- there's an "Article highlights."
 25 Q Uh-huh.
 00119:01 A So the thing that was specifically behind the
 02 \$80,000 business was in the second-from-right column
 03 where you see the "Touch ID High value in-app
 04 purchase."
 05 So that -- that aspect caught attention, and
 06 then these other items emerged, so...
 07 Q So that developer was offering a subscription
 08 to something for 99.99, right?

09 A Every seven days.

37. PAGE 120:02 TO 120:03 (RUNNING 00:00:04.649)

02 Q And if I could please direct your attention
03 to the page ending in 763.

38. PAGE 120:11 TO 120:14 (RUNNING 00:00:09.056)

11 Q Okay. So -- and -- and is this your -- in
12 your understanding, is this sort of a summary of
13 what happened with this app that this presentation
14 is discussing?

39. PAGE 120:15 TO 120:21 (RUNNING 00:00:27.603)

15 A I don't know if this is what this specific
16 app did.
17 Q Okay. What is the timeline laid out here if
18 not about a specific app?
19 A It may be an overlay of the things that one
20 could do to achieve this kind of abuse without
21 necessarily having to do all of them.

40. PAGE 120:22 TO 121:23 (RUNNING 00:00:48.907)

22 Q Okay. So, for example, number 1 says (as
23 read):
24 "Developer submits app with
25 prohibited terms, rejected twice."
00121:01 Do you see that?
02 A Uh-huh.
03 Q Are you aware of apps having been submitted
04 more than once for App Review and having been
05 rejected repeatedly?
06 A Yes.
07 Q Okay. Then it says (as read):
08 "Developer removes" -- I'm looking
09 at number 2 now.
10 (As read):
11 "Developer removes problem terms,
12 passes review but with problematic
13 content."
14 Are you aware of examples of a developer
15 resubmitting a previously rejected app including
16 remaining problematic content? Are you aware of
17 that happening before?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And there have been circumstances under which
20 the app has, in fact, passed review after having
21 been previously rejected for having problematic
22 content?
23 A Yes.

41. PAGE 121:24 TO 122:06 (RUNNING 00:00:13.714)

24 Q Okay. Is that a big problem in your view?
25 A I don't have any metrics about that.
00122:01 Q I'm sorry. You cut -- you cut out very
02 briefly.
03 A Oh.
04 Q If you wouldn't mind repeating the answer.
05 A Sure. I don't have any metrics about that
06 with which to tell you whether it's a big problem.

42. PAGE 122:21 TO 123:23 (RUNNING 00:01:03.522)

21 Number 4 says (as read):
22 "Users gulled into subscribing with
23 aggressive call to action."

24 Do you see that?
 25 A Uh-huh.
 00123:01 Q That's what we were just referring to. I
 02 think you said -- I'm sorry. Remind me of the term
 03 you used.
 04 A Misleading subscriptions or misleading subs.
 05 Q Okay. That's -- that's referring to -- to
 06 that number 4, right?
 07 A Yes.
 08 Q Okay. And then it says, number 5 (as read):
 09 "Conversion rate sufficient to enter
 10 Top Grossing chart."
 11 Do you see that?
 12 A I do.
 13 Q What does this mean by conversion rate?
 14 A So from discovery to -- through to purchase.
 15 Q So this refers to the rate of people who
 16 actually subscribed to that subscription?
 17 A Download and subscribe.
 18 Q Okay. And then number 5 is saying the rate
 19 was so high, this app was one of the top grossing
 20 apps in the store, right?
 21 A The terminology in there is a little -- is a
 22 little confusing, but the app generated enough
 23 revenue that it became top grossing.

43. PAGE 123:24 TO 124:16 (RUNNING 00:00:48.460)

24 Q Okay. It made so much money that it was one
 25 of the top grossing apps in the store, right?
 00124:01 A So as I said earlier, I don't know if this
 02 is -- is true of that specific app, whether it
 03 actually showed up in top grossing or not. But as
 04 the article says, it's \$80,000 in some -- some time
 05 period. It definitely made, you know, significant
 06 revenue. I can't tell you --
 07 Q Okay.
 08 A Oh, yeah, it was position X in the top
 09 grossing chart. I -- I don't have that information.
 10 Q Are you aware of there being -- putting this
 11 one -- this example aside, other fraudulent subs
 12 that generated a lot of money?
 13 A Define a lot of.
 14 Q Well, significant amounts.
 15 A You and I may have different opinions about
 16 what a significant amount is.

44. PAGE 134:25 TO 135:01 (RUNNING 00:00:03.595)

25 MR. BYARS: Thank you. And for the record,
 00135:01 this is marked as Exhibit 254.

45. PAGE 136:02 TO 136:18 (RUNNING 00:00:36.097)

02 Q Okay. Let's look at the email that's next
 03 up, the -- the most immediate email, that starts
 04 with --
 05 A 8:44 a.m.
 06 Q That's right.
 07 A Okay.
 08 Q So you say (as read):
 09 "Yes, the ability to pay for
 10 promotion would be awesome."
 11 So are you referring there to developers
 12 paying Apple for promotion within the App Store?
 13 A Yes.
 14 Q You say (as read):
 15 "We've floated it several times as

16 the way to end chart gaming."
17 Do you see that?
18 A Uh-huh.

46. PAGE 136:19 TO 137:07 (RUNNING 00:00:34.410)

19 Q To whom had you floated this proposal several
20 times?
21 A I definitely don't remember that.
22 Q Okay. You don't recall ever floating
23 developer's ability to pay for promotion in the App
24 Store?
25 A That's not what I said. I don't remember to
00137:01 whom or --
02 Q Okay. Do you --
03 A -- if I floated it.
04 Q Okay. But do you remember floating that
05 proposal?
06 A Well, clearly, I said that -- that we've done
07 it, but I don't remember doing it.

47. PAGE 137:11 TO 137:17 (RUNNING 00:00:21.312)

11 Chart gaming, what does that mean?
12 A Manipulation of inputs to the charting level
13 for them to appear more popular.
14 Q Okay. And that was that kind of abuse that
15 you said that your team was tasked with identifying
16 and -- and preventing, right?
17 A That's right.

48. PAGE 138:18 TO 138:24 (RUNNING 00:00:07.935)

18 Q Okay. You say (as read):
19 "If people are willing to pay
20 'marketing companies' (bot nets) to
21 gain position, why don't we just let
22 them pay us to gain position?"
23 Do you see that?
24 A Uh-huh.

49. PAGE 138:25 TO 139:09 (RUNNING 00:00:34.460)

25 Q So are you proposing that instead of
00139:01 developers paying bot nets to engage in chart abuse,
02 they instead just give that money to Apple to gain
03 position on the charts?
04 A No. I'm suggesting that we make a -- a
05 clearer distinction between incentivized placement
06 and -- and organic placement, which, you know,
07 there's a fairly common -- fairly commonly
08 distinction made in search. If you've used major
09 search engines, I'm sure you're aware of them.

50. PAGE 140:01 TO 140:11 (RUNNING 00:00:38.304)

00140:01 Q Okay. At this time, users of the App Store
02 couldn't rely on organic placement to determine
03 which apps were popular, right?
04 A That's a very sweeping statement. I -- I
05 don't think I can answer yes or no to that. I think
06 that in some context where we had a -- where we
07 missed a signal, where we were behind on adaptation,
08 then -- then there might have been -- there -- there
09 can be periods of unreliability, but, you know, it's
10 something that we actively fought and continue to
11 fight.

51. PAGE 140:15 TO 141:10 (RUNNING 00:01:08.011)

15 Were you at a period of unreliability around
 16 the time of this email?
 17 A I don't think I used the word
 18 "unreliability."
 19 Q You said there can be periods of
 20 unreliability.
 21 Were you in such a period at this time?
 22 A I don't -- I wouldn't describe it as a period
 23 so much as, you know, particular attacks. A new
 24 attack vector or an adaptation comes up, and then
 25 we -- we adjust that. But, you know, it's a fast
 00141:01 ecosystem, so it's not that the entire thing becomes
 02 tainted all at once. You know, there might be an
 03 outbreak in a particular area --
 04 Q Okay. So --
 05 A -- but in this conversation -- in this
 06 conversation, we're dialoguing about news from --
 07 from something in Google Play, which is not the same
 08 thing as -- which doesn't tell me that there was a
 09 moment right then where the chart problem was -- was
 10 flaring up anymore.

52. PAGE 141:12 TO 142:03 (RUNNING 00:00:33.438)

12 The third paragraph of the email on the
 13 bottom of the page starts (as read):
 14 "I've actually" --
 15 A On the penultimate page? Oh, yeah, "I've
 16 actually." Okay.
 17 Q On the first page (as read):
 18 "I've actually managed to convince
 19 myself that our App Store charts
 20 aren't really a discovery tool at
 21 all. Yes, they do drive some
 22 conversions, but that is (I suspect
 23 and haven't verified) mostly the
 24 bots and/or humans responding to
 25 incentivize" -- sorry, "incentives
 00142:01 from promotional companies."
 02 Do you see that?
 03 A Uh-huh.

53. PAGE 142:04 TO 142:10 (RUNNING 00:00:28.040)

04 Q So was it your view that the charts in App
 05 Store were not performing a discovery function
 06 around the time of this email?
 07 A So my remarks here are actually not about
 08 whether there was a flog problem or not. It's about
 09 whether in an app economy, a popularity chart is --
 10 is a really great way to discover content.

54. PAGE 143:11 TO 144:22 (RUNNING 00:01:44.380)

11 Q Okay. So your testimony is that you did not
 12 think there was a problem of bots and/or humans
 13 responding to incentives that were influencing the
 14 app charts?
 15 A That is not what I said.
 16 Q Okay.
 17 A You asked me --
 18 Q Now what --
 19 A You asked me to explain why I thought app
 20 charts aren't a -- aren't really a discovery tool at
 21 all. And as I explained in the third and fourth
 22 sentence, I go on to say that a chart -- and this is
 23 independent of -- of whether there's fraud or not

24 that puts YouTube and Flight Pilot Simulator 3D in
 25 the same list isn't useful to a human shopper.
 00144:01 Sure, you might buy both, but that decision won't be
 02 motivated by their popularity relative to one
 03 another.
 04 So if I'm going in and I'm looking at a chart
 05 and it shows me YouTube and, oh, yeah cool, I can --
 06 I can, you know, watch videos, I'm not going to look
 07 at the fact that it's above or below a flight
 08 simulator in making my decision on whether to pick
 09 YouTube. I want YouTube.
 10 So unlike a search where I'm interested in a
 11 category and I go in and I say, oh, I'm interested
 12 in photo editing apps and the -- and the recall of
 13 the algorithm comes back with all -- all of the
 14 photo editing apps. And then I might be -- I might
 15 be influenced by what's more popular than another.
 16 But a chart which is primarily based off of
 17 purchases, sales activity makes a lot more sense in
 18 music where people are interested in what's the hot
 19 song of the summer. But in my opinion, it doesn't
 20 make sense -- my opinion at the time, certainly, it
 21 doesn't make sense where people are being driven by
 22 function.

55. PAGE 144:24 TO 145:11 (RUNNING 00:00:16.557)

24 I want to go to the -- the top email on the
 25 page.
 00145:01 A Okay.
 02 Q It -- it starts (as read):
 03 "The devs would love it."
 04 A Uh-huh.
 05 Q (As read):
 06 "The problem is Tim" -- "the problem
 07 is that Tim is telling the world
 08 that we make great products without
 09 monetizing users."
 10 Who is the Tim there?
 11 A Tim Cook.

56. PAGE 145:12 TO 147:01 (RUNNING 00:02:01.282)

12 Q Okay. So in -- in your recollection, he had
 13 been conveying that message to people?
 14 A I don't think he would use those words. I
 15 don't think I recall him using those words. That's
 16 my -- that's, apparently, how I summarized it.
 17 Q Okay. Fair enough.
 18 A So --
 19 Q Yep. Then you say (as read):
 20 "Ads would be weirdly at odds with
 21 that."
 22 Why would ads be weirdly at odds with that?
 23 A Well, I think we need to unpack what "that"
 24 is.
 25 Q Are you -- are you not referring to the
 00146:01 message that Mr. Cook was telling the world when you
 02 said (as read):
 03 "Ads would be weirdly at odds with
 04 that"?
 05 A Well, again, this is -- this was my -- my
 06 opinion at the time, but as I read this, we -- you
 07 know, Apple absolutely and unequivocally has taken
 08 the stance that -- that we are -- you know, that we
 09 do not generate revenue off of -- off of our users.
 10 Our users are not the product, right? The
 11 devices and software that we make is the product.

12 And so -- hmmm, I'm thinking about this.
 13 I don't think I would -- I would view this in
 14 the same way today as the statement looks -- looks
 15 now, because if I look at this today, the question
 16 is, to me, does ad platforms enable developers and
 17 users to find one another?

18 And I think that it does, because there's
 19 transparency that this appears to be relevant to
 20 what you're seeking and was paid for. So it's
 21 transparent that -- that it was done in exchange
 22 for -- for compensation. So, in other words, I
 23 would --

24 Q Okay.

25 A Not write this. I -- I consider what I wrote
 00147:01 here to be incorrect.

57. PAGE 148:01 TO 148:11 (RUNNING 00:00:26.216)

00148:01 Q I want to talk about a concept and see if you
 02 understand what I'm saying, black market app stores.

03 A Uh-huh.

04 Q Is that a concept you're familiar with?

05 A It is.

06 Q Okay. What are those? Could you describe
 07 them.

08 A Yeah, it's a -- a center for illicit
 09 distribution. We have several different names that
 10 we use for them, but it's a vehicle for achieving
 11 illicit distribution.

58. PAGE 148:12 TO 148:23 (RUNNING 00:00:56.470)

12 Q Okay. And how are you aware of these black
 13 market app stores?

14 A How am I aware of them? Well, we see them in
 15 our -- in our program to curtail illicit
 16 distribution. They, at various times, have been --
 17 well, they're -- they're readily visible on the
 18 internet when -- when our crawlers find them.

19 Some of them have very public profiles.
 20 In -- in China, for example, I've heard about them
 21 in the news. Some of them have -- I lost my train
 22 of thought -- yeah, anyway, let's stop there.
 23 They're -- you know, they're not hiding.

59. PAGE 148:24 TO 149:15 (RUNNING 00:01:05.829)

24 Q Okay. Fair enough. Do you know why a user
 25 might choose to use a black market app store rather
 00149:01 than the legitimate Apple App Store?

02 A Sure, to obtain illicit -- illicit content.

03 Q Is that the only reason somebody might use a
 04 black market app store?

05 A Well, I can tell you that at least one of
 06 the -- oh, yeah, sorry. Another reason would be
 07 historically -- not really the case anymore -- that
 08 in China, when we first started looking at this
 09 problem, the black market app stores had a couple of
 10 things going wrong.

11 One had to do with performance that appeared
 12 to be advantageous, and the other had to do with
 13 that they had better -- better penetration of -- of
 14 payment instruments that were popular with Chinese
 15 customers at that time.

60. PAGE 155:05 TO 155:06 (RUNNING 00:00:02.560)

05 MR. BYARS: And for the record, this is
 06 Exhibit 255.

61. PAGE 155:25 TO 156:09 (RUNNING 00:00:16.918)

25 Q So you -- you write in your first email (as
00156:01 read):
02 "Hi Ben, I'm kicking up a lot of
03 dust over here about the black
04 market app stores, having plotted
05 the amount of usage data for them
06 versus the usage of the real app
07 store. It's not a pretty picture."
08 Do you see that?
09 A I do see that.

62. PAGE 157:04 TO 158:08 (RUNNING 00:00:45.930)

04 Q And the -- the penultimate paragraph, not the
05 little tiny short paragraph but the one before that,
06 it says, "I took" --
07 A "I took four days," uh-huh.
08 Q Yes, that's right.
09 A Yep.
10 Q (As read):
11 "I took four days of data and
12 measured the difference between the
13 real AppStore and 'some' of the
14 confirmed pirate app stores."
15 A Uh-huh.
16 Q And then there's a list in parenthesis.
17 Are those some of the -- what I was calling
18 black market app stores?
19 A That's right.
20 Q Okay. (As read):
21 "At this point, in China," you
22 write, "it appears that the Black
23 Market is the market."
24 A Uh-huh.
25 Q (As read):
00158:01 "The legit business is a rounding
02 error."
03 Do you see that?
04 A Uh-huh.
05 Q Rounding error, of course, means that it was
06 a very small amount, right?
07 A Yeah. Probably hyperbole in this context,
08 but I don't have the data in front of me, so...

Friedman, Eric (Vol. 02) - February 2, 2021**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:02:00.417)****4 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:02:00.417)****1. PAGE 346:19 TO 346:24 (RUNNING 00:00:14.142)**

19 Q Okay. Exhibit 276 is a chat between you and
 20 Herve Sibert, correct?
 21 A Yes.
 22 Q And it was a chat on February 14th, 2020,
 23 correct?
 24 A Yes.

2. PAGE 347:06 TO 347:11 (RUNNING 00:00:11.686)

06 Q You state (as read):
 07 "Which is why we," meaning Apple,
 08 "are the greatest platform for
 09 distributing child porn, et cetera,"
 10 correct?
 11 A I see that statement.

3. PAGE 347:15 TO 348:07 (RUNNING 00:00:43.043)

15 Q Okay. Herve responds at 15:25 (as read):
 16 "Really? I mean, there's a lot of
 17 this in our ecosystem? I thought
 18 there were even more opportunities
 19 for bad actors on other filing" --
 20 "file sharing systems," right?
 21 A Yes.
 22 Q And you respond (as read):
 23 "Yes," correct?
 24 A Yes.
 25 Q And then you're continuing on the next page
 00348:01 within Exhibit 276, the Bates at -- 15:25 GMT (as
 02 read):
 03 "But -- and here's the key -- we
 04 have chosen not to know in enough
 05 places where we really cannot say."
 06 correct?
 07 A Yes.

4. PAGE 348:15 TO 349:14 (RUNNING 00:00:51.546)

15 "The NY Times published a bar graph
 16 showing how companies are doing in
 17 this area. We are on it, but I
 18 think it's an underreport," correct?
 19 A Yes.
 20 Q You wrote at 15:27 (as read):
 21 "Also, we KNOW that developers on
 22 our platform are running social
 23 media integrations that are
 24 inherently unsafe. We can do things
 25 in our ecosystem to help that. For
 00349:01 example 'ask to chat' is a feature
 02 we could require developers to adopt
 03 and use for U13 accounts."
 04 Do you see that?
 05 A Yes.
 06 Q Herve responded (as read):
 07 "There are also lots of rapidly

08 changing trends in public focus,"
09 correct?
10 A Yes.
11 Q And you responded (as read):
12 "Let the parents make a decision,"
13 correct?
14 A Yes.



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Deposition Designation of Ron Okamoto (Vol. 1 & 2)
(December 16, 2020)
(December 17, 2020)

Time

Epic Games, Inc.'s Designations (Blue Highlight)	Apple Inc.'s Designations (Yellow Highlight)
11 minutes 19 seconds	N/A

Okamoto, Ron (Vol. 01) - December 16, 2020

1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:00:28.367)

4 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:00:28.367)

1. PAGE 16:05 TO 16:07 (RUNNING 00:00:06.374)

05 Would you please state just for the record
06 your name and address?
07 A. Ron Okamoto.

2. PAGE 44:12 TO 44:15 (RUNNING 00:00:13.648)

12 Q. Okay. So from 2001 to date, your title
13 would be vice-president developer relations, correct?
14 A. I believe the formal title is vice president
15 worldwide developer relations.

3. PAGE 64:03 TO 64:05 (RUNNING 00:00:06.812)

03 Q. And is it correct that the app reviewers
04 typically review in each review, 15 to 100 apps per
05 day?

4. PAGE 64:07 TO 64:07 (RUNNING 00:00:01.533)

07 THE WITNESS: In general, yes.

Okamoto, Ron (Vol. 02) - December 17, 2020**1 CLIP (RUNNING 00:10:57.740)****34 SEGMENTS (RUNNING 00:10:57.740)****1. PAGE 273:15 TO 273:18 (RUNNING 00:00:11.834)**

15 Q. Okay. And Apple doesn't think its unsafe to
 16 use a Mac, does it?
 17 A. No. We don't think it's unsafe to use a
 18 Mac.

2. PAGE 274:02 TO 274:04 (RUNNING 00:00:08.139)

02 Q. Okay. So it's fair to say that using a Mac
 03 is not insecure, right?
 04 A. Yes, I believe so.

3. PAGE 277:19 TO 277:22 (RUNNING 00:00:13.416)

19 Have you ever heard of a developer
 20 withdrawing their app from the App Store because they
 21 can create a web app?
 22 A. No, I can't name anything in specific.

4. PAGE 279:07 TO 279:09 (RUNNING 00:00:13.918)

07 Q. Have you ever heard anybody at Apple say
 08 that the macOS is a less secure platform than iOS?
 09 A. No, I haven't.

5. PAGE 289:19 TO 289:21 (RUNNING 00:00:07.908)

19 Q. So I'd like actually to mark an exhibit
 20 which I believe will be 41. I'll tell you when I've
 21 done so.

6. PAGE 291:12 TO 291:14 (RUNNING 00:00:07.149)

12 Q. Okay. Do you have any reason to doubt that
 13 you received this e-mail?
 14 A. No, I do not.

7. PAGE 291:15 TO 291:19 (RUNNING 00:00:11.498)

15 Q. Okay. You see the first paragraph of this
 16 e-mail says (as read):
 17 Attached is a study we conducted
 18 on App Store developers?
 19 A. Yes.

8. PAGE 295:01 TO 295:06 (RUNNING 00:00:13.352)

00295:01 Developers were randomly selected
 02 from the App Store Analytics team's
 03 database and invited to participate
 04 in a 15-minute web survey.
 05 Do you see that?
 06 A. Yes.

9. PAGE 305:21 TO 305:22 (RUNNING 00:00:07.759)

21 Q. If you would please navigate with me to page
 22 Bates ending in -- sorry, Bates ending in 55.

10. PAGE 306:12 TO 306:23 (RUNNING 00:00:24.163)

12 Q. And do you see the bottom left there's a
 13 small gray text that says (as read):
 14 Base: Develops apps for
 15 non-Apple OS and platforms?
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. And the question is (as read):
 19 What other operating systems and
 20 platforms does your company develop
 21 apps for?
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A. Yes, I do.

11. PAGE 307:21 TO 308:02 (RUNNING 00:00:28.903)

21 And in the U.S. column it says: 86 percent.
 22 Is it consistent with your understanding that a lot
 23 of iOS developers also program apps for Android?
 24 A. I would say it's consistent with my
 25 understanding that many do.
 00308:01 Q. Okay. And why do many developers program
 02 for both iOS and Android?

12. PAGE 308:04 TO 308:21 (RUNNING 00:00:54.997)

04 THE WITNESS: Because by being on both iOS
 05 and Android a developer can get to the broadest
 06 customer set possible.
 07 BY MR. BYARS:
 08 Q. And when you say "customer set," are you
 09 referring to the users of devices running those
 10 operating systems?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. If you would look at the row near the
 13 bottom, it says: Game consoles.
 14 Do you see that?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And it says: 3 percent. Do you see that
 17 under the U.S. column?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Is it consistent with your understanding to
 20 say that most Apple developers do not program for
 21 game consoles?

13. PAGE 308:23 TO 308:24 (RUNNING 00:00:04.744)

23 THE WITNESS: In my dealings with developers
 24 I've run across very few that do.

14. PAGE 309:15 TO 310:03 (RUNNING 00:00:43.148)

15 Q. So, Mr. Okamoto, I'd like you to navigate to
 16 Exhibit 42, which I've marked. It's a document, the
 17 Bates stamp on the first page is -- ends in 320915.
 18 Let me know when you have that exhibit
 19 pulled up.
 20 A. Yes, I have it.
 21 Q. AND there's an e-mail starting in the middle
 22 of the page, says (as read):
 23 Eshwar Vangala wrote.
 24 Do you see that?
 25 A. Yes.
 00310:01 Q. Mr. Vangala is one of the direct reports
 02 that we were talking about earlier, right?
 03 A. That's correct.

15. PAGE 311:23 TO 312:09 (RUNNING 00:00:32.112)

23 Q. And he says (as read):
24 Many developers claim to "test
25 market" on Android as they feel they
00312:01 can build a buzz for their app on
02 Android and then monetize on iOS.
03 Do you see that?
04 A. Yes, I do.
05 Q. Have you heard developers indicate that they
06 would publish on Android first before publishing on
07 iOS?
08 A. There's been occasions where developers have
09 mentioned that to me.

16. PAGE 312:16 TO 312:18 (RUNNING 00:00:05.355)

16 Q. Why would they choose to prototype on
17 Android rather than another operating system such as
18 iOS?

17. PAGE 312:20 TO 312:25 (RUNNING 00:00:19.888)

20 THE WITNESS: It depended on the developer.
21 I think in some cases, you know, they had said that
22 it was easier and quicker for them to do it. And
23 other cases they wanted to try things out on the
24 Android platform with respect to the technology and
25 then see if that works and then put it into iOS.

18. PAGE 320:04 TO 320:10 (RUNNING 00:00:22.552)

04 Let's look at the next to last bullet. The
05 penultimate bullet, it says (as read):
06 iOS consistently is the
07 monetization platform of choice.
08 Have you heard from developers that iOS is
09 the monetization platform of choice?
10 A. Yes, I have.

19. PAGE 320:14 TO 320:22 (RUNNING 00:00:28.508)

14 Q. Did they explain why they viewed iOS that
15 way?
16 A. Yes, they did.
17 Q. What did they explain?
18 A. They explained when they took a look at a
19 title, the similar title that was on Android and that
20 was on iOS in general, users spent more money on the
21 iOS application than they did on the Android
22 application.

20. PAGE 324:04 TO 324:13 (RUNNING 00:00:45.186)

04 Q. Has Apple ever wanted Epic to create
05 products for the iOS platform?
06 A. Yes.
07 Q. Why did Apple want Epic Games to do that?
08 A. Because when the iOS platform first came
09 out, one of the things that we highlighted was what a
10 great gaming device the iPhone with iOS was. Epic is
11 a very well-known developer that had some very strong
12 titles on it and we thought it would be great if they
13 would offer them on the iOS platform.

21. PAGE 324:20 TO 325:01 (RUNNING 00:00:23.884)

20 Q. And is that because doing so would attract
21 users to the iOS platform?
22 A. Yes. If the popular games they're playing
23 from developers and titles that they love were on

24 iOS, we think it would be attractive for our users.
 25 Q. And if you made it attractive for users, you
 00325:01 would sell more iOS devices, right?

22. PAGE 325:03 TO 325:06 (RUNNING 00:00:08.807)

03 THE WITNESS: If we made it attractive to
 04 users, we would definitely make the platform more
 05 attractive to everybody, and therefore, hope that
 06 they would come to it.

23. PAGE 325:08 TO 325:10 (RUNNING 00:00:06.326)

08 Q. By "come to it," you mean buy devices, buy
 09 iOS devices?
 10 A. Yes.

24. PAGE 349:02 TO 349:03 (RUNNING 00:00:03.712)

02 Q. Okay. So I'm looking at Exhibit 46. Can
 03 you pull that up for me.

25. PAGE 349:08 TO 349:10 (RUNNING 00:00:13.088)

08 Q. Is this an e-mail chain between you and
 09 Phillip Schiller and Eddie Cue?
 10 A. Yes.

26. PAGE 349:14 TO 349:23 (RUNNING 00:00:26.956)

14 Q. It begins (as read):
 15 Phil and Eddy,
 16 I spoke to Eric Wilfred today
 17 about this week's internal meeting
 18 for the next office launch.
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Who is Eric Wilfred?
 22 A. At the time Eric Wilfred was one of our
 23 contacts at Microsoft.

27. PAGE 350:16 TO 351:04 (RUNNING 00:00:48.839)

16 Q. All right. If you would look at the third
 17 bullet or the third dash, there's a paragraph that
 18 says (as read):
 19 They want us to think about an
 20 idea they have to handle signing up
 21 for subscriptions for Office from
 22 within their iOS app.
 23 Do you see that?
 24 A. I'm sorry, you said the third bullet or the
 25 third --
 00351:01 Q. It's the third large paragraph, the third
 02 bullet, the third hyphen, they want us to think
 03 about.
 04 A. Okay, I see it.

28. PAGE 351:12 TO 351:20 (RUNNING 00:00:15.449)

12 Q. Okay. The paragraph says (as read):
 13 Instead of using IAP --
 14 I'm reading the second sentence now
 15 (as read):
 16 Instead of using IAP, they would
 17 like to send users out to their
 18 "sign-up for Office website."
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. Yes.

29. PAGE 352:02 TO 352:08 (RUNNING 00:00:12.195)

02 Q. It continues (as read):
 03 They would then give us
 04 percentage of the revenue for each
 05 user that signs up for an account
 06 that comes from our devices.
 07 Do you see that?
 08 A. Yes, I do.

30. PAGE 352:18 TO 352:24 (RUNNING 00:00:16.334)

18 Q. (As read):
 19 The rationale is that they want
 20 to be able to have a consistent
 21 experience for signing up users.
 22 I'm in the next paragraph.
 23 Do you see that?
 24 A. Yes, I do.

31. PAGE 353:07 TO 353:15 (RUNNING 00:00:31.153)

07 Q. Okay. Have you ever heard any developer say
 08 they wanted to have a consistent experience for
 09 signing up users?
 10 A. Yes, I have.
 11 Q. Why -- had the developers explained why they
 12 want that?
 13 A. The developers that I have spoken to said
 14 that they have existing what they call sign up flows,
 15 and they wanted to maintain those sign up flows.

32. PAGE 358:18 TO 358:19 (RUNNING 00:00:04.503)

18 A. Mr. Byars, are we opening Exhibit 47?
 19 Q. Yes, that's right.

33. PAGE 358:24 TO 359:01 (RUNNING 00:00:09.381)

24 The first e-mail at the top of the document
 25 is from you; is that right?
 00359:01 A. Yes, it is.

34. PAGE 359:21 TO 360:09 (RUNNING 00:00:32.584)

21 Q. In that third paragraph Mr. Schiller says
 22 (as read):
 23 If PayPal were to announce a
 24 mechanism for iPhone developers that
 25 helps them to enable features or
 00360:01 functionality of iPhone applications
 02 with payments handled by PayPal, we
 03 would need to communicate with our
 04 developers, telling them that such
 05 use would be a violation of the
 06 iPhone developer agreement terms. I
 07 hope that does not become the case.
 08 You see that?
 09 A. Yes, I do.

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Transcription Errors

DATE OF DEPOSITION: February 24, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Ong, Adrian

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
74	9	“internet”	“in-app”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: January 12, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Shoemaker, Phillip (Vol. 1)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
73	24	“impromptu”	“imprimatur”	Transcription Error
74	3	“impromptu”	“imprimatur”	Transcription Error
134	17	“2006”	“2016”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: January 14, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Shoemaker, Phillip (Vol. 2)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
488	6	“siloing”	“sideloading”	Transcription Error
488	10	“siloing”	“sideloading”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: March 8, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Forstall, Scott (Vol. 1)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
41	7	“nominal”	“phenomenal”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: January 13, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Haun, CK (Vol. 1)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
185	1	“Max”	“Mac”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: February 1, 2021

NAME OF DEPONENT: Friedman, Eric (Vol. 1)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
50	11	“Infra-system”	“Eco-system”	Transcription Error

DATE OF DEPOSITION: December 16, 2020

NAME OF DEPONENT: Okamoto, Ron (Vol. 1)

Page	Line(s)	Original	Correction	Comment
64	4	“15”	“50”	Transcription Error